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8 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1938–1991 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Tanton
green
2 sentences1985The same transaction test “is concerned with whether the offenses were committed at the same time, were part of a continuous criminal act and inspired by the same criminal intent.” Tanton, 88 N.M. at 335 , 540 P.2d 813 . 1985The same transaction test “is concerned with whether the offenses were committed at the same time, were part of a continuous criminal act and inspired by the same criminal intent.” Tanton, 88 N.M. at 335 , 540 P.2d 813 . | 4 | 1976–1985 |
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Moszczynski v. Ashe
green
2 sentences1991In Moszczynski, the court went on to describe the necessarily included test as a version of the elements test, applicable to instances involving more than a single act: “Whether a single act or series of acts constitutes two or more separate offenses is determined by whether each offense requires proof of facts additional to those involved in the other.” Id. at 106 , 21 A.2d at 922 . 1991In Moszczynski, the court went on to describe the necessarily included test as a version of the elements test, applicable to instances involving more than a single act: “Whether a single act or series of acts constitutes two or more separate offenses is determined by whether each offense requires proof of facts additional to those involved in the other.” Id. at 106 , 21 A.2d at 922 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Central MacHinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission
green
2 sentences1986Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 448 U.S. 160 , 100 S.Ct. 2592 , 65 L.Ed.2d 684 (1980). 1986Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 448 U.S. 160 , 100 S.Ct. 2592 , 65 L.Ed.2d 684 (1980). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Martinez
green
2 sentences1985This definition of the included offense concept also goes beyond the same evidence test stated in State v. Martinez, 95 N.M. 421 , 622 P.2d 1041 (1981) and Owens v. Abram. 1985This definition of the included offense concept also goes beyond the same evidence test stated in State v. Martinez, 95 N.M. 421 , 622 P.2d 1041 (1981) and Owens v. Abram. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Dosier
green
2 sentences1977The test of whether one criminal offense has merged in another is not “whether two criminal acts are successive steps in the same transaction [the rejected same transaction test, Tanton II, supra] but whether one offense necessarily involves the other.” State v. Martinez, 77 N.M. 745 , 427 P.2d 260 (1967); State v. Dosier, 88 N.M. 32 , 536 P.2d 1088 (Ct.App.1975); Tanton I, supra. As defined, the merger concept has aspects of the included offense concept. 1977The test of whether one criminal offense has merged in another is not “whether two criminal acts are successive steps in the same transaction [the rejected same transaction test, Tanton II, supra] but whether one offense necessarily involves the other.” State v. Martinez, 77 N.M. 745 , 427 P.2d 260 (1967); State v. Dosier, 88 N.M. 32 , 536 P.2d 1088 (Ct.App.1975); Tanton I, supra. As defined, the merger concept has aspects of the included offense concept. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Martinez
green
2 sentences1977The test of whether one criminal offense has merged in another is not “whether two criminal acts are successive steps in the same transaction [the rejected same transaction test, Tanton II, supra] but whether one offense necessarily involves the other.” State v. Martinez, 77 N.M. 745 , 427 P.2d 260 (1967); State v. Dosier, 88 N.M. 32 , 536 P.2d 1088 (Ct.App.1975); Tanton I, supra. As defined, the merger concept has aspects of the included offense concept. 1977The test of whether one criminal offense has merged in another is not “whether two criminal acts are successive steps in the same transaction [the rejected same transaction test, Tanton II, supra] but whether one offense necessarily involves the other.” State v. Martinez, 77 N.M. 745 , 427 P.2d 260 (1967); State v. Dosier, 88 N.M. 32 , 536 P.2d 1088 (Ct.App.1975); Tanton I, supra. As defined, the merger concept has aspects of the included offense concept. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
City of Sacramento v. Adams
green
2 sentences1938The Supreme Court of California in City of Sacramento v. Adams, 171 Cal. 458 , 153 P. 908, 910 , held that section 31 of article 4 of the State Constitution prohibiting the giving or lending of the credit of any county, city, or political subdivision “in aid of or to any person, association, or corporation, whether municipal or otherwise, or to pledge the 'credit thereof,” etc., and further prohibiting the Legislature from making a gift or authorizing the making of any gift “of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal, or other corporation whatever,” did not operate as c 1938The Supreme Court of California in City of Sacramento v. Adams, 171 Cal. 458 , 153 P. 908, 910 , held that section 31 of article 4 of the State Constitution prohibiting the giving or lending of the credit of any county, city, or political subdivision “in aid of or to any person, association, or corporation, whether municipal or otherwise, or to pledge the 'credit thereof,” etc., and further prohibiting the Legislature from making a gift or authorizing the making of any gift “of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal, or other corporation whatever,” did not operate as c | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.