constitutional speedy trial claim in New York

2024We note that we do not include among the relevant factors either the nature of the underlying charge, which is recognized as a factor in the analogous context of a constitutional speedy trial claim ( see People v Taranovich , 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]), or the offender's risk of reoffense, as indicated by his adjudicated risk level, which defendant urges us to consider.

2024(We note, in this regard, that while defendant was ultimately adjudicated a level one offender, the charges against him included rape in the first degree, and he admitted to conduct constituting that crime at his plea hearing.) As to the nature of the underlying crime, Taranovich teaches that this is a relevant factor in the context of a constitutional speedy trial claim because "[u]pon such a serious charge, the District Attorney may be expected to proceed with far more caution and deliberation than he would expend on a relatively minor offense" ( id. at 446 ).

2025These include a constitutional speedy trial claim, a challenge to the legality of a sentence, a claim that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, and an assertion that a plea is not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent ( see Thomas , 34 NY3d at 558-559; People v Callahan , 80 NY2d 273, 280 [1992]).

2014The defendant’s valid waiver of his right to appeal does not foreclose appellate review of his constitutional speedy trial claim (see People v Romeo, 47 AD3d 954 , 957 [2008], affd 12 NY3d 51 [2009]). “[A] bargained-for waiver of the right to appeal is ineffective to the extent it impairs the defendant’s ability to obtain appellate review of a constitutional speedy trial claim” (People v Alexander, 19 NY3d 203, 218 [2012]; see People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273, 282 [1992]; *1052 People v Blakley, 34 NY2d at 314 ).

2020These factors lean decidedly against a finding of a constitutional speedy trial violation ( see People v Romeo , 12 NY3d 51, 55 [2009]; People v Taranovich , 37 NY2d 442 [1975]).

2015In reviewing an alleged constitutional speedy trial violation, we must consider five factors: “(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charges; (4) any extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) any impairment of defendant’s defense” (People v Romeo, 12 NY3d 51, 55 [2009], cert denied 558 US 817 [2009]; see People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]; People v Irvis, 90 AD3d 1302, 1303 [2011], lv denied 19 NY3d 962 [2012]).

2013However, the defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim survives both the entry of his plea of guilty and the valid waiver of his right to appeal (see People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227, 230-231 [2000]).

2013However, the defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim survives both the entry of his plea of guilty and the valid waiver of his right to appeal (see People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227, 230-231 [2000]).

2017In People v Blakley ( 34 NY2d 311, 314 [1974]) the Court of Appeals held that a constitutional speedy trial claim survives a plea of guilty, while in Matter of Rush v Mordue, the Court stated that prohibition does not lie where the claim is that the right to a speedy trial has been denied (see Matter of Rush v Mordue, 68 NY2d at 354 ). *779 The Court of Appeals has held that a claim of selective prosecution does not survive the entry of a plea of guilty (see People v Parilla, 8 NY3d at 659 ; People v Rodriguez, 55 NY2d 776 [1981]).

2014In that case, the Court held that conditioning a plea on a waiver of a constitutional speedy trial claim is “inherently coercive” (People v Blakley, 34 NY2d at 313 ).

2011Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s contention included a constitutional speedy trial claim, we conclude that such a claim may be voluntarily surrendered or abandoned (see People v Rodriguez, 50 NY2d 553, 557 ; People v Denis, 276 AD2d 237, 247 , lv denied 96 NY2d 782 , 861), and the record demonstrates that defendant withdrew his speedy trial motion before pleading guilty.

2011Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s contention included a constitutional speedy trial claim, we conclude that such a claim may be voluntarily surrendered or abandoned (see People v Rodriguez, 50 NY2d 553, 557 [1980]; People v Denis, 276 AD2d 237, 247 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 782 , 861 [2001]), and the record demonstrates that defendant withdrew his speedy trial motion before pleading guilty.

2025One example we gave in Seaberg was a constitutional speedy trial claim (74 NY2d at 9).

2025One example we gave in Seaberg was a constitutional speedy trial claim ( 74 NY2d at 9 ).

2019Here, although, as noted, defense counsel made a speedy trial claim, we conclude that there was no strategic or legitimate explanation for defense counsel's failure to alert the court that it had inaccurately calculated that only five months and seven days had passed between the commencement of the action and the People's statement of readiness and that, instead, more than six months had elapsed ( see generally People v Pavone , 26 NY3d 629, 646-647 [2015]; People v Caban , 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]).

2011Counsel had no obligation to present or support patently meritless motions (see People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]).

2014The narrow mode of proceedings exception speaks to fundamental flaws that implicate “rights of a constitutional dimension that go to the very heart of the process” (People v Hanley, 20 NY3d at 604 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 650-651 [2011]).

2014The narrow mode of proceedings exception speaks to fundamental flaws that implicate “rights of a constitutional dimension that go to the very heart of the process” (People v Hanley, 20 NY3d at 604 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 650-651 [2011]).

2014In reviewing a claim of a constitutional speedy trial violation, “[t]he five factors to be considered are: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charges; (4) any extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) any impairment of defendant’s defense” (People v Romeo, 12 NY3d 51, 55 [2009], cert denied 558 US 817 [2009]; see People v Anderson, 114 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2014], lv denied 22 NY3d 1196 [2014]).

2014In reviewing a claim of a constitutional speedy trial violation, “[t]he five factors to be considered are: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charges; (4) any extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) any impairment of defendant’s defense” (People v Romeo, 12 NY3d 51, 55 [2009], cert denied 558 US 817 [2009]; see People v Anderson, 114 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2014], lv denied 22 NY3d 1196 [2014]).

2014The narrow mode of proceedings exception speaks to fundamental flaws that implicate “rights of a constitutional dimension that go to the very heart of the process” (People v Hanley, 20 NY3d at 604 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 650-651 [2011]).

2014The narrow mode of proceedings exception speaks to fundamental flaws that implicate “rights of a constitutional dimension that go to the very heart of the process” (People v Hanley, 20 NY3d at 604 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 650-651 [2011]).

2014In reviewing a claim of a constitutional speedy trial violation, “[t]he five factors to be considered are: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charges; (4) any extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) any impairment of defendant’s defense” (People v Romeo, 12 NY3d 51, 55 [2009], cert denied 558 US 817 [2009]; see People v Anderson, 114 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2014], lv denied 22 NY3d 1196 [2014]).

2014In reviewing a claim of a constitutional speedy trial violation, “[t]he five factors to be considered are: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charges; (4) any extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) any impairment of defendant’s defense” (People v Romeo, 12 NY3d 51, 55 [2009], cert denied 558 US 817 [2009]; see People v Anderson, 114 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2014], lv denied 22 NY3d 1196 [2014]).

2013By waiving his right to appeal, the defendant gave up the right to challenge the adequacy of defense counsel’s representation, except insofar as counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness affected the voluntariness of the defendant’s plea (see People v Williams, 84 AD3d 1417, 1418 [2011]).

2013By waiving his right to appeal, the defendant gave up the right to challenge the adequacy of defense counsel’s representation, except insofar as counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness affected the voluntariness of the defendant’s plea (see People v Williams, 84 AD3d 1417, 1418 [2011]).

1985“This court has set forth five factors for evaluating a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason(s) for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether the defense may have been impaired by reason of the delay (see People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 ; see, also, People v Perez, 42 NY2d 971 ; People v Staley, supra; People v Imbesi, 38 NY2d 629 ; People v Johnson, supra).” Upon examining the five factors listed in Watts , the court finds that the defe

1982This court has set forth five factors for evaluating a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason(s) for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether the defense may have been impaired by reason of the delay (see People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 ; see, also, People v Perez, 42 NY2d 971 ; People v Staley, supra; People v Imbesi, 38 NY2d 629 ; People v Johnson, supra).

1992There being no proof that the waiver of the constitutional speedy trial claim was coerced (cf., People v Blakely, 34 NY2d 311, 315 ), the defendant’s waiver should be enforced (see, People v Rodriguez, 50 NY2d 553, 557 ; see also, People v Sutton, 175 AD2d 272 ; People v Baldwin, 162 AD2d 603 ; People v Gooden, 151 AD2d 773, 884 ; People v Harris, 103 AD2d 891 ; People v Galante, 91 AD2d 690 ).

1991The Court of Appeals and this court have both recognized the waivability of a constitutional speedy trial claim (see, People v Rodriguez, 50 NY2d 553, 557 ; People v Baldwin, 162 AD2d 603 ; People v Gooden, 151 AD2d 773 ; People v Galante, 91 AD2d 690 ; see also, People v Harris, 103 AD2d 891 ).

2011Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s contention included a constitutional speedy trial claim, we conclude that such a claim may be voluntarily surrendered or abandoned (see People v Rodriguez, 50 NY2d 553, 557 ; People v Denis, 276 AD2d 237, 247 , lv denied 96 NY2d 782 , 861), and the record demonstrates that defendant withdrew his speedy trial motion before pleading guilty.

2011Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s contention included a constitutional speedy trial claim, we conclude that such a claim may be voluntarily surrendered or abandoned (see People v Rodriguez, 50 NY2d 553, 557 [1980]; People v Denis, 276 AD2d 237, 247 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 782 , 861 [2001]), and the record demonstrates that defendant withdrew his speedy trial motion before pleading guilty.

1992There being no proof that the waiver of the constitutional speedy trial claim was coerced (cf., People v Blakely, 34 NY2d 311, 315 ), the defendant’s waiver should be enforced (see, People v Rodriguez, 50 NY2d 553, 557 ; see also, People v Sutton, 175 AD2d 272 ; People v Baldwin, 162 AD2d 603 ; People v Gooden, 151 AD2d 773, 884 ; People v Harris, 103 AD2d 891 ; People v Galante, 91 AD2d 690 ).

1991The Court of Appeals and this court have both recognized the waivability of a constitutional speedy trial claim (see, People v Rodriguez, 50 NY2d 553, 557 ; People v Baldwin, 162 AD2d 603 ; People v Gooden, 151 AD2d 773 ; People v Galante, 91 AD2d 690 ; see also, People v Harris, 103 AD2d 891 ).

2014Moreover, contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim was properly preserved for appellate review (see People v Watts, 78 AD2d 1008, 1009 [1980]; cf. People v Cedeno, 52 NY2d 847, 848 [1981]; People v Lieberman, 47 NY2d 931, 932 [1979]).

2000Memorandum: Although a constitutional speedy trial claim is not waived by a guilty plea (see, People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273, 282 ), defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds only (see, CPL 30.30) and thus failed to preserve for our review his present contention that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial (see, People v Lieberman, 47 NY2d 931, 932 ; People v James, 188 AD2d 296 ).