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10 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thomas M. McInnis & Associates, Inc. v. Hallgreen2 sentences2025The mutuality requirement was described as “a maxim which one would suppose to have found its way from the gaming-table to the bench.” McInnis, 318 N.C. at 432 (quoting Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954 (2d Cir. 1964)). 2004Ed. 2d 552 , 559 n.7 (1979) (“It is a violation of due *37 process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); McInnis, 318 N.C. at 433-34 , 349 S.E.2d at 559-60 (following Blonder-Tongue and Parklane Hosiery and abandoning the strict mutuality requirement for collateral estoppel in North Carolina). | 3 | 4 |
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundationgreen2 sentences1986Under North Carolina law as heretofore applied, collateral estoppel would not be available to her for failure to meet the mutuality requirement. *559 The modern trend in both federal and state courts is to abandon the requirement of mutuality for collateral estoppel, [4] subject to certain exceptions, as long as the party to be collaterally estopped had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action. 1B Moore's Federal Practice § 0.441[3.2] at 731-36 (2d ed. 1984 and Supp. 1985-86); see also Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 1986Under North Carolina law as heretofore applied, collateral estoppel would not be available to her for failure to meet the mutuality requirement. *559 The modern trend in both federal and state courts is to abandon the requirement of mutuality for collateral estoppel, [4] subject to certain exceptions, as long as the party to be collaterally estopped had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action. 1B Moore's Federal Practice § 0.441[3.2] at 731-36 (2d ed. 1984 and Supp. 1985-86); see also Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 | 1 | 2 |
Olga Zdanok v. The Glidden Company, Durkee Famous Foods Division, Frank T. Alexander v. The Glidden Company, Durkee Famous Foods Divisiongreen2 sentences2025The mutuality requirement was described as “a maxim which one would suppose to have found its way from the gaming-table to the bench.” McInnis, 318 N.C. at 432 (quoting Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954 (2d Cir. 1964)). 2025The mutuality requirement was described as “a maxim which one would suppose to have found its way from the gaming-table to the bench.” McInnis, 318 N.C. at 432 (quoting Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954 (2d Cir. 1964)). | 1 | 1 |
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Saving Associationgreen2 sentences2025Courts began recognizing that under a strict mutuality requirement, a party “who has had his day in court” would be permitted “to reopen identical issues by merely switching adversaries.” Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 895 . 2025See id. (“[W]e see no good reason for continuing to require mutuality of estoppel in cases like this case.”); see also Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 895 (“No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crosland-Cullen Company v. Crosland
green
2 sentences1983In Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland, 249 N.C. 167 , 105 S.E. 2d 655 (1958), the issue involved was the validity of an assignment of an insurance policy. 1983See King v. Grindstaff, supra ; Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland, 249 *185 N.C. 167, 105 S.E.2d 655 (1958); Note, Civil Procedure—Offensive Assertion of a Prior Judgment as Collateral Estoppel—A Sword in the Hands of the Plaintiff; 52 N.C.L. | 4 | 1983–1983 |
King v. Grindstaff
green
2 sentences1997King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. at 357 , 200 S.E.2d at 805 , However, in 1986, our Supreme Court, recognizing that “[t]he modem trend in both federal and state courts is to abandon the requirement of mutuality for collateral estoppel,” eliminated the mutuality requirement for defensive collateral estoppel. 1997King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. at 357 , 200 S.E.2d at 805 , However, in 1986, our Supreme Court, recognizing that “[t]he modem trend in both federal and state courts is to abandon the requirement of mutuality for collateral estoppel,” eliminated the mutuality requirement for defensive collateral estoppel. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Kayler v. Gallimore
green
2 sentences1986Kayler v. Gallimore, 269 N.C. 405 , 152 S.E.2d 518 (1967). 1986Kayler v. Gallimore, 269 N.C. 405 , 152 S.E.2d 518 (1967). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.