ethical violation in Wyoming

2005Finally, the appellant argues that this case is distinguishable from Billings v. Wyoming Bd. of Outfitters and Professional Guides, 2004 WY 42, ¶¶ 51-52 , 88 P.3d 455, 474-75 (Wyo.2004) (Billings II), where we concluded that expert testimony was not required to prove the professional standard and a breach thereof where an outfitter willfully abandoned a client on a wilderness trail, because [njeither the nature of the violation, nor the facts underlying it, involves subject matter "not within our knowledge" or requiring additional expert testimony.

2005Finally, the appellant argues that this case is distinguishable from Billings v. Wyoming Bd. of Outfitters and Professional Guides, 2004 WY 42, ¶¶ 51-52 , 88 P.3d 455, 474-75 (Wyo.2004) (Billings II), where we concluded that expert testimony was not required to prove the professional standard and a breach thereof where an outfitter willfully abandoned a client on a wilderness trail, because [njeither the nature of the violation, nor the facts underlying it, involves subject matter "not within our knowledge" or requiring additional expert testimony.

2001After we determined there was a similar error in Clark, we applied the analysis set forth in Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 261, 264 (Wyo.1991), which stated that an ethical violation, not brought by the prevailing party, will be reversed only if it results in manifest injustice.

1998In Moore, 809 P.2d at 264 , we held that an ethical violation, not brought about by the prevailing party, will be reversed only if it resulted in manifest injustice.

2005Robbins v. Robbins, 2002 WY 80, ¶¶ 6-10 , 46 P.3d 880, 882-83 (Wyo.2002); also see Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145 (Wyo.1998), and Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43 , 22 P.3d 861 (Wyo.2001). [¶ 19] Of course, we would like to see errors of this sort disappear entirely from proceedings such as this, but we also said in Robbins, ¶¶ 8-10, 46 P.3d at 882 -83: Clark also stands for the proposition that such an ethical violation not instigated by the prevailing party would not require reversal unless it somehow resulted in a manifest injustice.

2005Robbins v. Robbins, 2002 WY 80, ¶¶ 6-10 , 46 P.3d 880, 882-83 (Wyo.2002); also see Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145 (Wyo.1998), and Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43 , 22 P.3d 861 (Wyo.2001). [¶ 19] Of course, we would like to see errors of this sort disappear entirely from proceedings such as this, but we also said in Robbins, ¶¶ 8-10, 46 P.3d at 882 -83: Clark also stands for the proposition that such an ethical violation not instigated by the prevailing party would not require reversal unless it somehow resulted in a manifest injustice.

2001"Manifest injustice 'contemplate[s] a situation that is unmistakable or indisputable, was not foreseeable, and affects the substantial rights of a party' " Clark, 953 P.2d at 154 (quoting McCarthy v. State, 945 P.2d 775, 777 (Wyo.1997)).

2000However, it must be kept in mind that "breach of an ethical standard does not nee-essarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel." Nix v. Whiteside, 4745 U.S. 157 , 165, 106 S.Ct. 988, 998 , 89 LEd.2d 123 (1986); U.S. v. Gallegos, 39 F.3d 276, 279 (10th Cir. 1994).

1990To be compared is Johnson v. Morris, 445 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn.App. 1989), where the court first recognized that excessive force in arrest may be unconstitutional and "[q]ualified immunity of public officials for purposes of a section 1983 action does not automatically confer immunity from state law claims." The court stated in Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 676-77 (Minn. 1988) (quoting Creighton, 107 S.Ct. at 3041 ): [43] [D]efendants urge that qualified immunity for purposes of Section 1983 also applies to state law claims.

1990To be compared is Johnson v. Morris, 445 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn.App.1989), where the court first recognized that excessive force in arrest may be unconstitutional and “[qualified immunity of public officials for purposes of a section 1983 action does not automatically confer immunity from state law claims.” The court stated in Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 676-77 (Minn.1988) (quoting Creighton, 107 S.Ct. at 3041 ): 43 [Defendants urge that qualified immunity for purposes of Section 1983 also applies to state law claims.

1990To be compared is Johnson v. Morris, 445 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn.App. 1989), where the court first recognized that excessive force in arrest may be unconstitutional and "[q]ualified immunity of public officials for purposes of a section 1983 action does not automatically confer immunity from state law claims." The court stated in Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 676-77 (Minn. 1988) (quoting Creighton, 107 S.Ct. at 3041 ): [43] [D]efendants urge that qualified immunity for purposes of Section 1983 also applies to state law claims.

1990To be compared is Johnson v. Morris, 445 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn.App.1989), where the court first recognized that excessive force in arrest may be unconstitutional and “[qualified immunity of public officials for purposes of a section 1983 action does not automatically confer immunity from state law claims.” The court stated in Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 676-77 (Minn.1988) (quoting Creighton, 107 S.Ct. at 3041 ): 43 [Defendants urge that qualified immunity for purposes of Section 1983 also applies to state law claims.