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44 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1943–2026 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Howell v. Vito's Trucking and Excavating Co.green2 sentences2004But we need not sacrifice a well-established and valuable rule to achieve this balance. * * * In point of fact, the abandonment of the mutuality doctrine would in many instances create more pitfalls to orderly and efficient administration of justice. [ Id. at 48-49 , 191 N.W.2d 313 .] Howell involved a case of offensive collateral estoppel, but it is evident that the Court was basing its commitment to the mutuality requirement on larger policy concerns. 2004But we need not sacrifice a well-established and valuable rule to achieve this balance. * * * In point of fact, the abandonment of the mutuality doctrine would in many instances create more pitfalls to orderly and efficient administration of justice. [ Id. at 48-49 , 191 N.W.2d 313 .] Howell involved a case of offensive collateral estoppel, but it is evident that the Court was basing its commitment to the mutuality requirement on larger policy concerns. | 7 | 9 |
Monat v. State Farm Insurancegreen2 sentences2019See Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 691-692 ; 677 NW2d 843 (2004) (noting that the mutuality requirement need not be strictly followed when collateral estoppel is “asserted defensively” and that “a party is entitled to his day in court on a particular issue, and is not entitled to his day in court against a particular adversary.”); see also Everett, 319 Mich at 482-483 . -8- were litigated in a prior proceeding. 2019See Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 691-692 ; 677 NW2d 843 (2004) (noting that the mutuality requirement need not be strictly followed when collateral estoppel is “asserted defensively” and that “a party is entitled to his day in court on a particular issue, and is not entitled to his day in court against a particular adversary.”); see also Everett, 319 Mich at 482-483 . -8- were litigated in a prior proceeding. | 3 | 6 |
Braxton v. Litchalkgreen2 sentences1994Braxton v Litchalk, 55 Mich App 708 ; 223 NW2d 316 (1974); see also Lichon v American Universal Ins Co, 435 Mich 408, 428, n 16 ; 459 NW2d 288 (1990). 1994Braxton v Litchalk, 55 Mich App 708 ; 223 NW2d 316 (1974); see also Lichon v American Universal Ins Co, 435 Mich 408, 428, n 16 ; 459 NW2d 288 (1990). | 2 | 4 |
Lichon v. American Universal Insurancegreen2 sentences2004There are several well-established exceptions to the mutuality requirement, such as when an indemnitor seeks to assert in its defense a judgment in favor of its indemnitee, or where a master defends by asserting a judgment for a servant.” Lichon, supra at 428 n 16. 6 Although the circumstances of the instant case are distinct from those addressed in Lichon , we now expand the exceptions to the requirement of mutuality of estoppel to encompass these circumstances. 2004There are several well-established exceptions to the mutuality requirement, such as when an indemnitor seeks to assert in its defense a judgment in favor of its indemnitee, or where a master defends by asserting a judgment for a servant." Lichon, supra at 428 n. 16, 459 N.W.2d 288 . [6] Although the circumstances of the instant case are distinct from those addressed in Lichon , we now expand the exceptions to the requirement of mutuality of estoppel to encompass these circumstances. | 2 | 3 |
Kloian v. Domino's Pizza, LLCgreen2 sentences2026“The mutuality requirement is satisfied where a modification is established through clear and convincing evidence of a written agreement, oral agreement, or affirmative conduct establishing mutual agreement to waive the terms of the original contract.” Id. at 455 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2015Quality Prod & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 365 ; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). -4- “ ‘The mutuality requirement is satisfied where a modification is established through clear and convincing evidence of a written agreement, oral agreement, or affirmative conduct establishing mutual agreement to waive the terms of the original contract.’ ” Kloian, 273 Mich App at 454 (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Knoblauch v. Kenyongreen2 sentences1992However, the Supreme Court noted in Lichon that "[t]he Court of Appeals has recognized that [in addition to the well-established exceptions listed above] there may be other situations in which the mutuality requirement is relaxed.” Id. at 428, n 16 , citing Knoblauch v Kenyon, 163 Mich App 712 ; 415 NW2d 286 (1987). 1992However, the Supreme Court noted in Lichon that "[t]he Court of Appeals has recognized that [in addition to the well-established exceptions listed above] there may be other situations in which the mutuality requirement is relaxed.” Id. at 428, n 16 , citing Knoblauch v Kenyon, 163 Mich App 712 ; 415 NW2d 286 (1987). | 1 | 2 |
Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co.green2 sentences1989That exception was stated by the United States Supreme Court in Bigelow v Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co, 225 US 111, 127-128 ; 32 S Ct 641, 642 ; 56 L Ed 1009, 1021 (1912): An apparent exception to this rule of mutuality had been held to exist where the liability of the defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability of one exonerated in a prior suit, upon the same facts when sued by the same plaintiff. 1989That exception was stated by the United States Supreme Court in Bigelow v Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co, 225 US 111, 127-128 ; 32 S Ct 641, 642 ; 56 L Ed 1009, 1021 (1912): An apparent exception to this rule of mutuality had been held to exist where the liability of the defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability of one exonerated in a prior suit, upon the same facts when sued by the same plaintiff. | 1 | 2 |
Spettigue v. Mahoneygreen2 sentences1987The Howell Court articulated three reasons for its decision to reject nonmutual offensive estoppel in a civil to civil context: (1) in instances of several plaintiffs bringing successive actions against a single defendant, abandonment of the mutuality requirement would lead to "lopsided justice” in favor of the later plaintiffs, quoting Nevarov v Caldwell, 161 Cal App 2d 762; 327 P2d 111 (1958), (2) fear that abandonment would lead to increased litigation in order to avoid adverse judgment, and (3) the fact that "one contestant must be declared the loser to a competitor that he has never met,” 1987The Howell Court articulated three reasons for its decision to reject nonmutual offensive estoppel in a civil to civil context: (1) in instances of several plaintiffs bringing successive actions against a single defendant, abandonment of the mutuality requirement would lead to "lopsided justice” in favor of the later plaintiffs, quoting Nevarov v Caldwell, 161 Cal App 2d 762; 327 P2d 111 (1958), (2) fear that abandonment would lead to increased litigation in order to avoid adverse judgment, and (3) the fact that "one contestant must be declared the loser to a competitor that he has never met,” | 1 | 2 |
Everett v. Everettgreen2 sentences2019See Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 691-692 ; 677 NW2d 843 (2004) (noting that the mutuality requirement need not be strictly followed when collateral estoppel is “asserted defensively” and that “a party is entitled to his day in court on a particular issue, and is not entitled to his day in court against a particular adversary.”); see also Everett, 319 Mich at 482-483 . -8- were litigated in a prior proceeding. 2019See Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 691-692 ; 677 NW2d 843 (2004); see also Everett v Everett, 319 Mich 475 , 482- 483; 29 NW2d 919 (1947). | 1 | 1 |
Reid v. Bradstreet Co.green2 sentences2015Although a party can generally prove modification through evidence of an oral agreement or course of conduct, in cases involving the sale of real property, “[o]rdinarily, a subsequent modification of a contract for the sale of land must be in writing to be legally enforceable.” Windorf v Ferris, 154 Mich App 201, 203 ; 397 NW2d 268 (1986); see also Reid v Bradstreet Co, 256 Mich 282, 286 ; 239 NW 509 (1931) (noting that “[i]t is well established that a written contract may be varied by a subsequent parol agreement unless forbidden by the statute of frauds. . . .”) This is because Michigan’s st 2015Although a party can generally prove modification through evidence of an oral agreement or course of conduct, in cases involving the sale of real property, “[o]rdinarily, a subsequent modification of a contract for the sale of land must be in writing to be legally enforceable.” Windorf v Ferris, 154 Mich App 201, 203 ; 397 NW2d 268 (1986); see also Reid v Bradstreet Co, 256 Mich 282, 286 ; 239 NW 509 (1931) (noting that “[i]t is well established that a written contract may be varied by a subsequent parol agreement unless forbidden by the statute of frauds. . . .”) This is because Michigan’s st | 1 | 1 |
EC EX REL. JKC v. Katzgreen1 sentence2004See ns. 5-6. [1] See, e.g., Leon C Baker, PC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 821 So.2d 158, 165 (Ala., 2001), quoting McMillian v. Johnson, 878 F.Supp. 1473, 1520 (M.D.Ala., 1995) ("`It is noteworthy that Alabama has not followed the trend of abolishing the requirement that parties be identical, sometimes referred to as the mutuality of estoppel requirement.'"); EC v. Katz, 731 So.2d 1268, 1270 (Fla., 1999) (" This case falls squarely within our traditional requirement that there be mutuality of parties in order for collateral estoppel to apply defensively."); Hofsommer v. Hofs | 1 | 1 |
Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc.green2 sentences2004See, e.g., Leon C Baker, PC v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 821 So 2d 158, 165 (Ala, 2001), quoting McMillian v Johnson, 878 F Supp 1473, 1520 (MD Ala, 1995) (“ ‘It is noteworthy that Alabama has not followed the trend of abolishing the requirement that parties be identical, sometimes referred to as the mutuality of estoppel requirement.’ ”); EC v Katz, 731 So 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla, 1999) (“This case falls squarely within our traditional requirement that there be mutuality of parties in order for collateral estoppel to apply defensively.”); Hofsommer v Hofsommer Excavating, Inc, 488 2004See ns. 5-6. [1] See, e.g., Leon C Baker, PC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 821 So.2d 158, 165 (Ala., 2001), quoting McMillian v. Johnson, 878 F.Supp. 1473, 1520 (M.D.Ala., 1995) ("`It is noteworthy that Alabama has not followed the trend of abolishing the requirement that parties be identical, sometimes referred to as the mutuality of estoppel requirement.'"); EC v. Katz, 731 So.2d 1268, 1270 (Fla., 1999) (" This case falls squarely within our traditional requirement that there be mutuality of parties in order for collateral estoppel to apply defensively."); Hofsommer v. Hofs | 1 | 1 |
LEON C. BAKER, PC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.green1 sentence2004See ns. 5-6. [1] See, e.g., Leon C Baker, PC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 821 So.2d 158, 165 (Ala., 2001), quoting McMillian v. Johnson, 878 F.Supp. 1473, 1520 (M.D.Ala., 1995) ("`It is noteworthy that Alabama has not followed the trend of abolishing the requirement that parties be identical, sometimes referred to as the mutuality of estoppel requirement.'"); EC v. Katz, 731 So.2d 1268, 1270 (Fla., 1999) (" This case falls squarely within our traditional requirement that there be mutuality of parties in order for collateral estoppel to apply defensively."); Hofsommer v. Hofs | 1 | 1 |
Alterman v. Provizer, Eisenberg, Lichtenstein & Pearlman, Pcgreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Alterman v Provizer, Eisenberg, Lichtenstein & Pearlman, PC, 195 Mich App 422 ; 491 NW2d 868 (1992). 2004See, e.g., Alterman v Provizer, Eisenberg, Lichtenstein & Pearlman, PC, 195 Mich App 422 ; 491 NW2d 868 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
McMillian v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Leon C Baker, PC v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 821 So 2d 158, 165 (Ala, 2001), quoting McMillian v Johnson, 878 F Supp 1473, 1520 (MD Ala, 1995) (“ ‘It is noteworthy that Alabama has not followed the trend of abolishing the requirement that parties be identical, sometimes referred to as the mutuality of estoppel requirement.’ ”); EC v Katz, 731 So 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla, 1999) (“This case falls squarely within our traditional requirement that there be mutuality of parties in order for collateral estoppel to apply defensively.”); Hofsommer v Hofsommer Excavating, Inc, 488 2004See ns. 5-6. [1] See, e.g., Leon C Baker, PC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 821 So.2d 158, 165 (Ala., 2001), quoting McMillian v. Johnson, 878 F.Supp. 1473, 1520 (M.D.Ala., 1995) ("`It is noteworthy that Alabama has not followed the trend of abolishing the requirement that parties be identical, sometimes referred to as the mutuality of estoppel requirement.'"); EC v. Katz, 731 So.2d 1268, 1270 (Fla., 1999) (" This case falls squarely within our traditional requirement that there be mutuality of parties in order for collateral estoppel to apply defensively."); Hofsommer v. Hofs | 1 | 1 |
| City of Mason v. Mason State Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Quality Products and Concepts Co. v. Nagel Precision, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025“This mutuality requirement is satisfied where -8- a waiver or modification is established through clear and convincing evidence of a written agreement, oral agreement, or affirmative conduct establishing mutual agreement to modify or waive the particular original contract.” Quality Prod & Concepts Co, 469 Mich at 364-365 . 2024“The mutuality requirement is satisfied where a modification is established through clear and convincing evidence of a written agreement, oral agreement, or affirmative conduct establishing mutual agreement to waive the terms of the original contract.” Id. | 16 | 2007–2025 |
DePolo v. Greig
green
2 sentences1979As noted in Braxton , and also in DePolo v Greig, 338 Mich 703 ; 62 NW2d 441 (1954), well-recognized exceptions to the mutuality rule exist where there is a relationship of principal and agent, master and servant, or indemnitor and indemnitee. 1979As noted in Braxton , and also in DePolo v Greig, 338 Mich 703 ; 62 NW2d 441 (1954), well-recognized exceptions to the mutuality rule exist where there is a relationship of principal and agent, master and servant, or indemnitor and indemnitee. | 3 | 1979–2004 |
Darin & Armstrong v. Ben Agree Co.
green
2 sentences1990See Braxton v Litchalk, 55 Mich App 708 ; 223 NW2d 316 (1974); Darin & Armstrong v Ben Agree Co, 88 Mich App 128 ; 276 NW2d 869 (1979), lv den 406 Mich 1007 (1979). 1990See Braxton v Litchalk, 55 Mich App 708 ; 223 NW2d 316 (1974); Darin & Armstrong v Ben Agree Co, 88 Mich App 128 ; 276 NW2d 869 (1979), lv den 406 Mich 1007 (1979). | 2 | 1980–1990 |
Nevarov v. Caldwell
green
2 sentences1987The Howell Court articulated three reasons for its decision to reject nonmutual offensive estoppel in a civil to civil context: (1) in instances of several plaintiffs bringing successive actions against a single defendant, abandonment of the mutuality requirement would lead to "lopsided justice” in favor of the later plaintiffs, quoting Nevarov v Caldwell, 161 Cal App 2d 762; 327 P2d 111 (1958), (2) fear that abandonment would lead to increased litigation in order to avoid adverse judgment, and (3) the fact that "one contestant must be declared the loser to a competitor that he has never met,” 1971First, it is apparent from a review of the general authorities that those few jurisdictions which have abandoned or modified the mutuality requirement have done so in a very limited manner.6 7 Thus, the California Court, which, in Bernhard v. Bank of America, supra, took the lead to abandon mutuality and permitted defensive assertion of collateral estoppel in the administratrix’s action against defendant, qualified its position in Nevarov v. Caldwell (1958), 161 Cal App 2d 762 ( 327 P2d 111 ), and refused to permit offensive assertion of collateral estoppel by plaintiff-stranger in an automobi | 2 | 1971–1987 |
Adair v. State
green
2 sentences2021Id. at 687-688. 8 In addition, as discussed infra in connection with res judicata, the parties were not the same in the criminal and civil proceedings. -6- has taken a broad approach to the doctrine of res judicata, holding that it bars not only claims already litigated, but also every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not. [Adair v State, 470 Mich 105, 121 ; 680 NW2d 386 (2004).] In general, “[t]o be in privity is to be so identified in interest with another party that the first litigant represents the same leg 2021Id. at 687-688. 8 In addition, as discussed infra in connection with res judicata, the parties were not the same in the criminal and civil proceedings. -6- has taken a broad approach to the doctrine of res judicata, holding that it bars not only claims already litigated, but also every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not. [Adair v State, 470 Mich 105, 121 ; 680 NW2d 386 (2004).] In general, “[t]o be in privity is to be so identified in interest with another party that the first litigant represents the same leg | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Martin v. Martin
green
1 sentence2019The clear and convincing evidence standard is “the most demanding standard applied in civil cases.” In re Martin, 450 Mich 204, 227 ; 538 NW2d 399 (1995). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Shinholster v. Annapolis Hospital
green
1 sentence2019However, the modification “must be by mutual consent.” Id. “ ‘The mutuality requirement is satisfied where a modification is established through clear and convincing evidence of a written agreement, oral agreement, or affirmative conduct establishing mutual agreement to waive the terms of the original contract.’ ” Id. at 455, quoting Quality Prod & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 373 ; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Leahy v. Orion Township
green
2 sentences2019Leahy v Orion Twp, 269 Mich App 527, 530 ; 711 NW2d 438 (2006). 2019Leahy v Orion Twp, 269 Mich App 527, 530 ; 711 NW2d 438 (2006). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Windorf v. Ferris
neutral
2 sentences2015Although a party can generally prove modification through evidence of an oral agreement or course of conduct, in cases involving the sale of real property, “[o]rdinarily, a subsequent modification of a contract for the sale of land must be in writing to be legally enforceable.” Windorf v Ferris, 154 Mich App 201, 203 ; 397 NW2d 268 (1986); see also Reid v Bradstreet Co, 256 Mich 282, 286 ; 239 NW 509 (1931) (noting that “[i]t is well established that a written contract may be varied by a subsequent parol agreement unless forbidden by the statute of frauds. . . .”) This is because Michigan’s st 2015Although a party can generally prove modification through evidence of an oral agreement or course of conduct, in cases involving the sale of real property, “[o]rdinarily, a subsequent modification of a contract for the sale of land must be in writing to be legally enforceable.” Windorf v Ferris, 154 Mich App 201, 203 ; 397 NW2d 268 (1986); see also Reid v Bradstreet Co, 256 Mich 282, 286 ; 239 NW 509 (1931) (noting that “[i]t is well established that a written contract may be varied by a subsequent parol agreement unless forbidden by the statute of frauds. . . .”) This is because Michigan’s st | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Michaels v. Amway Corp.
green
2 sentences2014Relevant to the instant action, “[t]he rule in Michigan is that one who first [substantially] breaches a contract cannot maintain an action against the other contracting party for his subsequent breach or failure to perform.” Michaels v Amway Corp, 206 Mich App 644, 650 ; 522 NW2d 703 (1994) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 2014Relevant to the instant action, “[t]he rule in Michigan is that one who first [substantially] breaches a contract cannot maintain an action against the other contracting party for his subsequent breach or failure to perform.” Michaels v Amway Corp, 206 Mich App 644, 650 ; 522 NW2d 703 (1994) (citation and quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Saving Association
green
2 sentences2004In fact, it appears that, had this Court in Howell been presented with the issue raised here regarding defensive use of collateral estoppel, the Court may well have abandoned mutuality of estoppel where it is asserted defensively against a party who has already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in a prior suit: Although there may be merit to Justice Traynor’s observation in Bernhard [v Bank of American Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass’n, 19 Cal 2d 807; 122 P2d 892 (1942)] that the well-recognized exceptions to the mutuality rule in effect produce the same result as unilateral esto 2004In fact, it appears that, had this Court in Howell been presented with the issue raised here regarding defensive use of collateral estoppel, the Court may well have abandoned mutuality of estoppel where it is asserted defensively against a party who has already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in a prior suit: Although there may be merit to Justice Traynor's observation in Bernhard [ v. Bank of American Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807 , 122 P.2d 892 (1942)] that the well-recognized exceptions to the mutuality rule in effect produce the same result as unilateral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Rawlings v. Lopez
green
2 sentences2004See, e.g., Leon C Baker, PC v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 821 So 2d 158, 165 (Ala, 2001), quoting McMillian v Johnson, 878 F Supp 1473, 1520 (MD Ala, 1995) (“ ‘It is noteworthy that Alabama has not followed the trend of abolishing the requirement that parties be identical, sometimes referred to as the mutuality of estoppel requirement.’ ”); EC v Katz, 731 So 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla, 1999) (“This case falls squarely within our traditional requirement that there be mutuality of parties in order for collateral estoppel to apply defensively.”); Hofsommer v Hofsommer Excavating, Inc, 488 2004See ns. 5-6. [1] See, e.g., Leon C Baker, PC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 821 So.2d 158, 165 (Ala., 2001), quoting McMillian v. Johnson, 878 F.Supp. 1473, 1520 (M.D.Ala., 1995) ("`It is noteworthy that Alabama has not followed the trend of abolishing the requirement that parties be identical, sometimes referred to as the mutuality of estoppel requirement.'"); EC v. Katz, 731 So.2d 1268, 1270 (Fla., 1999) (" This case falls squarely within our traditional requirement that there be mutuality of parties in order for collateral estoppel to apply defensively."); Hofsommer v. Hofs | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People Ex Rel. Snead v. Kirkland
green
1 sentence1987Similarly, in People ex rel Snead v Kirkland, 462 F Supp 914 (ED Pa, 1978), decided before federal abrogation of the mutuality requirement, the plaintiff brought a civil action against several persons involved in a previous criminal trial, including his defense counsel. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Imperial Kosher Catering, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences1987In Imperial Kosher Catering, Inc v The Travelers Indemnity Co, 73 Mich App 543 ; 252 NW2d 509 (1977), the sole stockholders and officers of the plaintiff corporation were convicted of arson in a criminal proceeding. 1987In Imperial Kosher Catering, Inc v The Travelers Indemnity Co, 73 Mich App 543 ; 252 NW2d 509 (1977), the sole stockholders and officers of the plaintiff corporation were convicted of arson in a criminal proceeding. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Hibbett v. City of Cincinnati
green
1 sentence1987Hibbett v Cincinnati, 4 Ohio App 3d 128; 446 NE2d 832 (1982), also applied nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel in a criminal to civil context, although Ohio adheres to the mutuality requirement in a civil to civil context. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Goolsby v. Derby green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Duncan v. Duncan neutral | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Denevan v. Belter neutral | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.