ethical violation in West Virginia

1991A plea or verdict of guilty or a conviction after a plea of nolo contendere shall be deemed to be a con- In light of this language, we held in syllabus point 2 of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Six, 181 W.Va. 52 , 380 S.E.2d 219 (1989), that “[w]here there has been a final criminal conviction, proof on the record of such conviction satisfies the Committee on Legal Ethics’ burden of proving an ethical violation arising from such conviction.” Accord, syl.pt. 1, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Folio, 184 W.Va. 503 , 401 S.E.2d 248 (1990); syl. pt. 1, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Boettner, 183 W.Va. 13

1991A plea or verdict of guilty or a conviction after a plea of nolo contendere shall be deemed to be a con- In light of this language, we held in syllabus point 2 of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Six, 181 W.Va. 52 , 380 S.E.2d 219 (1989), that “[w]here there has been a final criminal conviction, proof on the record of such conviction satisfies the Committee on Legal Ethics’ burden of proving an ethical violation arising from such conviction.” Accord, syl.pt. 1, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Folio, 184 W.Va. 503 , 401 S.E.2d 248 (1990); syl. pt. 1, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Boettner, 183 W.Va. 13

1997In syllabus point one of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, 216 S.E.2d 236 (1975), we explained that “[i]n a court proceeding initiated by the Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar to annul the license of an attorney to practice law, the burden is on the Committee to prove, by full, preponderating and clear evidence, the charges contained in the Committee’s complaint.” Syllabus point two of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Six, 181 W.Va. 52 , 380 S.E.2d 219 (1989), instructs that “[w]here there has been a final criminal conviction, proof on the record of such conviction satisfi

1997In syllabus point one of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, 216 S.E.2d 236 (1975), we explained that “[i]n a court proceeding initiated by the Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar to annul the license of an attorney to practice law, the burden is on the Committee to prove, by full, preponderating and clear evidence, the charges contained in the Committee’s complaint.” Syllabus point two of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Six, 181 W.Va. 52 , 380 S.E.2d 219 (1989), instructs that “[w]here there has been a final criminal conviction, proof on the record of such conviction satisfi

1998In syllabus point one of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, 216 S.E.2d 236 (1975), we explained that “[i]n a court proceeding initiated by the Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar to annul the license of an attorney to practice law, the burden is on the Committee to prove, by full, preponderating and clear evidence, the charges contained in the Committee’s complaint.” Syllabus point two of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Six, 181 W.Va. 52 , 380 S.E.2d 219 (1989), further instructs that “[w]here there has been a final criminal conviction, proof on the record of such conviction

1997In syllabus point one of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, 216 S.E.2d 236 (1975), we explained that “[i]n a court proceeding initiated by the Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar to annul the license of an attorney to practice law, the burden is on the Committee to prove, by full, preponderating and clear evidence, the charges contained in the Committee’s complaint.” Syllabus point two of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Six, 181 W.Va. 52 , 380 S.E.2d 219 (1989), instructs that “[w]here there has been a final criminal conviction, proof on the record of such conviction satisfi

1991Where there has been a final criminal conviction, proof on the record of such conviction satisfies the Committee on Legal Ethics’ burden of proving an ethical violation arising from such conviction. “3. ‘ “Section 23, Part E, Article VI of the By-Laws of the West Virginia State Bar imposes upon any Court before which an attorney has been qualified a mandatory duty to annul the license of such attorney to practice law upon proof that he has been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.” Point 2, syllabus, In The Matter of Mann, 151 W.Va. 644 [ 154 S.E.2d 860 (1967)].’ Syllabus, In Re S

1991Where there has been a final criminal conviction, proof on the record of such conviction satisfies the Committee on Legal Ethics’ burden of proving an ethical violation arising from such conviction. “3. ‘ “Section 23, Part E, Article VI of the By-Laws of the West Virginia State Bar imposes upon any Court before which an attorney has been qualified a mandatory duty to annul the license of such attorney to practice law upon proof that he has been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.” Point 2, syllabus, In The Matter of Mann, 151 W.Va. 644 [ 154 S.E.2d 860 (1967)].’ Syllabus, In Re S

2021This Court has emphasized that a lawyer who holds public office is held to a higher ethical standard because of his or her position of public trust: “Ethical violations by a lawyer holding a public office are viewed as more egregious because of the betrayal of the public trust attached to the office.” Roark, 181 W.Va. at 261 , 382 S.E.2d at 314 , Syl.

2021This Court has emphasized that a lawyer who holds public office is held to a higher ethical standard because of his or her position of public trust: “Ethical violations by a lawyer holding a public office are viewed as more egregious because of the betrayal of the public trust attached to the office.” Roark, 181 W.Va. at 261 , 382 S.E.2d at 314 , Syl.

1995Although this Court, in Frame , stated that “[t]o establish an ethical violation under Rule 1.7(a), one does not have to prove prejudicial impact[,]” 189 W.Va. at 644 , 433 S.E.2d at 582 , we also looked at the following comment to that Rule: Relevant factors in determining whether there is potential for adverse effect include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer’s relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise.

1995Although this Court, in Frame , stated that “[t]o establish an ethical violation under Rule 1.7(a), one does not have to prove prejudicial impact[,]” 189 W.Va. at 644 , 433 S.E.2d at 582 , we also looked at the following comment to that Rule: Relevant factors in determining whether there is potential for adverse effect include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer’s relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise.

1998In syllabus point one of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, 216 S.E.2d 236 (1975), we explained that “[i]n a court proceeding initiated by the Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar to annul the license of an attorney to practice law, the burden is on the Committee to prove, by full, preponderating and clear evidence, the charges contained in the Committee’s complaint.” Syllabus point two of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Six, 181 W.Va. 52 , 380 S.E.2d 219 (1989), further instructs that “[w]here there has been a final criminal conviction, proof on the record of such conviction

1998In syllabus point one of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, 216 S.E.2d 236 (1975), we explained that “[i]n a court proceeding initiated by the Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar to annul the license of an attorney to practice law, the burden is on the Committee to prove, by full, preponderating and clear evidence, the charges contained in the Committee’s complaint.” Syllabus point two of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Six, 181 W.Va. 52 , 380 S.E.2d 219 (1989), further instructs that “[w]here there has been a final criminal conviction, proof on the record of such conviction

1995In accord Syl. pt. 2, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Moore, supra; Syl. pt. 1, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Boettner, 183 W.Va. 136 , 394 S.E.2d 735 (1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 209 , 121 L.Ed.2d 149 (1992).

1994In accord Syl. pt. 2, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Moore, supra; Syl. pt. 1, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Boettner, Jr., 183 W.Va. 136 , 394 S.E.2d 736 (1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 209 , 121 L.Ed.2d 149 (1992).

1995In accord Syl. pt. 2, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Moore, supra; Syl. pt. 1, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Boettner, 183 W.Va. 136 , 394 S.E.2d 735 (1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 209 , 121 L.Ed.2d 149 (1992).

1994In accord Syl. pt. 2, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Moore, supra; Syl. pt. 1, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Boettner, Jr., 183 W.Va. 136 , 394 S.E.2d 736 (1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 209 , 121 L.Ed.2d 149 (1992).

1991In Re Berzito, 156 W.Va. 201 , 192 S.E.2d 227 (1972); In Re West, 155 W.Va. 648 , 186 S.E.2d 776 (1972).

1991In Re Berzito, 156 W.Va. 201 , 192 S.E.2d 227 (1972); In Re West, 155 W.Va. 648 , 186 S.E.2d 776 (1972).

1991Where there has been a final criminal conviction, proof on the record of such conviction satisfies the Committee on Legal Ethics’ burden of proving an ethical violation arising from such conviction. “3. ‘ “Section 23, Part E, Article VI of the By-Laws of the West Virginia State Bar imposes upon any Court before which an attorney has been qualified a mandatory duty to annul the license of such attorney to practice law upon proof that he has been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.” Point 2, syllabus, In The Matter of Mann, 151 W.Va. 644 [ 154 S.E.2d 860 (1967)].’ Syllabus, In Re S

1991Where there has been a final criminal conviction, proof on the record of such conviction satisfies the Committee on Legal Ethics’ burden of proving an ethical violation arising from such conviction. “3. ‘ “Section 23, Part E, Article VI of the By-Laws of the West Virginia State Bar imposes upon any Court before which an attorney has been qualified a mandatory duty to annul the license of such attorney to practice law upon proof that he has been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.” Point 2, syllabus, In The Matter of Mann, 151 W.Va. 644 [ 154 S.E.2d 860 (1967)].’ Syllabus, In Re S

2001In Nicholas v. Sammons, 178 W.Va. 631 , 363 S.E.2d 516 (1987), this Court articulated two general policy considerations that underlie the necessity of disqualification.

2001In Nicholas v. Sammons, 178 W.Va. 631 , 363 S.E.2d 516 (1987), this Court articulated two general policy considerations that underlie the necessity of disqualification.

2001Id. at 408 , 452 S.E.2d at 724 .

2001Id. at 408 , 452 S.E.2d at 724 .

2000However, due to the complexity of human relationships and the myriad unique factual situations which may arise, it is a difficult proposition to write a rule which is fair and equitable under all circumstances.” 192 W.Va. at 530 n. 2, 453 S.E.2d at 364 n. 2.

2000Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. v. Mac-Queen, 187 W.Va. 97, 102 , 416 S.E.2d 55, 60 (1992) (noting "the ethical requirement that attorneys must 'avoid, as much as is possible, the appearance of impropriety’ ” (quoting Graf v. Frame, 177 W.Va. 282, 289 , 352 S.E.2d 31, 38 (1986) (citation omitted))); Committee on Legal Ethics of The West Virginia State Bar v. Tatterson, 173 W.Va. 613, 617 , 319 S.E.2d 381, 386 (1984) (" ‘An attorney's conduct should avoid even the appearance of impropriety.’ ” (quoting Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So.2d 437, 444 (La. 1976)) (footnote omitted)).

1997In In the Matter of Boese, 186 W.Va. 46 , 410 S.E.2d 282 (1991), we found an ethical violation in a magistrate’s attempt to use her judicial position to threaten her ex-spouse with arrest for driving under the influence.

1997In In the Matter of Boese, 186 W.Va. 46 , 410 S.E.2d 282 (1991), we found an ethical violation in a magistrate’s attempt to use her judicial position to threaten her ex-spouse with arrest for driving under the influence.

1997Under Canon 3B(7), a judicial officer is prohibited from engaging in ex parte communications or communications outside the presence of the parties in a pending proceeding. 6 With respect to ex parte communications, the Commentary explains that: “The prescriptions against communications concerning a proceeding includes communications from lawyers, law teachers, and other persons who are not participants in the proceeding, except to the limited extent permitted.” In In the Matter of Eplin, 187 W.Va. 131 , 416 S.E.2d 248 (1992), we found an ethical violation where a magistrate intervening on beha

1997Under Canon 3B(7), a judicial officer is prohibited from engaging in ex parte communications or communications outside the presence of the parties in a pending proceeding. 6 With respect to ex parte communications, the Commentary explains that: “The prescriptions against communications concerning a proceeding includes communications from lawyers, law teachers, and other persons who are not participants in the proceeding, except to the limited extent permitted.” In In the Matter of Eplin, 187 W.Va. 131 , 416 S.E.2d 248 (1992), we found an ethical violation where a magistrate intervening on beha

1996However, as stated in syllabus point 3 of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 174 W.Va. 494 , 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1028 , 105 S.Ct. 1395 , 84 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985): “This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys’ licenses to practice law.” In view of the circumstances herein and in view of the respondent’s prior violation of Rule 1.7(a), this Court is of the opinion that a public reprimand is warranted.

1996However, as stated in syllabus point 3 of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 174 W.Va. 494 , 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1028 , 105 S.Ct. 1395 , 84 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985): “This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys’ licenses to practice law.” In view of the circumstances herein and in view of the respondent’s prior violation of Rule 1.7(a), this Court is of the opinion that a public reprimand is warranted.

1996However, as stated in syllabus point 3 of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 174 W.Va. 494 , 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1028 , 105 S.Ct. 1395 , 84 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985): “This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys’ licenses to practice law.” In view of the circumstances herein and in view of the respondent’s prior violation of Rule 1.7(a), this Court is of the opinion that a public reprimand is warranted.

1996However, as stated in syllabus point 3 of Committee on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 174 W.Va. 494 , 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1028 , 105 S.Ct. 1395 , 84 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985): “This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys’ licenses to practice law.” In view of the circumstances herein and in view of the respondent’s prior violation of Rule 1.7(a), this Court is of the opinion that a public reprimand is warranted.