Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
12 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2026Even though Campbell makes a conclusory claim of a constitutional speedy trial error in his brief, he fails to explain how his constitutional right 5 to a speedy trial was violated or cite to any of the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L. 2026Even though Campbell makes a conclusory claim of a constitutional speedy trial error in his brief, he fails to explain how his constitutional right 5 to a speedy trial was violated or cite to any of the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Owensgreen2 sentences2026A court considers four factors when a defendant makes a constitutional speedy trial claim: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 ; see State v. Owens, 310 Kan. 865 , 869, 451 P.3d 467 (2019). 2026A court considers four factors when a defendant makes a constitutional speedy trial claim: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 ; see State v. Owens, 310 Kan. 865 , 869, 451 P.3d 467 (2019). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gillgreen1 sentence2024See Gill, 48 Kan. App. 2d at 113 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dupreegreen2 sentences2022See State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 43, 48 , 371 P.3d 862 (2016). 2022See State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 43, 48 , 371 P.3d 862 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Arnettgreen2 sentences2022See State v. Arnett, 5 307 Kan. 648, 650 , 413 P.3d 787 (2018) (issue not briefed deemed waived or abandoned). 2022See State v. Arnett, 5 307 Kan. 648, 650 , 413 P.3d 787 (2018) (issue not briefed deemed waived or abandoned). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1083-84 , 319 P.3d 528 (2014) (issues not argued or briefed are abandoned). 2016See State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1083-84 , 319 P.3d 528 (2014) (issues not argued or briefed are abandoned). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ghailanigreen1 sentence2016See United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29 , 30 44 (2d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that although other panels in the Second Circuit had previously used an abuse of discretion standard, "a district court is in no better position than a reviewing court to undertake the required balancing"); People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51-52 , 743 N.E.2d 555 (2001) (reasoning that because the trial court is in no better position than the reviewing court to apply the Barker factors, appellate courts should review a defendant's constitutional speedy trial challenge de novo); see also Hurst v. State, 195 So. 3d 736 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Friberggreen1 sentence2016App. 2001) ("We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and properly evaluated the four factors enumerated in [Barker] to determine whether a constitutional speedy trial violation had occurred."); State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 526 , 705 S.E.2d 636 (2011) ("The trial court's weighing of each factor and its balancing of all four factors—its ultimate judgment—are reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion."); State v. Pierre, 146 So. 3d 681, 684-85 (La. 2014) (reviewing the district court's application of the Barker factors for an abuse of discretion); State v. Friberg, 435 N. | 1 | 1 |
Joshua Hurst v. State of Mississippigreen1 sentence2016See United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29 , 30 44 (2d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that although other panels in the Second Circuit had previously used an abuse of discretion standard, "a district court is in no better position than a reviewing court to undertake the required balancing"); People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51-52 , 743 N.E.2d 555 (2001) (reasoning that because the trial court is in no better position than the reviewing court to apply the Barker factors, appellate courts should review a defendant's constitutional speedy trial challenge de novo); see also Hurst v. State, 195 So. 3d 736 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pierregreen1 sentence2016App. 2001) ("We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and properly evaluated the four factors enumerated in [Barker] to determine whether a constitutional speedy trial violation had occurred."); State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 526 , 705 S.E.2d 636 (2011) ("The trial court's weighing of each factor and its balancing of all four factors—its ultimate judgment—are reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion."); State v. Pierre, 146 So. 3d 681, 684-85 (La. 2014) (reviewing the district court's application of the Barker factors for an abuse of discretion); State v. Friberg, 435 N. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Warrengreen2 sentences2012See State v. Warren, 224 Kan. 454, 457 , 580 P.2d 1336 (1978) (The purpose of K.S.A. 22-3402 is to implement and define the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial.). 2012See State v. Warren, 224 Kan. 454, 457 , 580 P.2d 1336 (1978) (The purpose of K.S.A. 22-3402 is to implement and define the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial.). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. McDonald
green
2 sentences2024State v. McDonald, 62 Kan. App. 2d 59, 70 , 506 P.3d 930 (2022). 2024State v. McDonald, 62 Kan. App. 2d 59, 70 , 506 P.3d 930 (2022). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Crane
green
2 sentences2016See United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29 , 30 44 (2d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that although other panels in the Second Circuit had previously used an abuse of discretion standard, "a district court is in no better position than a reviewing court to undertake the required balancing"); People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51-52 , 743 N.E.2d 555 (2001) (reasoning that because the trial court is in no better position than the reviewing court to apply the Barker factors, appellate courts should review a defendant's constitutional speedy trial challenge de novo); see also Hurst v. State, 195 So. 3d 736 2016See United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29 , 30 44 (2d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that although other panels in the Second Circuit had previously used an abuse of discretion standard, "a district court is in no better position than a reviewing court to undertake the required balancing"); People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51-52 , 743 N.E.2d 555 (2001) (reasoning that because the trial court is in no better position than the reviewing court to apply the Barker factors, appellate courts should review a defendant's constitutional speedy trial challenge de novo); see also Hurst v. State, 195 So. 3d 736 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Porter
green
2 sentences2016App. 2001) ("We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and properly evaluated the four factors enumerated in [Barker] to determine whether a constitutional speedy trial violation had occurred."); State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 526 , 705 S.E.2d 636 (2011) ("The trial court's weighing of each factor and its balancing of all four factors—its ultimate judgment—are reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion."); State v. Pierre, 146 So. 3d 681, 684-85 (La. 2014) (reviewing the district court's application of the Barker factors for an abuse of discretion); State v. Friberg, 435 N. 2016App. 2001) ("We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and properly evaluated the four factors enumerated in [Barker] to determine whether a constitutional speedy trial violation had occurred."); State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 526 , 705 S.E.2d 636 (2011) ("The trial court's weighing of each factor and its balancing of all four factors—its ultimate judgment—are reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion."); State v. Pierre, 146 So. 3d 681, 684-85 (La. 2014) (reviewing the district court's application of the Barker factors for an abuse of discretion); State v. Friberg, 435 N. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Selvage
green
2 sentences2016App. 2001) ("We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and properly evaluated the four factors enumerated in [Barker] to determine whether a constitutional speedy trial violation had occurred."); State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 526 , 705 S.E.2d 636 (2011) ("The trial court's weighing of each factor and its balancing of all four factors—its ultimate judgment—are reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion."); State v. Pierre, 146 So. 3d 681, 684-85 (La. 2014) (reviewing the district court's application of the Barker factors for an abuse of discretion); State v. Friberg, 435 N. 2016App. 2001) ("We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and properly evaluated the four factors enumerated in [Barker] to determine whether a constitutional speedy trial violation had occurred."); State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 526 , 705 S.E.2d 636 (2011) ("The trial court's weighing of each factor and its balancing of all four factors—its ultimate judgment—are reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion."); State v. Pierre, 146 So. 3d 681, 684-85 (La. 2014) (reviewing the district court's application of the Barker factors for an abuse of discretion); State v. Friberg, 435 N. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Sherman
green
1 sentence2007Sherman involved a delay resulting from the defendant’s requests for continuances and failure to appear. 217 Kan. at 329 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Fitch
green
1 sentence2007Fitch involved a constitutional speedy trial analysis rather than a statutory speedy trial analysis. 249 Kan. at 563 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Goss
green
1 sentence2004Goss determined that “a little over a year” between arrest and trial is not presumptively prejudicial under a constitutional speedy-trial analysis. 245 Kan. at 193 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.