59 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1956–2026 19 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc.green2 sentences2026Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 218 (1988) (quoting Gov't of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978)). "[A] person's right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that 'there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement.'" Ibid. (quoting Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 477 (1980)). [Comando v. Nugiel, 436 N.J. 2022Recognizing "that a person's right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that 'there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement[,]'" the Court ultimately concluded "that an order disqualifying counsel on the eve of trial would do more to erode the confidence of the public in the legal profession and the judicial process than would an order allowing the firm to continue its representation of the plaintiff." Id. at 218-19 (quoting Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 477 (1980)). | 10 | 13 |
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.green2 sentences2026Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 218 (1988) (quoting Gov't of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978)). "[A] person's right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that 'there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement.'" Ibid. (quoting Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 477 (1980)). [Comando v. Nugiel, 436 N.J. 2025In striking that balance, courts must consider that "a person's right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement." Id. at 274 (quoting Dewey, 109 N.J. at 218 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 9 | 21 |
State v. Lucarellogreen2 sentences1997The Supreme Court noted in Dewey, supra, that: We recognize that a person’s right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that “there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement.” Reardon v. Marlayne, supra, 83 N.J. at 477 , 416 A.2d 852 ; State v. Lucarello, 135 N.J.Super. 347, 353 , 343 A.2d 465 (App.Div.), aff'd o.b., 69 N.J. 31 , 350 A.2d 226 (1975). [Dewey, supra, 109 N.J. at 218 , 536 A.2d 243 ] The Court also created a mechanism for the determination of disqualification issues. 1997The Supreme Court noted in Dewey, supra, that: We recognize that a person’s right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that “there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement.” Reardon v. Marlayne, supra, 83 N.J. at 477 , 416 A.2d 852 ; State v. Lucarello, 135 N.J.Super. 347, 353 , 343 A.2d 465 (App.Div.), aff'd o.b., 69 N.J. 31 , 350 A.2d 226 (1975). [Dewey, supra, 109 N.J. at 218 , 536 A.2d 243 ] The Court also created a mechanism for the determination of disqualification issues. | 2 | 6 |
City of Atlantic City v. Truposgreen2 sentences2026Super. 203, 213 (App. Div. 2014) (alteration in original).] A-0198-25 12 Whether counsel should be disqualified is an issue of law "subject to de novo plenary appellate review." City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 463 (2010); State v. Hudson, 443 N.J. 2024City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 463 (2010). "[A] person's right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that 'there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement.'" Dewey v. R.J. | 2 | 4 |
Twenty-First Century Rail Corp. v. New Jersey Transit Corp.green2 sentences2025Super. 184 , 192 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Dewey, 109 N.J. at 205 ). "[T]o strike that balance fairly, courts are required to recognize and to consider that 'a person's right to retain counsel of [their] choice is limited in that there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement.'" Twenty-First Century Rail Corp., 210 N.J. at 274 A-3454-23 9 (quoting Dewey, 109 N.J. at 218 ). 2025Transit Corp., 210 N.J. 264, 273-74 (2012) (quoting Dewey, 109 N.J. at 218 ). "[T]o strike that balance fairly[,]" courts are required "to recognize and to consider that 'a person's right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement.'" Mauer, 481 N.J. | 2 | 4 |
The Government of India and the Food Corporation of India v. Cook Industries, Inc. And Cook and Companygreen2 sentences2026Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 218 (1988) (quoting Gov't of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978)). "[A] person's right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that 'there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement.'" Ibid. (quoting Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 477 (1980)). [Comando v. Nugiel, 436 N.J. 2026Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 218 (1988) (quoting Gov't of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978)). "[A] person's right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that 'there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement.'" Ibid. (quoting Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 477 (1980)). [Comando v. Nugiel, 436 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Chreste v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1998See Chreste v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 77 , 186 S.W. 919 (1916); Drinker’s Legal Ethics, p. 28 et seq. 1998See Chreste v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 77 , 186 S.W. 919 (1916); Drinker’s Legal Ethics, p. 28 et seq. | 2 | 2 |
State of New Jersey v. David Hudsongreen1 sentence2026Super. 203, 213 (App. Div. 2014) (alteration in original).] A-0198-25 12 Whether counsel should be disqualified is an issue of law "subject to de novo plenary appellate review." City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 463 (2010); State v. Hudson, 443 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Elizabeth A. Comando v. Mary F. Nugielgreen1 sentence2026Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 218 (1988) (quoting Gov't of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978)). "[A] person's right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that 'there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement.'" Ibid. (quoting Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 477 (1980)). [Comando v. Nugiel, 436 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Complaint of PMD Enterprises Inc.green2 sentences2026The "fundamental tenet of professional responsibility" found in RPC 5.3 is that "an attorney may not do through an agent that which he could not do himself." In re PMD Enters., 215 F. Supp. 2d 519, 529 (D.N.J. 2002). 2026The "fundamental tenet of professional responsibility" found in RPC 5.3 is that "an attorney may not do through an agent that which he could not do himself." In re PMD Enters., 215 F. Supp. 2d 519, 529 (D.N.J. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
In re Zisagreen1 sentence2023See In re Zisa, 385 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Penagreen1 sentence2021In re Pena, 162 N.J. 15, 17 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Robinsongreen1 sentence2017Although plaintiff sought 18 A-3957-15T2 an award of attorney's fees in his complaint, in granting summary judgment to plaintiff, the court denied awarding attorney's fees noting "[n]o basis to award counsel fees was presented to the [c]ourt[.]" This court "'will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest.'" Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014) (quoting State v. Robi | 1 | 1 |
Tahir Zaman v. Barbara Felton (072128)green1 sentence2017Although plaintiff sought 18 A-3957-15T2 an award of attorney's fees in his complaint, in granting summary judgment to plaintiff, the court denied awarding attorney's fees noting "[n]o basis to award counsel fees was presented to the [c]ourt[.]" This court "'will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest.'" Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014) (quoting State v. Robi | 1 | 1 |
Herbert v. Haytaiangreen1 sentence2016Therefore, "'[i]f there be any doubt as to the propriety of an attorney's representation of a client, such doubt must be resolved in favor of disqualification.'" Herbert v. Haytaian, 292 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Baxt v. Liloiagreen2 sentences2004See Baxt v. Liloia, 155 N.J. 190 , 714 A. 2d 271 (1998). 2004See Baxt v. Liloia, 155 N.J. 190 , 714 A. 2d 271 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
| Ahto v. Weavergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Yaccarinogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Grossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Galatigreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Fostergreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Pennicagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lucarello
neutral
2 sentences1997The Supreme Court noted in Dewey, supra, that: We recognize that a person’s right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that “there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement.” Reardon v. Marlayne, supra, 83 N.J. at 477 , 416 A.2d 852 ; State v. Lucarello, 135 N.J.Super. 347, 353 , 343 A.2d 465 (App.Div.), aff'd o.b., 69 N.J. 31 , 350 A.2d 226 (1975). [Dewey, supra, 109 N.J. at 218 , 536 A.2d 243 ] The Court also created a mechanism for the determination of disqualification issues. 1997The Supreme Court noted in Dewey, supra, that: We recognize that a person’s right to retain counsel of his or her choice is limited in that “there is no right to demand to be represented by an attorney disqualified because of an ethical requirement.” Reardon v. Marlayne, supra, 83 N.J. at 477 , 416 A.2d 852 ; State v. Lucarello, 135 N.J.Super. 347, 353 , 343 A.2d 465 (App.Div.), aff'd o.b., 69 N.J. 31 , 350 A.2d 226 (1975). [Dewey, supra, 109 N.J. at 218 , 536 A.2d 243 ] The Court also created a mechanism for the determination of disqualification issues. | 4 | 1980–1997 |
Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus
green
2 sentences1995Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 128 N.J. 10 , 607 A. 2d 142 (1992), again confirmed that "any [contractual] provision, whether direct or indirect, that operates so as to restrict a lawyer's post-termination practice will contravene the ethical rule." Id. at 18 , 607 A. 2d 142 . 1995Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 128 N.J. 10 , 607 A. 2d 142 (1992), again confirmed that "any [contractual] provision, whether direct or indirect, that operates so as to restrict a lawyer's post-termination practice will contravene the ethical rule." Id. at 18 , 607 A. 2d 142 . | 2 | 1994–1995 |
State v. Riley
green
2 sentences1994Super. 383 , 523 A. 2d 1089 (App.Div. 1987), "if a lawyer violates the rules he may subject himself to disciplinary proceedings but we know of no per se bar to the admissibility of information ... based upon the ethical violation." Id. at 390 , 523 A. 2d 1089 . 1994Super. 383 , 523 A. 2d 1089 (App.Div. 1987), "if a lawyer violates the rules he may subject himself to disciplinary proceedings but we know of no per se bar to the admissibility of information ... based upon the ethical violation." Id. at 390 , 523 A. 2d 1089 . | 2 | 1992–1994 |
In Re Wilson
green
2 sentences1986This matter, like In re Hein, 104 N.J. 297 (1986), and In re Romano, 104 N.J. 306 (1986), both also decided today, arises from a Report and Recommendation of the Disciplinary Review Board that respondent be disbarred because of a knowing misappropriation of clients’ funds, an ethical violation calling for disbarment under In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451 (1979). 1986This matter arises from a Report and Recommendation of the Disciplinary Review Board that respondent be disbarred because of a knowing misappropriation of clients’ funds, an ethical violation calling for disbarment under In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451 (1979). | 2 | 1986–1986 |
In Re Biederman
green
2 sentences1975As pointed out by the court in In re Biederman, 63 N.J. 396 (1973): The ethical requirement that an attorney who has been a public employee may not, upon retirement, act on behalf of a private client in any matter upon which he was engaged in the public interest is neither new, ambiguous nor difficult to understand. 1975As pointed out by the court in In re Biederman, 63 N.J. 396 (1973): The ethical requirement that an attorney who has been a public employee may not, upon retirement, act on behalf of a private client in any matter upon which he was engaged in the public interest is neither new, ambiguous nor difficult to understand. | 2 | 1975–1975 |
Innes Ex Rel. Innes v. Marzano-Lesnevich
green
1 sentence2017Super. 198 (App. Div. 2014), aff'd in part and modified in part, 224 N.J. 584 (2016), allows a non- client third party to recover attorney's fees from a lawyer as a result of the lawyer's ethical violation if the lawyer owed an independent duty to that third party. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Feaster
green
2 sentences2000State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 85-87 , 716 A.2d 395 (1998). 2000State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 85-87 , 716 A.2d 395 (1998). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Matter of Noonan
green
2 sentences1999Misappropriation that results in disbarment “consists simply of a lawyer taking a client’s money entrusted to him, knowing that it is the client’s money and knowing that the client has not authorized the taking.” In re Noonan, 102 N.J. 157, 160 , 506 A.2d 722 (1986). 1999Misappropriation that results in disbarment “consists simply of a lawyer taking a client’s money entrusted to him, knowing that it is the client’s money and knowing that the client has not authorized the taking.” In re Noonan, 102 N.J. 157, 160 , 506 A.2d 722 (1986). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Matter of Trueger
neutral
2 sentences1998In similar cases, where attorneys have asserted a disorder, illness or condition as a mitigating factor, we have required "adequate proof that the underlying disability was so severe as to excuse or mitigate the ethical violation." In re Trueger, 140 N.J. 103, 116 , 657 A. 2d 847 (1995). 1998In similar cases, where attorneys have asserted a disorder, illness or condition as a mitigating factor, we have required "adequate proof that the underlying disability was so severe as to excuse or mitigate the ethical violation." In re Trueger, 140 N.J. 103, 116 , 657 A. 2d 847 (1995). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
In Re Frankel
green
2 sentences1998We characterized the conduct as "reprehensible and vicious" and a "serious transgression of the ethical principle[s]." Id. at 598 , 120 A. 2d 603 . 1998We characterized the conduct as "reprehensible and vicious" and a "serious transgression of the ethical principle[s]." Id. at 598 , 120 A. 2d 603 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.
green
1 sentence1996Id. at 64, 417 A. 2d 505 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Morelli
green
2 sentences1996State v. Lucarello, 135 N.J.Super. 347, 353 , 343 A.2d 465 (App.Div.1975), affd o.b., 69 N.J. 31 , 350 A.2d 226 (1975) (cited in State v. Morelli, supra, 152 N.J.Super. at 71 , 377 A.2d 774 ). 1996State v. Lucarello, 135 N.J.Super. 347, 353 , 343 A.2d 465 (App.Div.1975), affd o.b., 69 N.J. 31 , 350 A.2d 226 (1975) (cited in State v. Morelli, supra, 152 N.J.Super. at 71 , 377 A.2d 774 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Matter of Yaccarino
green
2 sentences1995We previously have evaluated an attorney’s misconduct by determining whether he had “known that what he was doing was unethical and improper, and that he could have refrained or desisted from doing what he did.” In re Yaccarino, 117 N.J. 175, 196 , 564 A.2d 1184 (1989). 1995We previously have evaluated an attorney’s misconduct by determining whether he had “known that what he was doing was unethical and improper, and that he could have refrained or desisted from doing what he did.” In re Yaccarino, 117 N.J. 175, 196 , 564 A.2d 1184 (1989). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
La Mantia v. Durst
green
1 sentence1995Court Rules, comment R. 1:14.] [10] Cf. LaMantia v. Durst, 234 N.J. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Jansson v. Fairleigh Dickinson University green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Darby green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Ramseur green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Bucanis green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Vega-Murrillo v. Looney green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Duncan v. Rhay green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Matter of Hein green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Matter of Romano green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| In re Sugarman neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Brown v. United States green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.