mutuality requirement in Alabama

2005Therefore, even though this Court based its judgment in Jones v. Stedman, supra, on a finding that Jones had given Blanton the authority to agree to a settlement, she is not barred from relitigating that issue in the case before us. 2 [[Image here]] S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971) (overruling Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 , 56 S.Ct. 645 , 80 L.Ed. 949 (1936), which had upheld the mutuality requirement); and Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 , 99 S.Ct. 645 , 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (approving the use of ‘offensive’ collateral estoppel).

2005Therefore, even though this Court based its judgment in Jones v. Stedman, supra, on a finding that Jones had given Blanton the authority to agree to a settlement, she is not barred from relitigating that issue in the case before us. 2 [[Image here]] S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971) (overruling Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 , 56 S.Ct. 645 , 80 L.Ed. 949 (1936), which had upheld the mutuality requirement); and Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 , 99 S.Ct. 645 , 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (approving the use of ‘offensive’ collateral estoppel).

2005Therefore, even though this Court based its judgment in Jones v. Stedman, supra, on a finding that Jones had given Blanton the authority to agree to a settlement, she is not barred from relitigating that issue in the case before us. 2 [[Image here]] S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971) (overruling Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 , 56 S.Ct. 645 , 80 L.Ed. 949 (1936), which had upheld the mutuality requirement); and Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 , 99 S.Ct. 645 , 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (approving the use of ‘offensive’ collateral estoppel).

2005Therefore, even though this Court based its judgment in Jones v. Stedman, supra, on a finding that Jones had given Blanton the authority to agree to a settlement, she is not barred from relitigating that issue in the case before us.2 "_____________ "2For a discussion of the issues involved in dropping the mutuality requirement, as well as how and why the Federal courts did so, see Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 , 91 S.Ct. 1434 , 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971) (overruling Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 , 56 S.Ct. 645 , 80 L.Ed. 949 (1936), which ha

2005Therefore, even though this Court based its judgment in Jones v. Stedman, supra, on a finding that Jones had given Blanton the authority to agree to a settlement, she is not barred from relitigating that issue in the case before us. 2 [[Image here]] S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971) (overruling Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 , 56 S.Ct. 645 , 80 L.Ed. 949 (1936), which had upheld the mutuality requirement); and Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 , 99 S.Ct. 645 , 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (approving the use of ‘offensive’ collateral estoppel).

2005Therefore, even though this Court based its judgment in Jones v. Stedman, supra, on a finding that Jones had given Blanton the authority to agree to a settlement, she is not barred from relitigating that issue in the case before us. 2 [[Image here]] S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971) (overruling Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 , 56 S.Ct. 645 , 80 L.Ed. 949 (1936), which had upheld the mutuality requirement); and Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 , 99 S.Ct. 645 , 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (approving the use of ‘offensive’ collateral estoppel).

2005Therefore, even though this Court based its judgment in Jones v. Stedman, supra, on a finding that Jones had given Blanton the authority to agree to a settlement, she is not barred from relitigating that issue in the case before us. 2 [[Image here]] S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971) (overruling Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 , 56 S.Ct. 645 , 80 L.Ed. 949 (1936), which had upheld the mutuality requirement); and Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 , 99 S.Ct. 645 , 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (approving the use of ‘offensive’ collateral estoppel).

2005Dec. 16, 1983) (en banc). “9[In re] Ethyl [Corp.], 975 S.W.2d 606 at 614-15 [ (Tex.1998) ]. “10Id. at 612 (quoting Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003 , 1008 (2d Cir.1995)). “11Id. at 610. “12Id. at 611. “13Id. “14Id. “15[In re] Bristol-Myers [Squibb], 975 S.W.2d [601] at 603-04 [ (Tex.1998) ] “16Ethyl, 975 S.W.2d at 610 . “17Bristol-Myers, 975 S.W.2d at 603 . “18Id. (quoting McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 Tex. L.Rev. 1821, 1843 (1995)).” “2For a discussion of the issues involved in dropping the mutuality requirement, as well as how and why the Federal co

2024The Court determined that "[t]here is a mutuality of immunity" and that "[a]n employee relinquishes his right to sue his co-employee for negligence or wantonness in exchange for assurance that he will not be sued by his co-employee for negligence or wantonness." Id.

2005Dec. 16, 1983) (en banc). “9[In re] Ethyl [Corp.], 975 S.W.2d 606 at 614-15 [ (Tex.1998) ]. “10Id. at 612 (quoting Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003 , 1008 (2d Cir.1995)). “11Id. at 610. “12Id. at 611. “13Id. “14Id. “15[In re] Bristol-Myers [Squibb], 975 S.W.2d [601] at 603-04 [ (Tex.1998) ] “16Ethyl, 975 S.W.2d at 610 . “17Bristol-Myers, 975 S.W.2d at 603 . “18Id. (quoting McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 Tex. L.Rev. 1821, 1843 (1995)).” “2For a discussion of the issues involved in dropping the mutuality requirement, as well as how and why the Federal co

2005We also note that in Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316 (Ala.1985), while addressing the claims of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the Court stated: “In order for one suit to bar subsequent litigation, the parties must have been substantially the same in both cases.

1997Moreover, recognition that mutuality of remedy is not required in arbitration is logically consistent with our recent statement in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc. , 57 N.Y.2d 458 , [464,] 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 , 443 N.E.2d 441 that 'while coextensive promises may constitute consideration for each other, "mutuality", in the sense of requiring such reciprocity, is not necessary when a promisor receives other valid consideration.' " Sablosky , 73 N.Y.2d at 137 , 535 N.E.2d at 646 , 538 N.Y.S.2d at 516 . *Page 1336 Upon further consideration of this question on rehearing, we hold that the arbitration claus

1997Moreover, recognition that mutuality of remedy is not required in arbitration is logically consistent with our recent statement in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc. , 57 N.Y.2d 458 , [464,] 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 , 443 N.E.2d 441 that 'while coextensive promises may constitute consideration for each other, "mutuality", in the sense of requiring such reciprocity, is not necessary when a promisor receives other valid consideration.' " Sablosky , 73 N.Y.2d at 137 , 535 N.E.2d at 646 , 538 N.Y.S.2d at 516 . *Page 1336 Upon further consideration of this question on rehearing, we hold that the arbitration claus

1997Moreover, recognition that mutuality of remedy is not required in arbitration is logically consistent with our recent statement in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc. , 57 N.Y.2d 458 , [464,] 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 , 443 N.E.2d 441 that 'while coextensive promises may constitute consideration for each other, "mutuality", in the sense of requiring such reciprocity, is not necessary when a promisor receives other valid consideration.' " Sablosky , 73 N.Y.2d at 137 , 535 N.E.2d at 646 , 538 N.Y.S.2d at 516 . *Page 1336 Upon further consideration of this question on rehearing, we hold that the arbitration claus

1997Moreover, recognition that mutuality of remedy is not required in arbitration is logically consistent with our recent statement in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc. , 57 N.Y.2d 458 , [464,] 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 , 443 N.E.2d 441 that 'while coextensive promises may constitute consideration for each other, "mutuality", in the sense of requiring such reciprocity, is not necessary when a promisor receives other valid consideration.' " Sablosky , 73 N.Y.2d at 137 , 535 N.E.2d at 646 , 538 N.Y.S.2d at 516 . *Page 1336 Upon further consideration of this question on rehearing, we hold that the arbitration claus