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13 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1914–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Roller v. Basic Construction Co.green2 sentences2008"Action" is defined by Code § 8.01-2, as noted above.[ [8] ] We defined "cause of action" in Roller v. Basic Construction Co., 238 Va. 321, 327 , 384 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1989), as "a set of operative facts which under the substantive law, may give rise to a right of action." Virginia follows the transaction rule set forth in the Restatement of Judgments 2d, § 24 for purposes of defining "cause of action." One "cause of action" may give rise to myriad rights of action, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and statutory claims; however, if the rights of action arise from the sa 2008"Action" is defined by Code § 8.01-2, as noted above.[ [8] ] We defined "cause of action" in Roller v. Basic Construction Co., 238 Va. 321, 327 , 384 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1989), as "a set of operative facts which under the substantive law, may give rise to a right of action." Virginia follows the transaction rule set forth in the Restatement of Judgments 2d, § 24 for purposes of defining "cause of action." One "cause of action" may give rise to myriad rights of action, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and statutory claims; however, if the rights of action arise from the sa | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Marshall Homes, Inc.green2 sentences2008June 5, 1996) ("As can be seen, Virginia follows the transaction rule set forth in the Restatement of Judgments 2d, § 24 for purposes of defining 'cause of action.'"); Davis v. Marshall Homes, Inc., 265 Va. 159 , 576 S.E.2d 504, 515 (2003) (Kinser, J., dissenting) (observing, in case which post-dated the present action, that majority opinion overruled transactional approach that previously applied, commenting "[i]n truth, the effect of the majority's explicit rejection of a transactional approach is to overrule our decision in Allstar Towing. 2008June 5, 1996) ("As can be seen, Virginia follows the transaction rule set forth in the Restatement of Judgments 2d, § 24 for purposes of defining 'cause of action.'"); Davis v. Marshall Homes, Inc., 265 Va. 159 , 576 S.E.2d 504, 515 (2003) (Kinser, J., dissenting) (observing, in case which post-dated the present action, that majority opinion overruled transactional approach that previously applied, commenting "[i]n truth, the effect of the majority's explicit rejection of a transactional approach is to overrule our decision in Allstar Towing. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Spicergreen2 sentences1996See Syl. pt. 1, State v. Spicer, 162 W.Va. 127 , 245 S.E.2d 922 (1978)(excessive evidence about rapes of the victims not admissible as part of the same transaction exception). 1996See Syl. pt. 1, State v. Spicer, 162 W.Va. 127 , 245 S.E.2d 922 (1978)(excessive evidence about rapes of the victims not admissible as part of the same transaction exception). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Millergreen2 sentences1996See State v. Miller, 175 W.Va. 616, 619 , 336 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1985) (In Gilkerson “we made it clear that we had abandoned the same transaction test as articulated in [Dowdy] ... for double jeopardy purposes and *585 that it existed only as a procedural joinder rule[.]”). 1996See State v. Miller, 175 W.Va. 616, 619 , 336 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1985) (In Gilkerson “we made it clear that we had abandoned the same transaction test as articulated in [Dowdy] ... for double jeopardy purposes and *585 that it existed only as a procedural joinder rule[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Davis v. Ruthbell Coal Co.
green
2 sentences1987In Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Ruthbell Coal Co., 133 W.Va. 319 , 56 S.E.2d 549 (1949), we determined that a defendant sued by the State could assert a counterclaim against the State on a matter growing out of the same transaction: “Where the State or a direct governmental agency thereof institutes an action at law or a notice of motion for judgment proceeding against a citizen, Article VI, Section 35, of the West Virginia Constitution, furnishes no defense to a counterclaim growing out of the same transaction as the claim pleaded.” Later, in State Road Comm’n v. Ball, 138 W.Va. 349 , 76 S.E. 1987In Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Ruthbell Coal Co., 133 W.Va. 319 , 56 S.E.2d 549 (1949), we determined that a defendant sued by the State could assert a counterclaim against the State on a matter growing out of the same transaction: “Where the State or a direct governmental agency thereof institutes an action at law or a notice of motion for judgment proceeding against a citizen, Article VI, Section 35, of the West Virginia Constitution, furnishes no defense to a counterclaim growing out of the same transaction as the claim pleaded.” Later, in State Road Comm’n v. Ball, 138 W.Va. 349 , 76 S.E. | 2 | 1957–1987 |
State Ex Rel. Dowdy v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1985Dowdy v. Robinson, 163 W.Va. 154 , 257 S.E.2d 167 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Adkins, 170 W.Va. 46 , 289 S.E.2d 720 (1982), for double jeopardy purposes and that it existed only as a procedural joinder rule: “The same transaction test for double jeopardy purposes is a procedural rule that is not mandated by either the State or federal constitutions but is in furtherance of the general policy enunciated in the double jeopardy clauses.” See also State ex rel. 1982Dowdy v. Robinson, 163 W.Va. 154 , 257 S.E.2d 167 (1979), this Court adopted both the same evidence test and the same transaction test to determine whether double jeopardy rules had been violated. | 2 | 1982–1985 |
State ex rel. Dowdy v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1985Dowdy v. Robinson, 163 W.Va. 154 , 257 S.E.2d 167 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Adkins, 170 W.Va. 46 , 289 S.E.2d 720 (1982), for double jeopardy purposes and that it existed only as a procedural joinder rule: “The same transaction test for double jeopardy purposes is a procedural rule that is not mandated by either the State or federal constitutions but is in furtherance of the general policy enunciated in the double jeopardy clauses.” See also State ex rel. 1982Dowdy v. Robinson, 163 W.Va. 154 , 257 S.E.2d 167 (1979), this Court adopted both the same evidence test and the same transaction test to determine whether double jeopardy rules had been violated. | 2 | 1982–1985 |
Gilkerson v. Lilly
green
2 sentences1985In Syllabus Point 2 of Gilkerson v. Lilly, 169 W.Va. 412 , 288 S.E.2d 164 (1982), we made it clear that we had abandoned the same transaction test as articulated in State ex rel. 1985In Syllabus Point 2 of Gilkerson v. Lilly, 169 W.Va. 412 , 288 S.E.2d 164 (1982), we made it clear that we had abandoned the same transaction test as articulated in State ex rel. | 2 | 1982–1985 |
State Ex Rel. Johnson v. Hamilton
green
2 sentences1980Johnson v. Hamilton, 164 W.Va. 682 , 266 S.E.2d 125 (1980) the English have accomplished the same result concerning the same transaction test under the doctrine of autrefois convict. 1980Johnson v. Hamilton, W.Va., 266 S.E.2d 125 (1980) the English have accomplished the same result concerning the same transaction test under the doctrine of autrefois convict. | 2 | 1980–1982 |
Overfield v. Collins
green
1 sentence2021Va. ___, 250 S.E.2d 777 (1978), overruled on other grounds by Syllabus point 2, Overfield v. Collins, 199 W. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
McCartney v. Coberly
green
1 sentence2021Va. ___, 250 S.E.2d 777 (1978), overruled on other grounds by Syllabus point 2, Overfield v. Collins, 199 W. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Allstar Towing, Inc. v. City of Alexandria
green
2 sentences2008In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted the transactional approach when it announced that “[f]or the purposes of res judicata, a ‘cause of action’ may be defined broadly ‘as an assertion of particular legal rights which have arisen out of a definable factual transaction.’ ” Id. (internal citation omitted). 45 The transactional approach has also been explained as follows: As can be seen, Virginia follows the transaction rule set forth in the Restatement of Judgments 2d, ’24 for purposes of defining “cause of action.” The importance of understanding the broad concept of 2008In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted the transactional approach when it announced that "[f]or the purposes of res judicata, a `cause of action' may be defined broadly `as an assertion of particular legal rights which have arisen out of a definable factual transaction.'" Id. (internal citation omitted). [45] The transactional approach has also been explained as follows: As can be seen, Virginia follows the transaction rule set forth in the Restatement of Judgments 2d, '24 for purposes of defining "cause of action." The importance of understanding the broad concept o | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State Road Commission of West Virginia v. Ball
green
2 sentences1987In Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Ruthbell Coal Co., 133 W.Va. 319 , 56 S.E.2d 549 (1949), we determined that a defendant sued by the State could assert a counterclaim against the State on a matter growing out of the same transaction: “Where the State or a direct governmental agency thereof institutes an action at law or a notice of motion for judgment proceeding against a citizen, Article VI, Section 35, of the West Virginia Constitution, furnishes no defense to a counterclaim growing out of the same transaction as the claim pleaded.” Later, in State Road Comm’n v. Ball, 138 W.Va. 349 , 76 S.E. 1987In Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Ruthbell Coal Co., 133 W.Va. 319 , 56 S.E.2d 549 (1949), we determined that a defendant sued by the State could assert a counterclaim against the State on a matter growing out of the same transaction: “Where the State or a direct governmental agency thereof institutes an action at law or a notice of motion for judgment proceeding against a citizen, Article VI, Section 35, of the West Virginia Constitution, furnishes no defense to a counterclaim growing out of the same transaction as the claim pleaded.” Later, in State Road Comm’n v. Ball, 138 W.Va. 349 , 76 S.E. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Adkins
green
2 sentences1985Dowdy v. Robinson, 163 W.Va. 154 , 257 S.E.2d 167 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Adkins, 170 W.Va. 46 , 289 S.E.2d 720 (1982), for double jeopardy purposes and that it existed only as a procedural joinder rule: “The same transaction test for double jeopardy purposes is a procedural rule that is not mandated by either the State or federal constitutions but is in furtherance of the general policy enunciated in the double jeopardy clauses.” See also State ex rel. 1985Dowdy v. Robinson, 163 W.Va. 154 , 257 S.E.2d 167 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Adkins, 170 W.Va. 46 , 289 S.E.2d 720 (1982), for double jeopardy purposes and that it existed only as a procedural joinder rule: “The same transaction test for double jeopardy purposes is a procedural rule that is not mandated by either the State or federal constitutions but is in furtherance of the general policy enunciated in the double jeopardy clauses.” See also State ex rel. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State Ex Rel. Watson v. Ferguson
green
2 sentences1985Watson v. Ferguson, 166 W.Va. 337 , 274 S.E.2d 440 (1980). 1985Watson v. Ferguson, 166 W.Va. 337 , 274 S.E.2d 440 (1980). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Iannelli v. United States
green
2 sentences1981We used the “same evidence” test explained in Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 , 95 S. Ct. 1284 , 43 L. 1981We used the “same evidence” test explained in Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 , 95 S. Ct. 1284 , 43 L. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Despard v. Despard
neutral
1 sentence1914“Acquiescence in a transaction may bar a party of the relief in a very short period.” Despard v. Despard, 53 W. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.