mutuality requirement in Ohio

2025The Supreme Court noted that “[f]or all practical purposes, the mutuality rule is coextensive with the requirement that the plea of res judicata is available only to a party to the judgment and to his privies.” Id. at 196 .

2014Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 195-196 , 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983). {¶19} However, relevant to the case at hand, the Ohio Supreme Court indicated in Goodson that the mutuality requirement could be relaxed “where justice would reasonably require it.” Id. at 199 .

2011In particular, the Goodson court cited Hicks v. De La Cruz (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 71 , * * * as an example of its willingness to ‘relax’ the mutuality requirement ‘where justice would reasonably require it.’ Goodson, supra, at 199 , * * *.” Hoover, 2004-Ohio-72, ¶ 8 . {¶ 31} “In Hicks, a negligence action, the city of Cincinnati sought to argue that it had immunity from liability because the Cincinnati General Hospital was a state-owned facility.

2011The court explained in Goodson , however, that Hicks was not an abandonment of the mutuality rule but simply a demonstration that the court “[was] willing to relax the [mutuality] rule where justice would reasonably require it.” Id. {¶ 6} The trend in lower courts in Ohio since Goodson has been in the direction of relaxing the mutuality requirement to allow for at least the defensive use of collateral estoppel.

2011In McCrory v. Children’s Hospital (1986), 28 Ohio App.3d 49, 53 , 501 N.E.2d 1238 , a Tenth District case, then-judge Thomas Moyer reached precisely this conclusion, relying on the language from Goodson quoted above.” Id. 1 {¶ 38} We also noted that “in more recent cases the Ohio Supreme Court has indicated that collateral estoppel applies ‘ “when the fact or issue (1) was actually and directly litigated in the prior action, (2) was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) when the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party [or] in privity wi

2011In McCrory v. Children’s Hospital (1986), 28 Ohio App.3d 49, 53 , * * * a Tenth District case, then- judge Thomas Moyer reached precisely this conclusion, relying on the language from Goodson quoted above.” Id.1 {¶ 38} We also noted that “in more recent cases the Ohio Supreme Court has indicated that collateral estoppel applies “ ‘when the fact or issue (1) was actually and directly litigated in the prior action, (2) was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) when the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party [or] in privity with a party t

2017Goodson at 200-01, 443 N.E.2d 978 ; Balboa at 527, 672 N.E.2d 718 .

2011See, e.g., Frank v. Simon, Lucas App. No. L-06-1185, 2007-Ohio-1324 , 2007 WL 866998 , at ¶ 12 (“[t]he defensive use of collateral estoppel has been upheld in the majority of Ohio appellate courts”).

2006See State v. Williams (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 290 , 667 N.E.2d 932 ; Hicks, supra. In particular, collateral estoppel will not bar the relitigation of an otherwise precluded issue if “[t]here is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue * * * because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action, or * * * because the party sought to be precluded, as a result *510 of the conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain

2006See State v. Williams (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 290 , 667 N.E.2d 932 ; Hicks, supra. In particular, collateral estoppel will not bar the relitigation of an otherwise precluded issue if “[t]here is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue * * * because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action, or * * * because the party sought to be precluded, as a result *510 of the conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain

2004See, e.g., McAdoo v. Dallas Corp. (6th Cir. 1991), 932 F.2d 522 , 525 (noting that "Ohio law with regard to the use of defensive collateral estoppel is not clear, especially in the wake of Goodson's general rule and its equally abstract provision for exceptions"); Freeman v. Holzer Medical Center (March 27, 1992), Galia App. No. 91 CA 8 ("[C]ourts and commentators alike have suggested that it is not entirely clear the extent to which the mutuality rule will be relaxed following the Goodson decision.").

2004See, e.g., McAdoo v. Dallas Corp. (6th Cir. 1991), 932 F.2d 522 , 525 (noting that "Ohio law with regard to the use of defensive collateral estoppel is not clear, especially in the wake of Goodson's general rule and its equally abstract provision for exceptions"); Freeman v. Holzer Medical Center (March 27, 1992), Galia App. No. 91 CA 8 ("[C]ourts and commentators alike have suggested that it is not entirely clear the extent to which the mutuality rule will be relaxed following the Goodson decision.").

1996Federal cases dealing with this issue suggest that the preclusive effect of a criminal conviction is determined by state law. 2 United States v. Turner (C.A.4, 1991), 933 F.2d 240, 243, fn. 2 ; Kowalski v. Gagne (C.A.1, 1990), 914 F.2d 299 , 302-304.

1983See Spettigue v. Mahoney (1968), 8 Ariz. App. 281 , 445 P. 2d 557 , and Reardon v. Allen (1965), 88 N. J.

1983See Spettigue v. Mahoney (1968), 8 Ariz. App. 281 , 445 P. 2d 557 , and Reardon v. Allen (1965), 88 N. J.