ethical violation in Arizona

2026See In re Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458 , 470 ¶ 47 (2020) (“When reviewing the conduct of prosecutors in the context of ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ claims, courts should differentiate between ‘error,’ which may not necessarily imply a concurrent ethical rules violation, and ‘misconduct,’ which may suggest an ethical violation.”).

2025We “differentiate between ‘error,’ which may not necessarily imply a concurrent ethical rules violation, and ‘misconduct,’ which may suggest an ethical violation.” In re Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458 , 470 ¶ 47 (2020).

2023State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, ¶ 51 (2007). ¶24 The statements here were within that permissible range.

2021Romero must demonstrate the error was “so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial.” See id. (quoting State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 335, ¶ 46 (2007)). ¶16 Romero has failed to carry his burden.

2021We will reverse for prosecutorial error if “(1) the prosecutor committed misconduct and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the prosecutor’s misconduct could have affected the verdict.” State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 465, ¶ 193 (2016).

2021See Matter of Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458 , 470, ¶ 47 (2020) (“When reviewing the conduct of prosecutors in the context of ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ claims, courts should differentiate between ‘error,’ which may not necessarily imply a concurrent ethical rules violation, and ‘misconduct,’ which may suggest an ethical violation.”). 4 with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 465 , ¶ 193 (quoting State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79, ¶ 26 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2021To succeed on a claim of prosecutorial error, “a defendant must 2 “When reviewing the conduct of prosecutors in the context of ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ claims, courts should differentiate between ‘error,’ which may not necessarily imply a concurrent ethical rules violation, and ‘misconduct,’ which may suggest an ethical violation.” Matter of Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458 , 470, ¶ 47 (2020). 4 demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Johnson, 247 Ariz. 166, 200, ¶ 133 (2019) (quoting Sta

2021To prove prosecutorial error, a defendant 2 must show that the error “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” See State v. Johnson, 247 Ariz. 166, 200, ¶ 133 (2019) (quoting State v. Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. 197 , 216, ¶ 66 (2018)).

2007See In re Taylor, 180 Ariz. 290, 292 , 883 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1994) (concluding that respondent who admittedly “knew that he should not be practicing [law] during [a period of suspension]” knowingly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law); see also In re Tocco, 194 Ariz. 453, 457, ¶ 11 , 984 P.2d 539, 543 (1999) (holding that “a mere showing that the attorney reasonably should have known her conduct was in violation of the rules, without more, is insufficient” to establish a knowing ethical violation); In re Levine, 174 Ariz. 146, 171 , 847 P.2d 1093, 1118 (1993) (indicating that the knowle

2007See In re Taylor, 180 Ariz. 290, 292 , 883 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1994) (concluding that respondent who admittedly “knew that he should not be practicing [law] during [a period of suspension]” knowingly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law); see also In re Tocco, 194 Ariz. 453, 457, ¶ 11 , 984 P.2d 539, 543 (1999) (holding that “a mere showing that the attorney reasonably should have known her conduct was in violation of the rules, without more, is insufficient” to establish a knowing ethical violation); In re Levine, 174 Ariz. 146, 171 , 847 P.2d 1093, 1118 (1993) (indicating that the knowle

2007See In re Taylor, 180 Ariz. 290, 292 , 883 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1994) (concluding that respondent who admittedly “knew that he should not be practicing [law] during [a period of suspension]” knowingly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law); see also In re Tocco, 194 Ariz. 453, 457, ¶ 11 , 984 P.2d 539, 543 (1999) (holding that “a mere showing that the attorney reasonably should have known her conduct was in violation of the rules, without more, is insufficient” to establish a knowing ethical violation); In re Levine, 174 Ariz. 146, 171 , 847 P.2d 1093, 1118 (1993) (indicating that the knowle

2007See In re Taylor, 180 Ariz. 290, 292 , 883 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1994) (concluding that respondent who admittedly “knew that he should not be practicing [law] during [a period of suspension]” knowingly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law); see also In re Tocco, 194 Ariz. 453, 457, ¶ 11 , 984 P.2d 539, 543 (1999) (holding that “a mere showing that the attorney reasonably should have known her conduct was in violation of the rules, without more, is insufficient” to establish a knowing ethical violation); In re Levine, 174 Ariz. 146, 171 , 847 P.2d 1093, 1118 (1993) (indicating that the knowle

2007See In re Taylor, 180 Ariz. 290, 292 , 883 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1994) (concluding that respondent who admittedly “knew that he should not be practicing [law] during [a period of suspension]” knowingly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law); see also In re Tocco, 194 Ariz. 453, 457, ¶ 11 , 984 P.2d 539, 543 (1999) (holding that “a mere showing that the attorney reasonably should have known her conduct was in violation of the rules, without more, is insufficient” to establish a knowing ethical violation); In re Levine, 174 Ariz. 146, 171 , 847 P.2d 1093, 1118 (1993) (indicating that the knowle

2007See In re Taylor, 180 Ariz. 290, 292 , 883 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1994) (concluding that respondent who admittedly “knew that he should not be practicing [law] during [a period of suspension]” knowingly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law); see also In re Tocco, 194 Ariz. 453, 457, ¶ 11 , 984 P.2d 539, 543 (1999) (holding that “a mere showing that the attorney reasonably should have known her conduct was in violation of the rules, without more, is insufficient” to establish a knowing ethical violation); In re Levine, 174 Ariz. 146, 171 , 847 P.2d 1093, 1118 (1993) (indicating that the knowle

2007See In re Walker, 200 Ariz. 155, 160, ¶ 20 , 24 P.3d 602, 607 (2001).

2007See In re Walker, 200 Ariz. 155, 160, ¶ 20 , 24 P.3d 602, 607 (2001).

2004Cf. In re Wolfram, 174 Ariz. 49, 53 , 847 P.2d 94, 98 (1993) (holding that a trial court’s finding of ineffective assistance of counsel in a Rule 32 proceeding does not "necessarily equate” to a finding of "a violation of our ethical rules”).

2004Cf. In re Wolfram, 174 Ariz. 49, 53 , 847 P.2d 94, 98 (1993) (holding that a trial court’s finding of ineffective assistance of counsel in a Rule 32 proceeding does not "necessarily equate” to a finding of "a violation of our ethical rules”).

2025Id. at 416 ¶ 9 n.3; see id. at 418 ¶ 17. ¶75 The panel found that Sponsel violated this ethical rule regarding the October 17 defendants, Walker, and Villa by “engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Specifically, the panel concluded that Sponsel “violated duties owed to her client, to members of the public, to the legal system, and to the [legal] profession.” In reaching this conclusion, the panel noted the harm suffered by Collins and Amy Kaper. 5 Collins testified that he was “terrified” after being arrested, that this incident “shook his faith in law en

2025Id. at 416 ¶ 9 n.3; see id. at 418 ¶ 17. ¶75 The panel found that Sponsel violated this ethical rule regarding the October 17 defendants, Walker, and Villa by “engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Specifically, the panel concluded that Sponsel “violated duties owed to her client, to members of the public, to the legal system, and to the [legal] profession.” In reaching this conclusion, the panel noted the harm suffered by Collins and Amy Kaper. 5 Collins testified that he was “terrified” after being arrested, that this incident “shook his faith in law en

2022Cases decided before Martinez generally do not make that distinction, referring to instances of prosecutorial impropriety as “misconduct.” See, e.g., id. at 463-65, ¶¶ 9-19 . 6 “Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 611 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 241, ¶ 25 (2001); accord Lee, 189 Ariz. at 616 . ¶22 Etienne points to five statements that he cont

2022Cases decided before Martinez generally do not make that distinction, referring to instances of prosecutorial impropriety as “misconduct.” See, e.g., id. at 463-65, ¶¶ 9-19 . 6 “Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 611 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 241, ¶ 25 (2001); accord Lee, 189 Ariz. at 616 . ¶22 Etienne points to five statements that he cont

2022Gilbert characterizes his claims as “prosecutorial misconduct” but does not appear to suggest they implicate the prosecutor’s ethical culpability; thus, we use the term “prosecutorial error.” In re Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458 , 470, ¶ 47 (2020) (“When reviewing the conduct of prosecutors in the context of ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ claims, courts should differentiate between ‘error,’ which may not necessarily imply a concurrent ethical rules violation, and ‘misconduct,’ which may suggest an ethical violation.”). ¶20 “Because the trial court is in the best position to determine the effect of a pros

2022Cases decided before Martinez generally do not make that distinction, referring to instances of prosecutorial impropriety as “misconduct.” See, e.g., id. at 463-65, ¶¶ 9-19 . 6 “Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 611 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 241, ¶ 25 (2001); accord Lee, 189 Ariz. at 616 . ¶22 Etienne points to five statements that he cont

2021Romero must demonstrate the error was “so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial.” See id. (quoting State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 335, ¶ 46 (2007)). ¶16 Romero has failed to carry his burden.

2021See Matter of Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458 , 470, ¶ 47 (2020) (“When reviewing the conduct of prosecutors in the context of ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ claims, courts should differentiate between ‘error,’ which may not necessarily imply a concurrent ethical rules violation, and ‘misconduct,’ which may suggest an ethical violation.”). 4 with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 465 , ¶ 193 (quoting State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79, ¶ 26 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2021To succeed on a claim of prosecutorial error, “a defendant must 2 “When reviewing the conduct of prosecutors in the context of ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ claims, courts should differentiate between ‘error,’ which may not necessarily imply a concurrent ethical rules violation, and ‘misconduct,’ which may suggest an ethical violation.” Matter of Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458 , 470, ¶ 47 (2020). 4 demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Johnson, 247 Ariz. 166, 200, ¶ 133 (2019) (quoting Sta

2020See, e.g., State v. Valdez, 160 Ariz. 9, 14 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Krone v. Hotham, 181 Ariz. 364 (1995) (noting that “in cases where there has been misconduct of either the prosecutor or defense counsel, but reversal is not required, the proper remedy will be affirmance, followed by institution of bar disciplinary proceedings against the offending lawyer, if such proceedings are warranted” (emphasis added)). ¶46 The American Bar Association (ABA) has recognized this distinction and urged courts in criminal cases, “when reviewing the conduct of prosecutors[,] to differentiate be

2020See, e.g., State v. Valdez, 160 Ariz. 9, 14 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Krone v. Hotham, 181 Ariz. 364 (1995) (noting that “in cases where there has been misconduct of either the prosecutor or defense counsel, but reversal is not required, the proper remedy will be affirmance, followed by institution of bar disciplinary proceedings against the offending lawyer, if such proceedings are warranted” (emphasis added)). ¶46 The American Bar Association (ABA) has recognized this distinction and urged courts in criminal cases, “when reviewing the conduct of prosecutors[,] to differentiate be

2015Moriber v. Dreiling, 95 So.3d 449, 454 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2012).

2007Although we consider the recommendation of the Hearing Officer and the Commission, “the responsibility to decide upon the appropriate sanction in a disciplinary proceeding is ultimately ours.” Peasley, 208 Ariz. at 33, ¶ 23 , 90 P.3d at 770 (quoting 6 Although failure to respond need not be done in bad faith or to obstruct the disciplinary process to constitute an ethical violation, see Ariz. R.

2007Although we consider the recommendation of the Hearing Officer and the Commission, “the responsibility to decide upon the appropriate sanction in a disciplinary proceeding is ultimately ours.” Peasley, 208 Ariz. at 33, ¶ 23 , 90 P.3d at 770 (quoting 6 Although failure to respond need not be done in bad faith or to obstruct the disciplinary process to constitute an ethical violation, see Ariz. R.

2006Construing an ethical rule quite similar to ER 5.6, [5] the court found that the provision was not prohibited because it did "not expressly or completely prohibit the [attorneys] from engaging in the practice of law, or from representing clients." Id. at 848.

2006Construing an ethical rule quite similar to ER 5.6, 5 the court found that the provision was not prohibited because it did “not expressly or completely prohibit the [attorneys] from engaging in the practice of law, or from representing clients.” Id. at 848.

2005At the time of the trial court proceedings, ER 5.6(a) provided: Restrictions on Right to Practice A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: (a) a partnership[ 3 ] or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement;____ ER 5.6. 4 ¶ 13 The ethical rule guarding against restrictive covenants among lawyers was created to “prevent[ ] lawyers from ‘bartering in clients,’ thereby protecting the client’s freedom to choose, discharge, or replace a lawyer at will.” Anderson v.

2000See Lopata v. Miller, 122 Md.App. 76 , 712 A.2d 24, 31 (1998) (determining that real estate agent had no duty based on licensing and ethical provisions of Maryland Code); Johnson Realty, Inc. v. Hand, 189 Ga.App. 706 , 377 S.E.2d 176, 180-81 (1988) (stating that standards promulgated by the Georgia Real Estate Commission have no bearing on civil liability, but are "solely for the regulatory purpose of licensing"); see also Shapiro v. McNeill, 92 N.Y.2d 91 , 677 N.Y.S.2d 48 , 699 N.E.2d 407, 409 (1998) (concluding that an attorney's ethical violation "will not, in and of itself, create a duty t

2000See Lopata v. Miller, 122 Md.App. 76 , 712 A.2d 24, 31 (1998) (determining that real estate agent had no duty based on licensing and ethical provisions of Maryland Code); Johnson Realty, Inc. v. Hand, 189 Ga.App.706, 377 S.E.2d 176, 180-81 (1988) (stating that standards promulgated by the Georgia Real Estate Commission have no bearing on civil liability, but are “solely for the regulatory purpose of licensing”); see also Shapiro v. McNeill, 92 N.Y.2d 91 , 677 N.Y.S.2d 48 , 699 N.E.2d 407, 409 (1998) (concluding that an attorney’s ethical violation “will not, in and of itself, create a duty tha

2000See Lopata v. Miller, 122 Md.App. 76 , 712 A.2d 24, 31 (1998) (determining that real estate agent had no duty based on licensing and ethical provisions of Maryland Code); Johnson Realty, Inc. v. Hand, 189 Ga.App.706, 377 S.E.2d 176, 180-81 (1988) (stating that standards promulgated by the Georgia Real Estate Commission have no bearing on civil liability, but are “solely for the regulatory purpose of licensing”); see also Shapiro v. McNeill, 92 N.Y.2d 91 , 677 N.Y.S.2d 48 , 699 N.E.2d 407, 409 (1998) (concluding that an attorney’s ethical violation “will not, in and of itself, create a duty tha

2000See Lopata v. Miller, 122 Md.App. 76 , 712 A.2d 24, 31 (1998) (determining that real estate agent had no duty based on licensing and ethical provisions of Maryland Code); Johnson Realty, Inc. v. Hand, 189 Ga.App.706, 377 S.E.2d 176, 180-81 (1988) (stating that standards promulgated by the Georgia Real Estate Commission have no bearing on civil liability, but are “solely for the regulatory purpose of licensing”); see also Shapiro v. McNeill, 92 N.Y.2d 91 , 677 N.Y.S.2d 48 , 699 N.E.2d 407, 409 (1998) (concluding that an attorney’s ethical violation “will not, in and of itself, create a duty tha

2000See Lopata v. Miller, 122 Md.App. 76 , 712 A.2d 24, 31 (1998) (determining that real estate agent had no duty based on licensing and ethical provisions of Maryland Code); Johnson Realty, Inc. v. Hand, 189 Ga.App.706, 377 S.E.2d 176, 180-81 (1988) (stating that standards promulgated by the Georgia Real Estate Commission have no bearing on civil liability, but are “solely for the regulatory purpose of licensing”); see also Shapiro v. McNeill, 92 N.Y.2d 91 , 677 N.Y.S.2d 48 , 699 N.E.2d 407, 409 (1998) (concluding that an attorney’s ethical violation “will not, in and of itself, create a duty tha

2000See Lopata v. Miller, 122 Md.App. 76 , 712 A.2d 24, 31 (1998) (determining that real estate agent had no duty based on licensing and ethical provisions of Maryland Code); Johnson Realty, Inc. v. Hand, 189 Ga.App.706, 377 S.E.2d 176, 180-81 (1988) (stating that standards promulgated by the Georgia Real Estate Commission have no bearing on civil liability, but are “solely for the regulatory purpose of licensing”); see also Shapiro v. McNeill, 92 N.Y.2d 91 , 677 N.Y.S.2d 48 , 699 N.E.2d 407, 409 (1998) (concluding that an attorney’s ethical violation “will not, in and of itself, create a duty tha