mutuality requirement in Minnesota

2002Corp., 466 F.Supp. 167 , 172 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (noting that “mutuality of parties is no longer essential for the operation of an estoppel, as long as the party against whom the estoppel is asserted * * * was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue in the prior proceeding” and citing Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 332 , 99 S.Ct. at 651-52 , and Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 954-56 ); Harris v. Jones, 471 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Iowa 1991) (noting that Iowa courts “have abandoned the strict doctrine of‘mutuality in both-offensive and defensive uses of issue preclusion”); Knoblauch v

2002Corp., 466 F.Supp. 167 , 172 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (noting that “mutuality of parties is no longer essential for the operation of an estoppel, as long as the party against whom the estoppel is asserted * * * was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue in the prior proceeding” and citing Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 332 , 99 S.Ct. at 651-52 , and Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 954-56 ); Harris v. Jones, 471 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Iowa 1991) (noting that Iowa courts “have abandoned the strict doctrine of‘mutuality in both-offensive and defensive uses of issue preclusion”); Knoblauch v

2012Id. at 565 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 85 cmt. e (1982)).

2003Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 565 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 85 cmt. e (1982)).

2003The court of appeals then quoted Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 85 cmt. e, which explained, “long before the mutuality rule was repudiated in civil cases, well-reasoned decisions had extended the rule of preclusion to operate in favor of third persons where the first action is criminal and the second is civil.” Reed, 647 N.W.2d at 565 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 85 cmt. e (1982)).

2002Corp., 466 F.Supp. 167 , 172 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (noting that “mutuality of parties is no longer essential for the operation of an estoppel, as long as the party against whom the estoppel is asserted * * * was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue in the prior proceeding” and citing Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 332 , 99 S.Ct. at 651-52 , and Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 954-56 ); Harris v. Jones, 471 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Iowa 1991) (noting that Iowa courts “have abandoned the strict doctrine of‘mutuality in both-offensive and defensive uses of issue preclusion”); Knoblauch v

2002Corp., 466 F.Supp. 167 , 172 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (noting that “mutuality of parties is no longer essential for the operation of an estoppel, as long as the party against whom the estoppel is asserted * * * was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue in the prior proceeding” and citing Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 332 , 99 S.Ct. at 651-52 , and Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 954-56 ); Harris v. Jones, 471 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Iowa 1991) (noting that Iowa courts “have abandoned the strict doctrine of‘mutuality in both-offensive and defensive uses of issue preclusion”); Knoblauch v

2002Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349-50 , 91 S.Ct. 1434,1453 , 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971).

2002Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349-50 , 91 S.Ct. 1434,1453 , 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971).

1984Because collateral estoppel could be asserted only against those who had had their "day in court" on the issue, the mutuality requirement normally limited the application of collateral estoppel to cases in which both the party asserting and the party defending against preclusion were parties to the litigation that first determined the issue. *187 The leading case in the movement abolishing the mutuality requirement is Bernhard v. Bank of America [ 19 Cal.2d 807 , 122 P.2d 892 ], decided in 1942 by the Supreme Court of California.

1984Because collateral estoppel could be asserted only against those who had had their "day in court" on the issue, the mutuality requirement normally limited the application of collateral estoppel to cases in which both the party asserting and the party defending against preclusion were parties to the litigation that first determined the issue. *187 The leading case in the movement abolishing the mutuality requirement is Bernhard v. Bank of America [ 19 Cal.2d 807 , 122 P.2d 892 ], decided in 1942 by the Supreme Court of California.

1960Rev. 281. 13 See footnote 2, supra.

1902This question came before the supreme court of the state of Wisconsin in the case of Kennan v. Rundle, 81 Wis. 212, 228 , 51 N. W. 426 , where the court in a very able and clear opinion held that such a corporation had no power to create such a fund; that to permit it to do so would be to change wholly the character of the corporation and destroy the mutuality principle upon which it is founded.

1902This question came before the supreme court of the state of Wisconsin in the case of Kennan v. Rundle, 81 Wis. 212, 228 , 51 N. W. 426 , where the court in a very able and clear opinion held that such a corporation had no power to create such a fund; that to permit it to do so would be to change wholly the character of the corporation and destroy the mutuality principle upon which it is founded.