18 Virginia opinions name it 7 courts 1974–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Selected Risks Insurance v. Deangreen2 sentences2008See Selected Risks Insurance Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260 , 263-64, 355 S.E.2d 579 , 581 (1987) (Commonwealth and crime victim are not the same party for purposes of satisfying the mutuality requirement). 2008See Selected Risks Insurance Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260 , 263-64, 355 S.E.2d 579 , 581 (1987) (Commonwealth and crime victim are not the same party for purposes of satisfying the mutuality requirement). | 3 | 4 |
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co.green2 sentences2003Ry. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 221 Va. 638, 641 (1980) (“Mindful ofthe [national] trend [to abrogate the mutuality rule], we decline to spurn the necessity for mutuality in this case.”). 1996Under the mutuality doctrine, for which no exception applies in this case, “a litigant is generally prevented from invoking the preclusive force of a judgment unless he would have been bound had the prior litigation of the issue reached the opposite result.” N & W Railway Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 221 Va. 638, 640 , 272 S.E.2d 217, 218 (1980). | 3 | 4 |
Walter B. Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc.green2 sentences2003“In addition, an exception to the rule of mutuality has been recognized where the liability ofthe person invoking the former judgment is only derivative, i.e., based solely upon the fault of another who has been exonerated.” Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 898 (4th Cir. 1965) (applying Virginia law) (citing Ward v. Charlton, 177 Va. 101 (1941)). 1980See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n., 19 Cal.2d 807 , 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Annot, 31 A.L.R.3d 1044 . | 2 | 3 |
Eagle, Star & British Dominions Insurance v. Hellergreen2 sentences2023Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82 , 104- 05 (1927) (barring convicted arsonist from recovering on his fire-insurance policy because he sought “to recover the fruit of his own crime”), and Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 , 316 n.10 (1983) (noting that Eagle’s “narrow exception” to the mutuality doctrine “was expressly limited to cases in which ‘the plaintiff who brings [the] action has committed a felony, and seeks to recover the fruit of his own crime’” (alteration in original) (quoting Eagle, 149 Va. at 105 )). -9- grand larceny from the person. 2023Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82 , 104- 05 (1927) (barring convicted arsonist from recovering on his fire-insurance policy because he sought “to recover the fruit of his own crime”), and Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 , 316 n.10 (1983) (noting that Eagle’s “narrow exception” to the mutuality doctrine “was expressly limited to cases in which ‘the plaintiff who brings [the] action has committed a felony, and seeks to recover the fruit of his own crime’” (alteration in original) (quoting Eagle, 149 Va. at 105 )). -9- grand larceny from the person. | 1 | 6 |
Bates v. Deversgreen2 sentences2003Perhaps, as Sarno asserts, the Supreme Court tempered the mutuality doctrine in Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667 (1974), 1 but the Court declined the invitation to eliminate mutuality as a required element in Norfolk & W. 2003On mutuality, the Bates court stated: “But, as is the case with any other judicial doctrine grounded in public policy, the mutuality doctrine should not be mechanistically applied when it is compellingly clear from the prior record that the party in the subsequent civil action against whom collateral estoppel is asserted has fully and fairly litigated and lost an issue of fact which was essential to the prior judgment.” Bates, 214 Va. at 671 . | 1 | 4 |
Haring v. Prosisegreen2 sentences2023Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82 , 104- 05 (1927) (barring convicted arsonist from recovering on his fire-insurance policy because he sought “to recover the fruit of his own crime”), and Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 , 316 n.10 (1983) (noting that Eagle’s “narrow exception” to the mutuality doctrine “was expressly limited to cases in which ‘the plaintiff who brings [the] action has committed a felony, and seeks to recover the fruit of his own crime’” (alteration in original) (quoting Eagle, 149 Va. at 105 )). -9- grand larceny from the person. 2023Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82 , 104- 05 (1927) (barring convicted arsonist from recovering on his fire-insurance policy because he sought “to recover the fruit of his own crime”), and Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 , 316 n.10 (1983) (noting that Eagle’s “narrow exception” to the mutuality doctrine “was expressly limited to cases in which ‘the plaintiff who brings [the] action has committed a felony, and seeks to recover the fruit of his own crime’” (alteration in original) (quoting Eagle, 149 Va. at 105 )). -9- grand larceny from the person. | 1 | 3 |
Godbolt v. Brawleygreen2 sentences2005See 250 Va. at 470 , 463 S.E.2d at 659 (discussing the mutuality requirement and same object/same results tests). 2005See 250 Va. at 470 , 463 S.E.2d at 659 (discussing the mutuality requirement and same object/same results tests). | 1 | 2 |
Angstadt v. Atlantic Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2010Along with the four elements of collateral estoppel already set forth, there must also be “mutuality.” The mutuality requirement precludes a litigant from invoking collateral estoppel “unless he would have been bound had the litigation of the issue in the prior action reached the opposite result.” Angstadt, 249 Va. at 447 , 457 S.E.2d at 87 (1995). 2010Along with the four elements of collateral estoppel already set forth, there must also be “mutuality.” The mutuality requirement precludes a litigant from invoking collateral estoppel “unless he would have been bound had the litigation of the issue in the prior action reached the opposite result.” Angstadt, 249 Va. at 447 , 457 S.E.2d at 87 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shoregreen1 sentence1980See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n., 19 Cal.2d 807 , 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Annot, 31 A.L.R.3d 1044 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nero v. Ferris
green
2 sentences2003A corollary of privity, parties so identical in interest with another that they represent the same legal right, is embodied in the mutuality doctrine. “[A] litigant is generally prevented from invoking the preclusive force of a judgment unless he would have been bound had the prior litigation of the issue reached the opposite result.” Nero, 222 Va. at 812 . 1987Furthermore, there is no mutuality, which is the established rule in Virginia to prove collateral estoppel, especially when estoppel is used offensively, N. & W. v. Bailey, supra; Anderson v. Sisson, 170 Va. 178 , 196 S.E. 515 (1932); or defensively, Ferebee v. Hungate, supra. In N. & W. v. Bailey, supra, at p. 642 , the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirms the mutuality requirement when "offensive use of collateral estoppel is sought to be invoked in one of a series of damage suits arising from a common disaster." And further our Supreme Court cited an example of the "unfair results likely, shoul | 3 | 1987–2003 |
Smith v. New Dixie Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82 , 104-05, 140 S.E. 314 , 321 (1927) ; see also Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 , 316 n. 10, 103 S.Ct. 2368 , 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983) ; Smith v. New Dixie Lines, Inc., 201 Va. 466 , 472-73, 111 S.E.2d 434 , 438-39 (1959) ; Aetna Cas. & Sur. 2016Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82 , 104-05, 140 S.E. 314 , 321 (1927) ; see also Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 , 316 n. 10, 103 S.Ct. 2368 , 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983) ; Smith v. New Dixie Lines, Inc., 201 Va. 466 , 472-73, 111 S.E.2d 434 , 438-39 (1959) ; Aetna Cas. & Sur. | 2 | 2008–2016 |
Ward v. Charlton
green
1 sentence2003“In addition, an exception to the rule of mutuality has been recognized where the liability ofthe person invoking the former judgment is only derivative, i.e., based solely upon the fault of another who has been exonerated.” Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 898 (4th Cir. 1965) (applying Virginia law) (citing Ward v. Charlton, 177 Va. 101 (1941)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Miller v. Sevamp, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997However, in Miller v. SEVAMP , the Court stated, “[a]n employee is ordinarily at liberty to leave his employment for any reason or for no reason, upon giving reasonable notice, without incurring liability to his employer.” 234 Va. at 465 , 362 S.E.2d at 916-17 . 1997However, in Miller v. SEVAMP , the Court stated, “[a]n employee is ordinarily at liberty to leave his employment for any reason or for no reason, upon giving reasonable notice, without incurring liability to his employer.” 234 Va. at 465 , 362 S.E.2d at 916-17 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Dual & Associates, Inc. v. Wells
green
2 sentences1994Nero v. Ferris, 222 Va. 807, 812 , 284 S.E.2d 828 (1981); Dual & Assoc. v. Wells, 241 Va. 542, 545 , 403 S.E.2d 354 (1991). 1994Nero v. Ferris, 222 Va. 807, 812 , 284 S.E.2d 828 (1981); Dual & Assoc. v. Wells, 241 Va. 542, 545 , 403 S.E.2d 354 (1991). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Anderson v. Sisson
green
1 sentence1987Furthermore, there is no mutuality, which is the established rule in Virginia to prove collateral estoppel, especially when estoppel is used offensively, N. & W. v. Bailey, supra; Anderson v. Sisson, 170 Va. 178 , 196 S.E. 515 (1932); or defensively, Ferebee v. Hungate, supra. In N. & W. v. Bailey, supra, at p. 642 , the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirms the mutuality requirement when "offensive use of collateral estoppel is sought to be invoked in one of a series of damage suits arising from a common disaster." And further our Supreme Court cited an example of the "unfair results likely, shoul | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Commonwealth v. Baltimore Tank Lines, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1987We wrote as follows: "We . . . have concluded not to abandon the mutuality requirement when, as here, offensive use of collateral estoppel is sought to be invoked in one of a series of damage suits arising from a common disaster." Id. at 642 , 272 S.E.2d 220 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Saving Association
green
2 sentences1980See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n., 19 Cal.2d 807 , 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Annot, 31 A.L.R.3d 1044 . 1980See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n., 19 Cal.2d 807 , 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Annot, 31 A.L.R.3d 1044 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.