9 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev.green2 sentences2006See Gentile v State Bar of Nevada, 501 US 1030, 1048 ; 111 S Ct 2720 ; 115 L Ed 2d 888 (1991). 2006See Gentile v State Bar of Nevada, 501 US 1030, 1048 ; 111 S Ct 2720 ; 115 L Ed 2d 888 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Friedman v. Dozorcgreen1 sentence2002Further, “under no circumstances could a lawyer properly represent both the plaintiff and the defendant in contested litigation.” Friedman v Dozorc, 412 Mich 1, 24, n 10 ; 312 NW2d *198 585 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Osbornegreen2 sentences1999However, the brief was returned to him because it was late. [3] The Court of Appeals stated that Mr. Wistrom "committed a serious ethical violation," observing that "[i]t is possible that this violation was unintentional." 230 Mich.App. at 720, n. 4 , 584 N.W.2d 649 . 1999However, the brief was returned to him because it was late. [3] The Court of Appeals stated that Mr. Wistrom "committed a serious ethical violation," observing that "[i]t is possible that this violation was unintentional." 230 Mich.App. at 720, n. 4 , 584 N.W.2d 649 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Allengreen2 sentences1998We recognized that when an “alleged accomplice invokes the privilege in the presence of the jury, prejudice arises from the human tendency to treat the claim of privilege as a confession of crime, creating an adverse inference which an accused is powerless to combat by cross-examination.” [Id. at 645, quoting State v Allen, 224 NW2d 237, 241 (Iowa, 1974).] We again addressed this issue in People v Dyer, 425 Mich 572 ; 390 NW2d 645 (1986), in which the defendant wanted to put a witness on the stand solely to have him assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury in order to support 1998We recognized that when an "alleged accomplice invokes the privilege in the presence of the jury, prejudice arises from the human tendency to treat the claim of privilege as a confession of crime, creating an adverse inference which an accused is powerless to combat by cross-examination." [ Id. at 645 , 250 N.W.2d 492 , quoting State v. Allen, 224 N.W.2d 237, 241 (Iowa, 1974).] We again addressed this issue in People v. Dyer, 425 Mich. 572 , 390 N.W.2d 645 (1986), in which the defendant wanted to put a witness on the stand solely to have him assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the | 1 | 1 |
People v. Giacalonegreen2 sentences1998We recognized that when an "alleged accomplice invokes the privilege in the presence of the jury, prejudice arises from the human tendency to treat the claim of privilege as a confession of crime, creating an adverse inference which an accused is powerless to combat by cross-examination." [ Id. at 645 , 250 N.W.2d 492 , quoting State v. Allen, 224 N.W.2d 237, 241 (Iowa, 1974).] We again addressed this issue in People v. Dyer, 425 Mich. 572 , 390 N.W.2d 645 (1986), in which the defendant wanted to put a witness on the stand solely to have him assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the 1998Giacalone turned on the Court's acceptance of the reference in the ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice [1] to the ethical rule that "[a] lawyer may not knowingly offer inadmissable evidence or call a witness knowing that he will claim a valid privilege not to testify." Giacalone at 645, 250 N.W.2d 492 . | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.green2 sentences1973An attorney's negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence in handling clients' affairs can constitute an ethical violation of standards imposed upon the Bar. [2] Numerous Michigan cases stand for the proposition that it is breach of an attorney's ethical obligation to the Bar and to his or her client to settle a case without specific authority. [3] Most recently, we held in Henderson v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 374 Mich 142 ; 132 NW2d 75 (1965) that: "`[A]n attorney at law has no power, by virtue of his general retainer, to compromise his client's cause of action; but that pre 1973An attorney's negligence, inattention, or professional incompetence in handling clients' affairs can constitute an ethical violation of standards imposed upon the Bar. [2] Numerous Michigan cases stand for the proposition that it is breach of an attorney's ethical obligation to the Bar and to his or her client to settle a case without specific authority. [3] Most recently, we held in Henderson v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 374 Mich 142 ; 132 NW2d 75 (1965) that: "`[A]n attorney at law has no power, by virtue of his general retainer, to compromise his client's cause of action; but that pre | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barkley v. City of Detroit
green
2 sentences2006“It is a well-established ethical principle that ‘an attorney owes undivided allegiance to a client and usually may not represent parties on both sides of a dispute.’ ” Evans & Luptak, PLC v Lizza, 251 Mich App 187, 197 ; 650 NW2d 364 (2002), quoting Barkley v Detroit, 204 Mich App 194, 203 ; 514 NW2d 242 (1994). 2006“It is a well-established ethical principle that ‘an attorney owes undivided allegiance to a client and usually may not represent parties on both sides of a dispute.’ ” Evans & Luptak, PLC v Lizza, 251 Mich App 187, 197 ; 650 NW2d 364 (2002), quoting Barkley v Detroit, 204 Mich App 194, 203 ; 514 NW2d 242 (1994). | 2 | 2002–2006 |
Killingbeck v. Killingbeck
green
2 sentences2025“It is a well-established ethical principle that an attorney owes undivided allegiance to a client and usually may not represent parties on both sides of a dispute.” Killingbeck v Killingbeck, 269 Mich App 132, 148 ; 711 NW2d 759 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2025“It is a well-established ethical principle that an attorney owes undivided allegiance to a client and usually may not represent parties on both sides of a dispute.” Killingbeck v Killingbeck, 269 Mich App 132, 148 ; 711 NW2d 759 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Doyle
green
1 sentence2021Our Supreme Court has also held that “several factors need to be considered in deciding whether to disqualify an entire prosecutor’s office.” Osborne II, citing Doyle, 159 Mich App at 644-647 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza
green
2 sentences2006“It is a well-established ethical principle that ‘an attorney owes undivided allegiance to a client and usually may not represent parties on both sides of a dispute.’ ” Evans & Luptak, PLC v Lizza, 251 Mich App 187, 197 ; 650 NW2d 364 (2002), quoting Barkley v Detroit, 204 Mich App 194, 203 ; 514 NW2d 242 (1994). 2006“It is a well-established ethical principle that ‘an attorney owes undivided allegiance to a client and usually may not represent parties on both sides of a dispute.’ ” Evans & Luptak, PLC v Lizza, 251 Mich App 187, 197 ; 650 NW2d 364 (2002), quoting Barkley v Detroit, 204 Mich App 194, 203 ; 514 NW2d 242 (1994). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Smith v. Goguen
green
2 sentences2006Moreover, it requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Where a statute’s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts. [Smith v Goguen, 415 US 566, 572-573 ; 94 S Ct 1242 ; 39 L Ed 2d 605 (1974).] But, an ethical rule that would normally be void for vagueness will escape invalidation if a state court has o 2006Moreover, it requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Where a statute’s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts. [Smith v Goguen, 415 US 566, 572-573 ; 94 S Ct 1242 ; 39 L Ed 2d 605 (1974).] But, an ethical rule that would normally be void for vagueness will escape invalidation if a state court has o | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Cuyler v. Sullivan
green
1 sentence2000Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively represented conflicting interests’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’ Cuyler v Sullivan, supra, 446 US [350, 348] (footnote omitted.).” [In re Osborne, supra at 230 Mich App 717 .] Further, we held that although the ethical violation may have been unintended, Mr. Wistrom’s prosecution of his former client in the same proceeding violated the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, MRPC 1.11(c)(1) and MRPC 1.9(a). 1 We acknowledged the *601 position of the petitione | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Grant
green
2 sentences2000Nonetheless, relying in part on People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 553 ; 520 NW2d 123 (1994), 2 we held that although respondent’s fifth court-appointed attorney made no objection regarding the conflict of interest, the error was plain 3 and warranted reversal irrespective of actual prejudice. 2000Nonetheless, relying in part on People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 553 ; 520 NW2d 123 (1994), 2 we held that although respondent’s fifth court-appointed attorney made no objection regarding the conflict of interest, the error was plain 3 and warranted reversal irrespective of actual prejudice. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Dyer
green
2 sentences1998We recognized that when an “alleged accomplice invokes the privilege in the presence of the jury, prejudice arises from the human tendency to treat the claim of privilege as a confession of crime, creating an adverse inference which an accused is powerless to combat by cross-examination.” [Id. at 645, quoting State v Allen, 224 NW2d 237, 241 (Iowa, 1974).] We again addressed this issue in People v Dyer, 425 Mich 572 ; 390 NW2d 645 (1986), in which the defendant wanted to put a witness on the stand solely to have him assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury in order to support 1998We recognized that when an “alleged accomplice invokes the privilege in the presence of the jury, prejudice arises from the human tendency to treat the claim of privilege as a confession of crime, creating an adverse inference which an accused is powerless to combat by cross-examination.” [Id. at 645, quoting State v Allen, 224 NW2d 237, 241 (Iowa, 1974).] We again addressed this issue in People v Dyer, 425 Mich 572 ; 390 NW2d 645 (1986), in which the defendant wanted to put a witness on the stand solely to have him assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury in order to support | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Hartman v. Frontier City, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1973Even more on point is the recent Court of Appeals decision in Hartman v Frontier City, Inc, 20 Mich App 274 ; 174 NW2d 48 (1969). 1973Even more on point is the recent Court of Appeals decision in Hartman v Frontier City, Inc, 20 Mich App 274 ; 174 NW2d 48 (1969). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.