5 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 2006–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bowen ex rel. Doe v. Arnoldgreen2 sentences2026See id. at 108, 115 . 2025“Almost from its inception, however, the mutuality requirement was sharply criticized by both judges and scholars because it allowed a party to relitigate an issue against another defendant even though that same party had already once litigated and lost on the issue.” Id. (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labys., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shoregreen2 sentences2025“Almost from its inception, however, the mutuality requirement was sharply criticized by both judges and scholars because it allowed a party to relitigate an issue against another defendant even though that same party had already once litigated and lost on the issue.” Id. (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labys., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. 2025After this decision and others by the California Supreme Court, “[m]any state and federal courts rejected the mutuality requirement, especially where the prior judgment was invoked defensively in a second action against a plaintiff bringing suit on an issue he litigated and lost as plaintiff in a prior action.” Id. at 109 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labys., Inc., 402 U.S. at 324 ). 11 The United States Supreme Court eliminated the mutuality requirement first for defensive collateral estoppel, id. (citing Blonder-Tongue Labys., Inc., 402 U.S. at 350 ), and then for offensive collateral estoppel in | 1 | 1 |
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundationgreen2 sentences2025After this decision and others by the California Supreme Court, “[m]any state and federal courts rejected the mutuality requirement, especially where the prior judgment was invoked defensively in a second action against a plaintiff bringing suit on an issue he litigated and lost as plaintiff in a prior action.” Id. at 109 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labys., Inc., 402 U.S. at 324 ). 11 The United States Supreme Court eliminated the mutuality requirement first for defensive collateral estoppel, id. (citing Blonder-Tongue Labys., Inc., 402 U.S. at 350 ), and then for offensive collateral estoppel in 2025After this decision and others by the California Supreme Court, “[m]any state and federal courts rejected the mutuality requirement, especially where the prior judgment was invoked defensively in a second action against a plaintiff bringing suit on an issue he litigated and lost as plaintiff in a prior action.” Id. at 109 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labys., Inc., 402 U.S. at 324 ). 11 The United States Supreme Court eliminated the mutuality requirement first for defensive collateral estoppel, id. (citing Blonder-Tongue Labys., Inc., 402 U.S. at 350 ), and then for offensive collateral estoppel in | 1 | 1 |
Auton's Fine Jewelry & Bridal Center, Inc. v. Beckner's, Inc.green1 sentence2020Mutuality of debts requires “that the demands be . . . subsisting between the same parties and that the demands be of the same grade and nature or be due in the same capacity or right.” Auton’s Fine Jewelry & Bridal Ctr., Inc. v. Beckner’s, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Edington v. Pickle, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 122 , 124 (1853)); see Huggins v. McKee, 403 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). 5 Because the mutuality requirement is unsatisfied here, Mr. Reynolds was not entitled to a set-off. | 1 | 1 |
Delwin L. Huggins, John P. Konvalinka v. R. Ellsworth McKeegreen1 sentence2020Mutuality of debts requires “that the demands be . . . subsisting between the same parties and that the demands be of the same grade and nature or be due in the same capacity or right.” Auton’s Fine Jewelry & Bridal Ctr., Inc. v. Beckner’s, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Edington v. Pickle, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 122 , 124 (1853)); see Huggins v. McKee, 403 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). 5 Because the mutuality requirement is unsatisfied here, Mr. Reynolds was not entitled to a set-off. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Trinity Industries, Inc. v. McKinnon Bridge Co.
green
2 sentences2025Defensive collateral estoppel—like the case before us— involves “a defendant seeking to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating an issue that the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost,” while “[o]ffensive collateral estoppel refers to a plaintiff attempting to prevent a defendant from relitigating an issue that the defendant has previously litigated and lost.” Id. at 107–08. 10 As early as 1942, “the California Supreme Court unanimously rejected [the strict mutuality requirement], finding ‘no compelling reason’ for requiring a party asserting collateral estoppel to ‘have been a party, or i 2025Defensive collateral estoppel—like the case before us— involves “a defendant seeking to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating an issue that the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost,” while “[o]ffensive collateral estoppel refers to a plaintiff attempting to prevent a defendant from relitigating an issue that the defendant has previously litigated and lost.” Id. at 107–08. 10 As early as 1942, “the California Supreme Court unanimously rejected [the strict mutuality requirement], finding ‘no compelling reason’ for requiring a party asserting collateral estoppel to ‘have been a party, or i | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Saving Association
green
2 sentences2025After this decision and others by the California Supreme Court, “[m]any state and federal courts rejected the mutuality requirement, especially where the prior judgment was invoked defensively in a second action against a plaintiff bringing suit on an issue he litigated and lost as plaintiff in a prior action.” Id. at 109 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labys., Inc., 402 U.S. at 324 ). 11 The United States Supreme Court eliminated the mutuality requirement first for defensive collateral estoppel, id. (citing Blonder-Tongue Labys., Inc., 402 U.S. at 350 ), and then for offensive collateral estoppel in 2025We could no longer discern any “‘compelling reason’ to maintain the mutuality requirement” and adopted the approach of section 29 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments,12 which generally focuses on whether “the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or some other circumstance justifies affording that party an opportunity to relitigate the issue.” Id. at 115–16 (quoting Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 894 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Edington v. Pickle
neutral
1 sentence2020Mutuality of debts requires “that the demands be . . . subsisting between the same parties and that the demands be of the same grade and nature or be due in the same capacity or right.” Auton’s Fine Jewelry & Bridal Ctr., Inc. v. Beckner’s, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Edington v. Pickle, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 122 , 124 (1853)); see Huggins v. McKee, 403 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). 5 Because the mutuality requirement is unsatisfied here, Mr. Reynolds was not entitled to a set-off. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State Ex Rel. Cihlar v. Crawford
green
1 sentence2012Crawford, 39 S.W.3d at 180 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Town of McMinnville v. Rhea
green
2 sentences2006In McMinnville v. Rhea, 44 Tenn.App. 612 , 316 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn.Ct.App.1958), this Court held that the purchaser of property was entitled to reformation of its deed where evidence established that the deed failed to include all the land the defendant/grantors agreed to convey and the plaintiff/grantees agreed to purchase. 2006In McMinnville v. Rhea, 44 Tenn.App. 612 , 316 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn.Ct.App.1958), this Court held that the purchaser of property was entitled to reformation of its deed where evidence established that the deed failed to include all the land the defendant/grantors agreed to convey and the plaintiff/grantees agreed to purchase. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.