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18 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1897–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howellgreen2 sentences2017A violation of an ethical rule 'should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer' or 'necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation.' Supreme Court Rule 226, Scope [20]; see also OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 260 Kan. 305, 325 , 918 P.2d 1274 (1996) (discussing Supreme Court Rule 226; ethics rules do not impose legal duty on attorneys). 2017A violation of an ethical rule 'should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer' or 'necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation.' Supreme Court Rule 226, Scope [20]; see also OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 260 Kan. 305, 325 , 918 P.2d 1274 (1996) (discussing Supreme Court Rule 226; ethics rules do not impose legal duty on attorneys). | 2 | 2 |
Beck v. BD. OF REGENTS OF STATE OF KAN.green2 sentences2016Kan. 1981).” Beck v. Bd. of Regents of State of Kan., 568 F. Supp. 1107, 1110 (D. 1995Even then, the court should not act unless ‘the offending attorney’s conduct threatens to “taint the underlying trial” with a serious ethical violation.’ ” (Quoting Beck v. Board of Regents of the State of Kansas, 568 F. Supp. 1107, 1110 [D. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Timleygreen1 sentence2024See Timley, 255 Kan. at 296 ("The ethical rule prohibiting an attorney from representing a client when there is a conflict of interest is for the benefit of the client. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hurdgreen2 sentences2019See State v. Hurd , 298 Kan. 555 , 570, 316 P.3d 696 (2013) ("Recusal is required under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when the judge is actually biased or there is a constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias."); State v. Sawyer , 297 Kan. 902 , 909, 305 P.3d 608 (2013) (test asks "whether the judge had a duty to recuse from the case because the judge was biased, prejudiced, or partial" and "whether the judge's failure to recuse resulted in actual bias or prejudice"). 2019See State v. Hurd , 298 Kan. 555 , 570, 316 P.3d 696 (2013) ("Recusal is required under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when the judge is actually biased or there is a constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias."); State v. Sawyer , 297 Kan. 902 , 909, 305 P.3d 608 (2013) (test asks "whether the judge had a duty to recuse from the case because the judge was biased, prejudiced, or partial" and "whether the judge's failure to recuse resulted in actual bias or prejudice"). | 1 | 1 |
Field v. Freedmangreen1 sentence2016Even then, the court should not act unless ‘the offending attorney’s conduct threatens to “taint the underlying trial” with a serious ethical violation.’ Field v. Freedman, 527 F. Supp. 935, 940 (D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Huffmanred2 sentences2026See In re Spencer, 317 Kan. 70 , 85-86, 524 P.3d 57 (2023) (rejecting the jointly agreed to sanction of a 90-day suspension because of the Disciplinary Administrator's faulty legal theory of liability); In re Huffman, 315 Kan. 641 , 682-83, 509 P.3d 1253 (2022) (stating that harsh criticism of a judge demonstrated 'a serious lack of judgment' but did not rise to the level of an ethical violation under either KRPC 3.5[d] or KRPC 8.2[a]); In re Todd, 308 Kan. 133 , 136, 418 P.3d 1265 (2018) (rejecting the disciplinary panel's conclusion that respondent had violated KRPC 8.1[b] despite respondent 2024See In re Spencer, 317 Kan. 70 , 85-86, 524 P.3d 57 (2023) (rejecting the jointly agreed to sanction of a 90-day suspension because of the Disciplinary Administrator's faulty legal theory of liability); In re Huffman, 315 Kan. 641 , 682-83, 509 P.3d 1253 (2022) (stating that harsh criticism of a judge demonstrated "a serious lack of 38 judgment" but did not rise to the level of an ethical violation under either KRPC 3.5[d] or KRPC 8.2[a]); In re Todd, 308 Kan. 133 , 136, 418 P.3d 1265 (2018) (rejecting the disciplinary panel's conclusion that respondent had violated KRPC 8.1[b] despite respond | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Todd – (
neutral
2 sentences2026See In re Spencer, 317 Kan. 70 , 85-86, 524 P.3d 57 (2023) (rejecting the jointly agreed to sanction of a 90-day suspension because of the Disciplinary Administrator's faulty legal theory of liability); In re Huffman, 315 Kan. 641 , 682-83, 509 P.3d 1253 (2022) (stating that harsh criticism of a judge demonstrated 'a serious lack of judgment' but did not rise to the level of an ethical violation under either KRPC 3.5[d] or KRPC 8.2[a]); In re Todd, 308 Kan. 133 , 136, 418 P.3d 1265 (2018) (rejecting the disciplinary panel's conclusion that respondent had violated KRPC 8.1[b] despite respondent 2024See In re Spencer, 317 Kan. 70 , 85-86, 524 P.3d 57 (2023) (rejecting the jointly agreed to sanction of a 90-day suspension because of the Disciplinary Administrator's faulty legal theory of liability); In re Huffman, 315 Kan. 641 , 682-83, 509 P.3d 1253 (2022) (stating that harsh criticism of a judge demonstrated "a serious lack of 38 judgment" but did not rise to the level of an ethical violation under either KRPC 3.5[d] or KRPC 8.2[a]); In re Todd, 308 Kan. 133 , 136, 418 P.3d 1265 (2018) (rejecting the disciplinary panel's conclusion that respondent had violated KRPC 8.1[b] despite respond | 2 | 2024–2026 |
State v. Stovall
green
2 sentences2025See Coleman, 318 Kan. at 319; State v. Stovall, 298 Kan. 362, 372 , 312 P.3d 1271 (2013). 2025See Coleman, 318 Kan. at 319; State v. Stovall, 298 Kan. 362, 372 , 312 P.3d 1271 (2013). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Sawyer
green
2 sentences2019See State v. Hurd , 298 Kan. 555 , 570, 316 P.3d 696 (2013) ("Recusal is required under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when the judge is actually biased or there is a constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias."); State v. Sawyer , 297 Kan. 902 , 909, 305 P.3d 608 (2013) (test asks "whether the judge had a duty to recuse from the case because the judge was biased, prejudiced, or partial" and "whether the judge's failure to recuse resulted in actual bias or prejudice"). 2019See State v. Hurd , 298 Kan. 555 , 570, 316 P.3d 696 (2013) ("Recusal is required under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when the judge is actually biased or there is a constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias."); State v. Sawyer , 297 Kan. 902 , 909, 305 P.3d 608 (2013) (test asks "whether the judge had a duty to recuse from the case because the judge was biased, prejudiced, or partial" and "whether the judge's failure to recuse resulted in actual bias or prejudice"). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In Re Bryan
green
2 sentences2019"The ethical requirement of confidentiality is ... interpreted broadly, with the exceptions being few and narrowly limited." In re Bryan , 275 Kan. 202 , 222, 61 P.3d 641 (2003). 2019"The ethical requirement of confidentiality is ... interpreted broadly, with the exceptions being few and narrowly limited." In re Bryan , 275 Kan. 202 , 222, 61 P.3d 641 (2003). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Nix v. Whiteside
green
2 sentences2014Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 , 106 S. Ct. 988 , 89 L. 2014Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 , 106 S. Ct. 988 , 89 L. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co.
green
1 sentence2013To that end, and independent of the ethical rules governing attorney conduct in Kansas, we find tire attorney-client relationship between the parties in this case is sufficient to establish the existence of Richard’s legal duty, fiduciary in character, binding him “to the highest degree of fidelity and good faith to his client on account of the trust and confidence imposed.” Ford, 220 Kan. 244 , Syl. ¶ 3. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Mickens v. Taylor
green
1 sentence2012In resolving this case on the grounds on which it was presented to us, we do not rule upon the need for the [Cuyler v. ] Sullivan prophylaxis in cases of successive representation.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 176 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In Re Quinn
green
2 sentences2001Arabia respectfully reminds this court that the mere finding that a lawyer’s requested fee is too high does not carry with it any implication of ethical impropriety, and of the following passages from In re Quinn, 25 N.J. 284, 289-90 , 135 A.2d 869 (1957): “The intangibles which bear upon the fairness of a fee [citation omitted] defy translation into simple mathematics. 2001Arabia respectfully reminds this court that the mere finding that a lawyer’s requested fee is too high does not carry with it any implication of ethical impropriety, and of the following passages from In re Quinn, 25 N.J. 284, 289-90 , 135 A.2d 869 (1957): “The intangibles which bear upon the fairness of a fee [citation omitted] defy translation into simple mathematics. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Stakes
neutral
2 sentences2001State v. Stakes, 227 Kan. 711, 720 , 608 P.2d 997 (1980).” Attorneys may be guilty of boorish conduct without such actions becoming an ethical violation. 2001State v. Stakes, 227 Kan. 711, 720 , 608 P.2d 997 (1980).” Attorneys may be guilty of boorish conduct without such actions becoming an ethical violation. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.
green
1 sentence1997“In determining whether disqualification is required, courts have examined various factors, including (1) the nature of the ethical violation, (2) the prejudice to the parties, including the extent of actual or potential delay in the proceedings, (3) the effectiveness of counsel in light of the violations, and (4) the public’s perception of the profession. [Citation omitted.] In addition, whether or not a motion to disqualify has been used as a tactical device or a means of harassment should also be considered. [Citations omitted.]” 936 F. Supp. at 703 . *459 But see Kabi Pharmacia AB v. Alcon | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Kabi Pharmacia AB v. Alcon Surgical, Inc.
green
1 sentence1997“In determining whether disqualification is required, courts have examined various factors, including (1) the nature of the ethical violation, (2) the prejudice to the parties, including the extent of actual or potential delay in the proceedings, (3) the effectiveness of counsel in light of the violations, and (4) the public’s perception of the profession. [Citation omitted.] In addition, whether or not a motion to disqualify has been used as a tactical device or a means of harassment should also be considered. [Citations omitted.]” 936 F. Supp. at 703 . *459 But see Kabi Pharmacia AB v. Alcon | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Manoir-Electroalloys Corp. v. Amalloy Corp.
green
1 sentence1997Del. 1992); and Manoir-Electroalloys Corp. v. Amalloy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 188 (D.N.J. 1989), where disqualification was ordered. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Smelting Co. v. Kemp
green
1 sentence1897Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, § 165 ; Smelting Company v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 ; Houck v. Kelsey, 17 Kan. 333 ; Carithers v. Weaver, 7 id. 110 ; Green v. Barker et al., 47 Neb. 934 , 66 N. W. | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Sherry v. Sampson
neutral
1 sentence1897The Supreme Court in Sherry v. Sampson ( 11 Kan. 611 ), says: “And a person who has no interest in the land will not be allowed to raise any question as to whether the probate judge has made the deed to the proper person or not.’’ This is the universally recognized rule, as I read the cases and the text writers; it is the reasonable rule, the ethical rule, the logical rule. | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Houck v. Kelsey
neutral
2 sentences1897Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, § 165 ; Smelting Company v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 ; Houck v. Kelsey, 17 Kan. 333 ; Carithers v. Weaver, 7 id. 110 ; Green v. Barker et al., 47 Neb. 934 , 66 N. W. 1897Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, § 165 ; Smelting Company v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 ; Houck v. Kelsey, 17 Kan. 333 ; Carithers v. Weaver, 7 id. 110 ; Green v. Barker et al., 47 Neb. 934 , 66 N. W. | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Green v. Barker
neutral
2 sentences1897Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, § 165 ; Smelting Company v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 ; Houck v. Kelsey, 17 Kan. 333 ; Carithers v. Weaver, 7 id. 110 ; Green v. Barker et al., 47 Neb. 934 , 66 N. W. 1897Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, § 165 ; Smelting Company v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 ; Houck v. Kelsey, 17 Kan. 333 ; Carithers v. Weaver, 7 id. 110 ; Green v. Barker et al., 47 Neb. 934 , 66 N. W. | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.