transaction rule in Montana

2025See State v. Derbyshire, 2009 MT 27, ¶ 29 , 349 Mont. 114 , 201 P.3d 811 . ¶18 The District Court concluded the transaction rule did not apply because the evidence of Socheath’s seat belt use was neither inextricably linked to, nor explanatory of, Loera’s conduct.

2025See State v. Derbyshire, 2009 MT 27, ¶ 29 , 349 Mont. 114 , 201 P.3d 811 . ¶18 The District Court concluded the transaction rule did not apply because the evidence of Socheath’s seat belt use was neither inextricably linked to, nor explanatory of, Loera’s conduct.

2009As we stated in State v. Crosley, 2009 MT 126 , 350 Mont. 223 , 206 P.3d 932 , The transaction rule acknowledges that “a longstanding distinction exists between Rule 404(b) ‘other crimes’ evidence and evidence of a defendant’s misconduct which is inseparably related to the alleged criminal act.” Thus, the requirements of the Modified Just Rule are not applied to evidence that ‘is not wholly independent or unrelated to the charged offense.” Crosley , ¶ 48 (quoting State v. Lozon, 2004 MT 34, ¶ 12 , 320 Mont. 26 , 85 P.3d 753 ). ¶42 The State argues that the disputed prior bad act evidence in th

2009As we stated in State v. Crosley, 2009 MT 126 , 350 Mont. 223 , 206 P.3d 932 , The transaction rule acknowledges that “a longstanding distinction exists between Rule 404(b) ‘other crimes’ evidence and evidence of a defendant’s misconduct which is inseparably related to the alleged criminal act.” Thus, the requirements of the Modified Just Rule are not applied to evidence that ‘is not wholly independent or unrelated to the charged offense.” Crosley , ¶ 48 (quoting State v. Lozon, 2004 MT 34, ¶ 12 , 320 Mont. 26 , 85 P.3d 753 ). ¶42 The State argues that the disputed prior bad act evidence in th

2023State v. Sage, 2010 MT 156, ¶ 39 , 357 Mont. 99 , 235 P.3d 1284 . 13 ¶20 “Admissibility under the transaction rule is predicated on the jury’s right to hear what [transpired] immediately prior and subsequent to the commission of the offense charged, so that they may evaluate the evidence in the context in which the criminal act occurred.” State v. Michelotti, 2018 MT 158, ¶ 13 , 392 Mont. 33 , 420 P.3d 1020 (internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted).

2023State v. Sage, 2010 MT 156, ¶ 39 , 357 Mont. 99 , 235 P.3d 1284 . 13 ¶20 “Admissibility under the transaction rule is predicated on the jury’s right to hear what [transpired] immediately prior and subsequent to the commission of the offense charged, so that they may evaluate the evidence in the context in which the criminal act occurred.” State v. Michelotti, 2018 MT 158, ¶ 13 , 392 Mont. 33 , 420 P.3d 1020 (internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted).

2012For that matter, subsequent to Marshall , the Court cautioned that “the transaction rule should not be permitted to admit propensity evidence that would otherwise be excluded by Rule 404(b).” State v. Guill, 2010 MT 69, ¶ 26 , 355 Mont. 490 , 228 P.3d 1152 (citing State v. Berosik, 2009 MT 260, ¶ 46 , 352 Mont. 16 , 214 P.3d 776 ); accord State v. Sage, 2010 MT 156, ¶ 36 , 357 Mont. 99 , 235 P.3d 1284 .

2012For that matter, subsequent to Marshall , the Court cautioned that “the transaction rule should not be permitted to admit propensity evidence that would otherwise be excluded by Rule 404(b).” State v. Guill, 2010 MT 69, ¶ 26 , 355 Mont. 490 , 228 P.3d 1152 (citing State v. Berosik, 2009 MT 260, ¶ 46 , 352 Mont. 16 , 214 P.3d 776 ); accord State v. Sage, 2010 MT 156, ¶ 36 , 357 Mont. 99 , 235 P.3d 1284 .

2018"Admissibility under the transaction rule is 'predicated on the jury's right to hear what transgressed immediately prior and subsequent to the commission of the offense charged, so that they may evaluate the evidence *1025 in the context in which the criminal act occurred.' " State v. Detonancour , 2001 MT 213 , ¶ 29, 306 Mont. 389 , 34 P.3d 487 (quoting State v. Wing , 264 Mont. 215 , 225, 870 P.2d 1368 , 1374 (1994) ).

2018"Admissibility under the transaction rule is 'predicated on the jury's right to hear what transgressed immediately prior and subsequent to the commission of the offense charged, so that they may evaluate the evidence *1025 in the context in which the criminal act occurred.' " State v. Detonancour , 2001 MT 213 , ¶ 29, 306 Mont. 389 , 34 P.3d 487 (quoting State v. Wing , 264 Mont. 215 , 225, 870 P.2d 1368 , 1374 (1994) ).

2010See State v. Lozon, 2004 MT 34, ¶ 12 , 320 Mont. 26 , 85 P.3d 753 (noting that the prosecution is not required to comply with Just and Matt’s notice requirement where the evidence at issue is admissible under the transaction rule). ¶21 Anderson disputed the prosecutor’s analyses under both the transaction rule and the Modified Just Rule.

2010See State v. Lozon, 2004 MT 34, ¶ 12 , 320 Mont. 26 , 85 P.3d 753 (noting that the prosecution is not required to comply with Just and Matt’s notice requirement where the evidence at issue is admissible under the transaction rule). ¶21 Anderson disputed the prosecutor’s analyses under both the transaction rule and the Modified Just Rule.

2010As support for this proposition, the State cites State v. Berosik, 2009 MT 260, ¶ 46 , 352 Mont. 16 , 214 P.3d 776 , which in turn cites my special concurrence in State v. Crosley, 2009 MT 126, ¶ 67 , 350 Mont. 223 , 206 P.3d 932 , where I argued (presciently) that if this Court did not rein in its ever-expanding pronouncements concerning the scope of the transaction rule, the rule would completely swallow the Modified Just Rule and Rule 404(b)’s general prohibition against character evidence.

2010As support for this proposition, the State cites State v. Berosik, 2009 MT 260, ¶ 46 , 352 Mont. 16 , 214 P.3d 776 , which in turn cites my special concurrence in State v. Crosley, 2009 MT 126, ¶ 67 , 350 Mont. 223 , 206 P.3d 932 , where I argued (presciently) that if this Court did not rein in its ever-expanding pronouncements concerning the scope of the transaction rule, the rule would completely swallow the Modified Just Rule and Rule 404(b)’s general prohibition against character evidence.

2021State v. Buck, 2006 MT 81, ¶ 81 , 331 Mont. 517 , 134 P.3d 53 . ¶40 While we make no conclusions as to why Denny’s trial counsel stipulated to the evidence, we reject Denny’s theory on appeal that no plausible justification existed for trial counsel’s failure to object to such evidence.

2021State v. Buck, 2006 MT 81, ¶ 81 , 331 Mont. 517 , 134 P.3d 53 . ¶40 While we make no conclusions as to why Denny’s trial counsel stipulated to the evidence, we reject Denny’s theory on appeal that no plausible justification existed for trial counsel’s failure to object to such evidence.

2010Citing State v. Derbyshire, 2009 MT 27, ¶¶ 32-33 , 349 Mont. 114 , 201 P.3d 811 , and State v. Hansen, 1999 MT 253, ¶ 96 , 296 Mont. 282 , 989 P.3d 388 , Douglas contends that this formulation of the transaction rule is an erroneous remnant of the discredited doctrines of res gestae and corpus delicti. ¶26 We conclude that the District Court did not err in employing the “inextricably linked” formulation of the transaction rule.

2010Citing State v. Derbyshire, 2009 MT 27, ¶¶ 32-33 , 349 Mont. 114 , 201 P.3d 811 , and State v. Hansen, 1999 MT 253, ¶ 96 , 296 Mont. 282 , 989 P.3d 388 , Douglas contends that this formulation of the transaction rule is an erroneous remnant of the discredited doctrines of res gestae and corpus delicti. ¶26 We conclude that the District Court did not err in employing the “inextricably linked” formulation of the transaction rule.

2026Recognizing that when evidence tends to show consciousness of guilt it “tends to prove the commission of a crime and the defendant’s responsibility for it,” this Court has held that if a defendant’s subsequent acts demonstrate a consciousness of guilt as to the crime charged, those acts are “intertwined with the evidence of the proof of the crime itself” and therefore relevant and admissible under the transaction rule.3 State v. Moore, 254 Mont. 241, 245-46 , 836 P.2d 604, 607 (1992). ¶57 In Moore, we considered the admissibility of a defendant’s acts of concealment subsequent to the crime cha

2026Recognizing that when evidence tends to show consciousness of guilt it “tends to prove the commission of a crime and the defendant’s responsibility for it,” this Court has held that if a defendant’s subsequent acts demonstrate a consciousness of guilt as to the crime charged, those acts are “intertwined with the evidence of the proof of the crime itself” and therefore relevant and admissible under the transaction rule.3 State v. Moore, 254 Mont. 241, 245-46 , 836 P.2d 604, 607 (1992). ¶57 In Moore, we considered the admissibility of a defendant’s acts of concealment subsequent to the crime cha

2010Evid. 404(b) and the Modified Just Rule (see State v. Just, 184 Mont. 262, 269, 274 , 602 P.2d 957, 961, 963-64 (1979), modified, State v. Matt, 249 Mont. 136, 142-43 , 814 P.2d 52, 56 (1991)). ¶51 The problem is that it is much easier for prosecutors and trial courts to shotgun evidence into a trial under the transaction rule than it is to comply with the exacting substantive and procedural requirements of M.

2010Evid. 404(b) and the Modified Just Rule (see State v. Just, 184 Mont. 262, 269, 274 , 602 P.2d 957, 961, 963-64 (1979), modified, State v. Matt, 249 Mont. 136, 142-43 , 814 P.2d 52, 56 (1991)). ¶51 The problem is that it is much easier for prosecutors and trial courts to shotgun evidence into a trial under the transaction rule than it is to comply with the exacting substantive and procedural requirements of M.

2009Bowie, 232 F.3d at 928-29 . 4 “See United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1332 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that the inextricably intertwined doctrine is sometimes labeled res gestae, ‘an appellation that tends merely to obscure the analysis underlying the admissibility of the evidence.’).” Bowie, 232 F.3d at 928 n. 2. 35 ¶75 Likewise here, the appropriate course of action with respect to the transaction rule is to apply the plain (and clearly narrow) language of § 26-1-103, MCA, and to require the prosecution in all other instances to comply with the requirements of the Modified Just Rule.

2009Bowie, 232 F.3d at 928-29 . ¶75 Likewise here, the appropriate course of action with respect to the transaction rule is to apply the plain (and clearly narrow) language of § 26-1-103, MCA, and to require the prosecution in all other instances to comply with the requirements of the Modified Just Rule.

2010Evid. 404(b) and the Modified Just Rule (see State v. Just, 184 Mont. 262, 269, 274 , 602 P.2d 957, 961, 963-64 (1979), modified, State v. Matt, 249 Mont. 136, 142-43 , 814 P.2d 52, 56 (1991)). ¶51 The problem is that it is much easier for prosecutors and trial courts to shotgun evidence into a trial under the transaction rule than it is to comply with the exacting substantive and procedural requirements of M.

2010Evid. 404(b) and the Modified Just Rule (see State v. Just, 184 Mont. 262, 269, 274 , 602 P.2d 957, 961, 963-64 (1979), modified, State v. Matt, 249 Mont. 136, 142-43 , 814 P.2d 52, 56 (1991)). ¶51 The problem is that it is much easier for prosecutors and trial courts to shotgun evidence into a trial under the transaction rule than it is to comply with the exacting substantive and procedural requirements of M.

2010Specifically, the State takes the position that evidence of “the Barbara Miller Story” was admissible under the transaction rule because Bill’s death “left perplexing circumstances that required explanation.” Although the State recognizes that this evidence was admissible for a variety of Rule 404(b) purposes-to establish the perpetrator’s “identity” and “motive,” and to show that Stout engaged in a long-term and persistent “preparation or planning” of her husband’s murder-the State maintains that the evidence was properly admitted instead as transaction evidence under § 26-1-103, MCA, to “exp

2010Specifically, the State takes the position that evidence of “the Barbara Miller Story” was admissible under the transaction rule because Bill’s death “left perplexing circumstances that required explanation.” Although the State recognizes that this evidence was admissible for a variety of Rule 404(b) purposes-to establish the perpetrator’s “identity” and “motive,” and to show that Stout engaged in a long-term and persistent “preparation or planning” of her husband’s murder-the State maintains that the evidence was properly admitted instead as transaction evidence under § 26-1-103, MCA, to “exp

2009The State also replies that a Daubert hearing was unnecessary and that McLaughlin waived the issues of foundation and expert testimony by raising them for the first time on appeal. ¶14 The statutory transaction rule states that Twjhere the declaration, act, or omission forms part of a transaction which is itself the fact in dispute or evidence of that fact, such declaration, act, or omission is evidence as part of the transaction.” Section 26-1-103, MCA. ‘Pursuant to the transaction rule, prior acts that are inextricably linked to, and explanatory of, the charged offense are admissible notwith

2009The State also replies that a Daubert hearing was unnecessary and that McLaughlin waived the issues of foundation and expert testimony by raising them for the first time on appeal. ¶14 The statutory transaction rule states that Twjhere the declaration, act, or omission forms part of a transaction which is itself the fact in dispute or evidence of that fact, such declaration, act, or omission is evidence as part of the transaction.” Section 26-1-103, MCA. ‘Pursuant to the transaction rule, prior acts that are inextricably linked to, and explanatory of, the charged offense are admissible notwith