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56 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1927–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Whitered2 sentences2006If actual situations should arise in which application of the same transaction test would not serve that objective, we will, in such case, consider the adoption of limited exceptions to the same transaction test. [ White at 258, n 6 .] Therefore, it is clear the exception set forth by this Court in White duplicates the exception outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Diaz , restated in Brown and Jeffers , and applied in Garrett . 2006If actual situations should arise in which application of the same transaction test would not serve that objective, we will, in such case, consider the adoption of limited exceptions to the same transaction test. [White at 258, n 6 .] Therefore, it is clear the exception set forth by this Court in White duplicates the exception outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Diaz , restated in Brown and Jeffers , and applied in Garrett . | 9 | 24 |
Ashe v. Swensongreen2 sentences1976In People v White, 390 Mich 245 ; 212 NW2d 222 (1973), our Supreme Court adopted the same transaction test of double jeopardy as outlined in the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436 ; 90 S Ct 1189 ; 25 L Ed 2d 469 (1970). 1976In People v White, 390 Mich 245 ; 212 NW2d 222 (1973), our Supreme Court adopted the same transaction test of double jeopardy as outlined in the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436 ; 90 S Ct 1189 ; 25 L Ed 2d 469 (1970). | 4 | 8 |
Adair v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate those parts of the Court of Appeals judgment stating that the same transaction test for compulsory joinder and res judicata is “if the same facts or evidence are essential to the maintenance of the two actions” and whether the two claims “concern identical evidence or essential facts.” The proper test is “ Vhether the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation, [and] whether they form a convenient trial unit ....’” Adair v Michigan, 470 Mich 105, 125 (2004), quoting 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 533, p 801. 2016As the Michigan Supreme Court clarified in Adair, the same transaction test applies “regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories [.] ” Adair, 470 Mich at 124 (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 4 | 4 |
People v. Whitegreen2 sentences2004“In doing so, it recognizes that the prohibition of double jeopardy is for the defendant’s protection.” [White, supra at 258-259 , quoting 41 Mich App 370, 378 ; 200 NW2d 326 (1972).] The White Court also noted that the equivalent of the same transaction test had long been the standard applied to civil actions by the court rule governing joinder and by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. 2004“In doing so, it recognizes that the prohibition of double jeopardy is for the defendant’s protection.” [White, supra at 258-259 , quoting 41 Mich App 370, 378 ; 200 NW2d 326 (1972).] The White Court also noted that the equivalent of the same transaction test had long been the standard applied to civil actions by the court rule governing joinder and by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. | 3 | 5 |
Crampton v. 54-A District Judgegreen2 sentences2004In Crampton v 54-A Dist Judge, 397 Mich 489, 501-502 ; 245 NW2d 28 (1976), this Court, recognizing the difficulty of applying the same transaction test, introduced a different inflection on the White “single intent and goal” factor where some of the offenses at issue did not involve criminal intent: Where criminal intent is required in the offenses involved, the criterion set forth in White applies: “continuous time sequence and display [of] a single intent and goal.” [ 390 Mich 259 .] [However], [w]here one or more of the offenses does not involve criminal intent, the criterion is whether the 2004In Crampton v 54-A Dist Judge, 397 Mich 489, 501-502 ; 245 NW2d 28 (1976), this Court, recognizing the difficulty of applying the same transaction test, introduced a different inflection on the White “single intent and goal” factor where some of the offenses at issue did not involve criminal intent: Where criminal intent is required in the offenses involved, the criterion set forth in White applies: “continuous time sequence and display [of] a single intent and goal.” [ 390 Mich 259 .] [However], [w]here one or more of the offenses does not involve criminal intent, the criterion is whether the | 2 | 5 |
Green v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1976Jurisdictions achieving same result via statute include: Minnesota, see State v Corning, 289 Minn 382; 184 NW2d 603 (1971); California, see In re Henry, 65 Cal 2d 330; 54 Cal Rptr 633; 420 P2d 97 (1966); New York, NY Crim Pro L § 40.10(2) (McKinney 1971). [2] The Michigan Double Jeopardy Clause, which is substantially identical to the Double Jeopardy Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy." Const 1963, art 1, § 15. [3] As the Supreme Court of Minnesota no 1976Jurisdictions achieving same result via statute include: Minnesota, see State v Corning, 289 Minn 382; 184 NW2d 603 (1971); California, see In re Henry, 65 Cal 2d 330; 54 Cal Rptr 633; 420 P2d 97 (1966); New York, NY Crim Pro L § 40.10(2) (McKinney 1971). [2] The Michigan Double Jeopardy Clause, which is substantially identical to the Double Jeopardy Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy." Const 1963, art 1, § 15. [3] As the Supreme Court of Minnesota no | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hardinggreen2 sentences2004People v Harding, 443 Mich 693, 702 ; 506 NW2d 482 (1993). 2004People v Harding, 443 Mich 693, 702 ; 506 NW2d 482 (1993). | 1 | 3 |
Whitton v. Stategreen2 sentences1973State v Richardson, 460 SW2d 537 (Mo, 1970); Walton v State, 448 SW2d 690 (Tenn Crim App, 1969); Burnam v State, 2 Ga App 395; 58 SE 683 (1907); State v Bell, 205 NC 225; 171 SE 50 (1933); State v Brown, 262 Or 442 ; 497 P2d 1191 (1972); Commonwealth v Campana, 452 Pa 233; 304 A2d 432 (1973); see also, Whitton v State, 479 P2d 302 (Alas, 1970). 1973State v Richardson, 460 SW2d 537 (Mo, 1970); Walton v State, 448 SW2d 690 (Tenn Crim App, 1969); Burnam v State, 2 Ga App 395; 58 SE 683 (1907); State v Bell, 205 NC 225; 171 SE 50 (1933); State v Brown, 262 Or 442 ; 497 P2d 1191 (1972); Commonwealth v Campana, 452 Pa 233; 304 A2d 432 (1973); see also, Whitton v State, 479 P2d 302 (Alas, 1970). | 1 | 2 |
Carter v. McClaughrygreen2 sentences2004Dixon, supra at 709 n 14; see also Carter v McClaughry, 183 US 367 , 394-395; 22 S Ct 181 ; 46 L Ed 236 (1901) (“[t]he fact that both charges related to and grew out of one transaction made no difference” in determining whether they were the “same offence” under the Fifth Amendment). 15 Instead, the Morey/Blockburger same-elements analysis was consistently applied by the Court, with two limited exceptions, 16 until the Court in Grady, supra, adopted a “same-conduct” rule—a somewhat compromised version of Justice Brennan’s “same transaction” test—as an additional step to be performed in address 2004Dixon, supra at 709 n 14; see also Carter v McClaughry, 183 US 367 , 394-395; 22 S Ct 181 ; 46 L Ed 236 (1901) (“[t]he fact that both charges related to and grew out of one transaction made no difference” in determining whether they were the “same offence” under the Fifth Amendment). 15 Instead, the Morey/Blockburger same-elements analysis was consistently applied by the Court, with two limited exceptions, 16 until the Court in Grady, supra, adopted a “same-conduct” rule—a somewhat compromised version of Justice Brennan’s “same transaction” test—as an additional step to be performed in address | 1 | 1 |
Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2002See Baltimore S S Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 , 47 S.Ct. 600 , 71 L.Ed. 1069 (1927); Tomiyasu v. Golden, 81 Nev. 140, 142-143 , 400 P.2d 415 (1965). 2002See Baltimore S S Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 , 47 S.Ct. 600 , 71 L.Ed. 1069 (1927); Tomiyasu v. Golden, 81 Nev. 140, 142-143 , 400 P.2d 415 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
| Falk v. State Bar of Mich.green | 1 | 1 |
| Stachnik v. Winkelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Robinsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fairgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martinis v. Supreme Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Charles Johnson
green
2 sentences1980Among the approved decisions was that in People v Charles Johnson, 62 Mich App 240 ; 233 NW2d 246 (1975), in which the defendant was convicted and sentenced for prison escape. 1980Among the approved decisions was that in People v Charles Johnson, 62 Mich App 240 ; 233 NW2d 246 (1975), in which the defendant was convicted and sentenced for prison escape. | 4 | 1976–1980 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences1991In People v Williams, 61 Mich App 642, 643 ; 233 NW2d 122 (1975), the defendant was charged with assault with intent to commit murder, armed robbery, and breaking and entering an occupied dwelling, and, later, as a result of a plea bargain, pled guilty of the latter charge. 1991In People v Williams, 61 Mich App 642, 643 ; 233 NW2d 122 (1975), the defendant was charged with assault with intent to commit murder, armed robbery, and breaking and entering an occupied dwelling, and, later, as a result of a plea bargain, pled guilty of the latter charge. | 3 | 1976–1991 |
People v. Norfleet
green
2 sentences2025When a statute provides the trial court discretion to impose a consecutive sentence, a decision to do so is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, “i.e., whether the trial court’s decision was outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Norfleet, 317 Mich App 649, 654 ; 897 NW2d 195 (2016) (Norfleet I). 2025When a statute provides the trial court discretion to impose a consecutive sentence, a decision to do so is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, “i.e., whether the trial court’s decision was outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Norfleet, 317 Mich App 649, 654 ; 897 NW2d 195 (2016) (Norfleet I). | 2 | 2020–2025 |
In Re Cummin Estate
green
2 sentences2017“Common-law agency principles, which generally apply to powers of attorney, permit an agent to personally engage in a transaction with the principle with consent of the principal after a full disclosure of the details of the transaction.” In re Estate of Cummin, 258 Mich App 402, 407-408 ; 671 NW2d 165 (2003). 2017“Common-law agency principles, which generally apply to powers of attorney, permit an agent to personally engage in a transaction with the principle with consent of the principal after a full disclosure of the details of the transaction.” In re Estate of Cummin, 258 Mich App 402, 407-408 ; 671 NW2d 165 (2003). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Ream
green
2 sentences2017When legislative intent is not clear, Michigan courts apply the “abstract legal elements” test from Ream, 481 Mich 223 , to determine whether the Legislature intended to classify two offenses as the “same offense” for purposes of double jeopardy. 2017When legislative intent is not clear, Michigan courts apply the “abstract legal elements” test from Ream, 481 Mich 223 , to determine whether the Legislature intended to classify two offenses as the “same offense” for purposes of double jeopardy. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Goans
green
2 sentences1981Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder's Court Judge, 92 Mich App 433, 442 ; 285 NW2d 318 (1979), People v Kenneth Smith, 69 Mich App 537, 539 , 245 NW2d 125 (1976), People v Goans, 59 Mich App 294, 297 ; 229 NW2d 422 (1975). *136 My reading of the record leads me to conclude that defense counsel was unaware of the exception to the single transaction requirement as found in People v Goans, supra . 1981Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder's Court Judge, 92 Mich App 433, 442 ; 285 NW2d 318 (1979), People v Kenneth Smith, 69 Mich App 537, 539 , 245 NW2d 125 (1976), People v Goans, 59 Mich App 294, 297 ; 229 NW2d 422 (1975). *136 My reading of the record leads me to conclude that defense counsel was unaware of the exception to the single transaction requirement as found in People v Goans, supra . | 2 | 1976–1981 |
Burnam v. State
green
2 sentences1976Jurisdictions in which the same transaction test has been adopted by court decision include: Missouri, State v Richardson, 460 SW2d 537 (Mo, 1970); Tennessee, Walton v State, 448 SW2d 690 (Tenn Crim App, 1969); Georgia, Burnam v State, 2 Ga App 395; 58 SE 683 (1907); North Carolina, State v Bell, 205 NC 225; 171 SE 50 (1933); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v Campana, 452 Pa 233; 304 A2d 432 (1973). 1976NOTES [1] Jurisdictions in which the same transaction test has been adopted by court decision include: Missouri, State v Richardson, 460 SW2d 537 (Mo, 1970); Tennessee, Walton v State, 448 SW2d 690 (Tenn Crim App, 1969); Georgia, Burnam v State, 2 Ga App 395; 58 SE 683 (1907); North Carolina, State v Bell, 205 NC 225; 171 SE 50 (1933); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v Campana, 452 Pa 233; 304 A2d 432 (1973). | 2 | 1973–1976 |
Walton v. State
green
2 sentences1976Jurisdictions in which the same transaction test has been adopted by court decision include: Missouri, State v Richardson, 460 SW2d 537 (Mo, 1970); Tennessee, Walton v State, 448 SW2d 690 (Tenn Crim App, 1969); Georgia, Burnam v State, 2 Ga App 395; 58 SE 683 (1907); North Carolina, State v Bell, 205 NC 225; 171 SE 50 (1933); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v Campana, 452 Pa 233; 304 A2d 432 (1973). 1976NOTES [1] Jurisdictions in which the same transaction test has been adopted by court decision include: Missouri, State v Richardson, 460 SW2d 537 (Mo, 1970); Tennessee, Walton v State, 448 SW2d 690 (Tenn Crim App, 1969); Georgia, Burnam v State, 2 Ga App 395; 58 SE 683 (1907); North Carolina, State v Bell, 205 NC 225; 171 SE 50 (1933); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v Campana, 452 Pa 233; 304 A2d 432 (1973). | 2 | 1973–1976 |
Commonwealth v. Campana
green
2 sentences1976Jurisdictions in which the same transaction test has been adopted by court decision include: Missouri, State v Richardson, 460 SW2d 537 (Mo, 1970); Tennessee, Walton v State, 448 SW2d 690 (Tenn Crim App, 1969); Georgia, Burnam v State, 2 Ga App 395; 58 SE 683 (1907); North Carolina, State v Bell, 205 NC 225; 171 SE 50 (1933); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v Campana, 452 Pa 233; 304 A2d 432 (1973). 1976NOTES [1] Jurisdictions in which the same transaction test has been adopted by court decision include: Missouri, State v Richardson, 460 SW2d 537 (Mo, 1970); Tennessee, Walton v State, 448 SW2d 690 (Tenn Crim App, 1969); Georgia, Burnam v State, 2 Ga App 395; 58 SE 683 (1907); North Carolina, State v Bell, 205 NC 225; 171 SE 50 (1933); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v Campana, 452 Pa 233; 304 A2d 432 (1973). | 2 | 1973–1976 |
State v. . Bell
green
2 sentences1976Jurisdictions in which the same transaction test has been adopted by court decision include: Missouri, State v Richardson, 460 SW2d 537 (Mo, 1970); Tennessee, Walton v State, 448 SW2d 690 (Tenn Crim App, 1969); Georgia, Burnam v State, 2 Ga App 395; 58 SE 683 (1907); North Carolina, State v Bell, 205 NC 225; 171 SE 50 (1933); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v Campana, 452 Pa 233; 304 A2d 432 (1973). 1976NOTES [1] Jurisdictions in which the same transaction test has been adopted by court decision include: Missouri, State v Richardson, 460 SW2d 537 (Mo, 1970); Tennessee, Walton v State, 448 SW2d 690 (Tenn Crim App, 1969); Georgia, Burnam v State, 2 Ga App 395; 58 SE 683 (1907); North Carolina, State v Bell, 205 NC 225; 171 SE 50 (1933); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v Campana, 452 Pa 233; 304 A2d 432 (1973). | 2 | 1973–1976 |
People v. Davenport
neutral
2 sentences1976"It has long been recognized that crimes separate in nature, although arising out of the same transaction, may be defined and convictions thereon sustained without exposing defendant to double jeopardy (People v Snyder, 214 App Div 742 ; 209 NYS 898 [1925], affd 241 NY 81 ; 148 NE 796 [1925]; People v Skarczewski, 287 NY 826 ; 41 NE2d 99 [1942]; People v Di Lapo, 14 NY2d 170 ; 250 NYS2d 261 ; 199 NE2d 361 [1964])." [8] We agree with the Court of Appeals application of the White rationale in the following cases: People v Rolston, 51 Mich App 146 ; 214 NW2d 894 (1974); People v Joines (On Remand 1976"It has long been recognized that crimes separate in nature, although arising out of the same transaction, may be defined and convictions thereon sustained without exposing defendant to double jeopardy (People v Snyder, 214 App Div 742 ; 209 NYS 898 [1925], affd 241 NY 81 ; 148 NE 796 [1925]; People v Skarczewski, 287 NY 826 ; 41 NE2d 99 [1942]; People v Di Lapo, 14 NY2d 170 ; 250 NYS2d 261 ; 199 NE2d 361 [1964])." [8] We agree with the Court of Appeals application of the White rationale in the following cases: People v Rolston, 51 Mich App 146 ; 214 NW2d 894 (1974); People v Joines (On Remand | 2 | 1975–1976 |
People v. Jackson
green
2 sentences1975Finally, without mention of its decision in White, the Supreme Court in People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323 ; 217 NW2d 22 (1974), applied the same transaction test to refute defendant’s double jeopardy claim. 1975Finally, without mention of its decision in White, the Supreme Court in People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323 ; 217 NW2d 22 (1974), applied the same transaction test to refute defendant’s double jeopardy claim. | 2 | 1975–1976 |
State v. Richardson
green
2 sentences1976Jurisdictions in which the same transaction test has been adopted by court decision include: Missouri, State v Richardson, 460 SW2d 537 (Mo, 1970); Tennessee, Walton v State, 448 SW2d 690 (Tenn Crim App, 1969); Georgia, Burnam v State, 2 Ga App 395; 58 SE 683 (1907); North Carolina, State v Bell, 205 NC 225; 171 SE 50 (1933); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v Campana, 452 Pa 233; 304 A2d 432 (1973). 1976NOTES [1] Jurisdictions in which the same transaction test has been adopted by court decision include: Missouri, State v Richardson, 460 SW2d 537 (Mo, 1970); Tennessee, Walton v State, 448 SW2d 690 (Tenn Crim App, 1969); Georgia, Burnam v State, 2 Ga App 395; 58 SE 683 (1907); North Carolina, State v Bell, 205 NC 225; 171 SE 50 (1933); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v Campana, 452 Pa 233; 304 A2d 432 (1973). | 2 | 1973–1976 |
People v. Hardiman
green
1 sentence2019Morgan was the one who testified about the STRmix, and so the testimony of the sperm cell was not relevant to the “strong support” for the DNA mixture on SD’s underwear. -5- inference from all the evidence, see Hardiman, 466 Mich at 428 , is that defendant restrained SD with the intent to engage in criminal sexual penetration or criminal sexual contact in violation of MCL 750.349(1)(c). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Durant v. State of Michigan
green
2 sentences2004The majority holds that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by res judicata because they arose from the same transaction as the claims in Durant v Michigan, 456 Mich 175 ; 566 NW2d 272 (1997) (Durant I), and, thus, could have been filed while that litigation was pending. 2004The majority holds that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by res judicata because they arose from the same transaction as the claims in Durant v Michigan, 456 Mich 175 ; 566 NW2d 272 (1997) (Durant I), and, thus, could have been filed while that litigation was pending. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Grady v. Corbin
red
2 sentences2004Dixon, supra at 709 n 14; see also Carter v McClaughry, 183 US 367 , 394-395; 22 S Ct 181 ; 46 L Ed 236 (1901) (“[t]he fact that both charges related to and grew out of one transaction made no difference” in determining whether they were the “same offence” under the Fifth Amendment). 15 Instead, the Morey/Blockburger same-elements analysis was consistently applied by the Court, with two limited exceptions, 16 until the Court in Grady, supra, adopted a “same-conduct” rule—a somewhat compromised version of Justice Brennan’s “same transaction” test—as an additional step to be performed in address 2004The tripartite split among the Court of Appeals judges in the case before us exemplifies the difficulty that inheres in the application of the same transaction test, particularly as that test has been muddled by Crampton and the Court of Appeals' "specific intent" jurisprudence. [23] See, for example, the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, New College Ed, which defines "offense," in relevant part, as "[a]ny violation or infraction of a moral or social code; a transgression or sin[;]... [a] transgression of law; a crime." [24] "Obviously, the word transaction is broader than | 1 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Dixon
green
2 sentences2004FEDERAL SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS PROTECTION AND THE SAME-ELEMENTS TEST Application of the same-elements test, commonly known as the “Blockburger test,” 12 is the well-established method of defining the Fifth Amendment term “same offence.” The test, which has “deep historical roots,” United States v Dixon, 509 US 688, 704 ; 113 S Ct 2849 ; 125 L Ed 2d 556 (1993), “focuses on the statutory elements of the offense. 2004FEDERAL SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS PROTECTION AND THE SAME-ELEMENTS TEST Application of the same-elements test, commonly known as the “Blockburger test,” 12 is the well-established method of defining the Fifth Amendment term “same offence.” The test, which has “deep historical roots,” United States v Dixon, 509 US 688, 704 ; 113 S Ct 2849 ; 125 L Ed 2d 556 (1993), “focuses on the statutory elements of the offense. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Tomiyasu v. Golden
green
2 sentences2002See Baltimore S S Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 , 47 S.Ct. 600 , 71 L.Ed. 1069 (1927); Tomiyasu v. Golden, 81 Nev. 140, 142-143 , 400 P.2d 415 (1965). 2002See Baltimore S S Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 , 47 S.Ct. 600 , 71 L.Ed. 1069 (1927); Tomiyasu v. Golden, 81 Nev. 140, 142-143 , 400 P.2d 415 (1965). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Jackson
green
1 sentence2002Jackson, supra at 46 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Cuellar
green
1 sentence2002In Cuellar, supra at 22 , the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the five sales were part of a “unitary supply contract” to the undercover agent and therefore part of the same transaction. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Gonzalez green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Spicer green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Bull v. United States green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Rust v. Conrad green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Seguin v. Madison neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Kenneth Smith green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Ayer v. Commissioner of Administration green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Matter of Andreozzi v. Carey neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Snyder green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Skarczewski neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| In Re Henry green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| State v. Corning green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Genesee Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Joines green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| G. A. Soden & Co. v. Van Buren neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Rolston neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. West green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Di Lapo green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Martinez green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.