transaction test in Maryland

1993Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 453 n. 7 [ 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1199 n. 7, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 ] (1970), suggests that if a crime is not completed or not discovered, despite diligence on the part of the police “until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction, an exception to the same transaction rule should be made to permit a separate prosecution.” In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 [ 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 ] (1974), the Court referred to Diaz as a case in which it was impossible to charge the defendant wi

1993Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 453 n. 7 [ 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1199 n. 7, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 ] (1970), suggests that if a crime is not completed or not discovered, despite diligence on the part of the police “until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction, an exception to the same transaction rule should be made to permit a separate prosecution.” In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 [ 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 ] (1974), the Court referred to Diaz as a case in which it was impossible to charge the defendant wi

1993Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 453 n. 7 [ 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1199 n. 7, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 ] (1970), suggests that if a crime is not completed or not discovered, despite diligence on the part of the police “until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction, an exception to the same transaction rule should be made to permit a separate prosecution.” In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 [ 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 ] (1974), the Court referred to Diaz as a case in which it was impossible to charge the defendant wi

1993Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 453 n. 7 [ 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1199 n. 7, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 ] (1970), suggests that if a crime is not completed or not discovered, despite diligence on the part of the police “until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction, an exception to the same transaction rule should be made to permit a separate prosecution.” In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 [ 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 ] (1974), the Court referred to Diaz as a case in which it was impossible to charge the defendant wi

1993Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 453 n. 7 [ 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1199 n. 7, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 ] (1970), suggests that if a crime is not completed or not discovered, despite diligence on the part of the police “until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction, an exception to the same transaction rule should be made to permit a separate prosecution.” In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 [ 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 ] (1974), the Court referred to Diaz as a case in which it was impossible to charge the defendant wi

1993Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 453 n. 7 [ 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1199 n. 7, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 ] (1970), suggests that if a crime is not completed or not discovered, despite diligence on the part of the police “until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction, an exception to the same transaction rule should be made to permit a separate prosecution.” In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 [ 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 ] (1974), the Court referred to Diaz as a case in which it was impossible to charge the defendant wi

1977Morgan v. Devine, 237 U. S. 632 , 35 S. Ct. 712 , 59 L.

1977Morgan v. Devine, 237 U. S. 632 , 35 S. Ct. 712 , 59 L.

2015See also, Gertz v. Anne Arundel County, 339 Md. 261, 269-70 , 661 A.2d 1157 (1995) (“[W]e adopted *241 the transaction test of § 24 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as the basic test for determining when two claims or causes of action are the same.”) (Emphasis supplied); Shum v. Gaudreau, 317 Md. 49, 54-56 , 562 A.2d 707 (1989); Gonsalves v. Bingel, 194 Md.App. 695, 709-12 , 5 A.3d 768 (2010); Patel v. HealthPlus, Inc., 112 Md.App. 251, 272-83 , 684 A.2d 904 (1996); Esslinger v. Baltimore City, 95 Md.App. 607, 617-19 , 622 A.2d 774 (1993).

2015See also, Gertz v. Anne Arundel County, 339 Md. 261, 269-70 , 661 A.2d 1157 (1995) (“[W]e adopted *241 the transaction test of § 24 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as the basic test for determining when two claims or causes of action are the same.”) (Emphasis supplied); Shum v. Gaudreau, 317 Md. 49, 54-56 , 562 A.2d 707 (1989); Gonsalves v. Bingel, 194 Md.App. 695, 709-12 , 5 A.3d 768 (2010); Patel v. HealthPlus, Inc., 112 Md.App. 251, 272-83 , 684 A.2d 904 (1996); Esslinger v. Baltimore City, 95 Md.App. 607, 617-19 , 622 A.2d 774 (1993).

2015See also, Gertz v. Anne Arundel County, 339 Md. 261, 269-70 , 661 A.2d 1157 (1995) (“[W]e adopted *241 the transaction test of § 24 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as the basic test for determining when two claims or causes of action are the same.”) (Emphasis supplied); Shum v. Gaudreau, 317 Md. 49, 54-56 , 562 A.2d 707 (1989); Gonsalves v. Bingel, 194 Md.App. 695, 709-12 , 5 A.3d 768 (2010); Patel v. HealthPlus, Inc., 112 Md.App. 251, 272-83 , 684 A.2d 904 (1996); Esslinger v. Baltimore City, 95 Md.App. 607, 617-19 , 622 A.2d 774 (1993).

2015See also, Gertz v. Anne Arundel County, 339 Md. 261, 269-70 , 661 A.2d 1157 (1995) (“[W]e adopted *241 the transaction test of § 24 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as the basic test for determining when two claims or causes of action are the same.”) (Emphasis supplied); Shum v. Gaudreau, 317 Md. 49, 54-56 , 562 A.2d 707 (1989); Gonsalves v. Bingel, 194 Md.App. 695, 709-12 , 5 A.3d 768 (2010); Patel v. HealthPlus, Inc., 112 Md.App. 251, 272-83 , 684 A.2d 904 (1996); Esslinger v. Baltimore City, 95 Md.App. 607, 617-19 , 622 A.2d 774 (1993).

2015See also, Gertz v. Anne Arundel County, 339 Md. 261, 269-70 , 661 A.2d 1157 (1995) (“[W]e adopted *241 the transaction test of § 24 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as the basic test for determining when two claims or causes of action are the same.”) (Emphasis supplied); Shum v. Gaudreau, 317 Md. 49, 54-56 , 562 A.2d 707 (1989); Gonsalves v. Bingel, 194 Md.App. 695, 709-12 , 5 A.3d 768 (2010); Patel v. HealthPlus, Inc., 112 Md.App. 251, 272-83 , 684 A.2d 904 (1996); Esslinger v. Baltimore City, 95 Md.App. 607, 617-19 , 622 A.2d 774 (1993).

2015See also, Gertz v. Anne Arundel County, 339 Md. 261, 269-70 , 661 A.2d 1157 (1995) (“[W]e adopted *241 the transaction test of § 24 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as the basic test for determining when two claims or causes of action are the same.”) (Emphasis supplied); Shum v. Gaudreau, 317 Md. 49, 54-56 , 562 A.2d 707 (1989); Gonsalves v. Bingel, 194 Md.App. 695, 709-12 , 5 A.3d 768 (2010); Patel v. HealthPlus, Inc., 112 Md.App. 251, 272-83 , 684 A.2d 904 (1996); Esslinger v. Baltimore City, 95 Md.App. 607, 617-19 , 622 A.2d 774 (1993).

2014Applying the transaction test, 14 he asserts that the claims involve the same transaction because the facts in both cases “are predicated on the same lease dated September 14, 2010, and arise from the exact same breach of that lease.” He argues that in both cases, Grady Management claimed the right to terminate Mr. Epps’s lease because of a particular breach or set of alleged facts, and that, citing Whitaker v. Whitaker, 60 Md.App. 695, 702 , 484 A.2d 314 (1984), “cannot *727 escape the bar of res judicata by bringing a new claim when that claim differs merely in form but not substance.” In re

2014Applying the transaction test, 14 he asserts that the claims involve the same transaction because the facts in both cases “are predicated on the same lease dated September 14, 2010, and arise from the exact same breach of that lease.” He argues that in both cases, Grady Management claimed the right to terminate Mr. Epps’s lease because of a particular breach or set of alleged facts, and that, citing Whitaker v. Whitaker, 60 Md.App. 695, 702 , 484 A.2d 314 (1984), “cannot *727 escape the bar of res judicata by bringing a new claim when that claim differs merely in form but not substance.” In re

1996A somewhat old, but similar case, Ex parte Carlin, 212 Md. 526 , 129 A.2d 827 (1957), involved a claim for fees by an attorney against a client when the arrangement was similar to an open account.

1996A somewhat old, but similar case, Ex parte Carlin, 212 Md. 526 , 129 A.2d 827 (1957), involved a claim for fees by an attorney against a client when the arrangement was similar to an open account.

1984Turning first to the issue not really before it — sufficiency of the evidence — the Court adopted the approach suggested in 15 R.C.L. 394; i.e., “where the prosecution shows a sale of intoxicating liquor by the accused within the general prohibition of a statute this establishes a prima facie case, and the burden is then cast on him to show that the transaction was not in violation of the law because it satisfies a condition under which the sale of liquor has by statute been made lawful.” In the case at hand, the Court continued, at p. 544, 119 A. 297 , Howes “knew better than anyone else whet

1984Turning first to the issue not really before it — sufficiency of the evidence — the Court adopted the approach suggested in 15 R.C.L. 394; i.e., "where the prosecution shows a sale of intoxicating liquor by the accused within the general prohibition of a statute this establishes a prima facie case, and the burden is then cast on him to show that the transaction was not in violation of the law because it satisfies a condition under which the sale of liquor has by statute been made lawful." In the case at hand, the Court continued, at p. 544, 119 A. 297 , Howes "knew better than anyone else whet

1976State v. Gregory, 66 N. J. 510, 333 A. 2d 257 (1975) (successive trials for offenses based “on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode” are prohibited). 3 The majority of states, however, have not adopted the same transaction test but have continued to apply the required evidence test for defining whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes.

1976Ed. 376 (1953); State v. Coblentz, 169 Md. 159 , 180 A. 266 (1935); Gilpin v. State, supra. Thus, we find no basis for applying the same transaction test under the circumstances here presented.

1976Ed. 376 (1953); State v. Coblentz, 169 Md. 159 , 180 A. 266 (1935); Gilpin v. State, supra. Thus, we find no basis for applying the same transaction test under the circumstances here presented.

1976State v. Brown, supra, 497 P. 2d at 1199 . 2 For other cases adopting the same transaction test as a matter of state constitutional law, see People v. White, 390 Mich. 245 , 212 N.W.2d 222, 228 (1973) (holding that offenses committed in a continuous time sequence and displaying a single intent and goal must be joined in a single prosecution); Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A. 2d 432 (1973), vacated and remanded, 414 U. S. 808 , 94 S. Ct. 73 , 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), aff'd, 455 Pa. 622 , 314 A. 2d 854 (1974).

1976State v. Brown, supra, 497 P. 2d at 1199 . 2 For other cases adopting the same transaction test as a matter of state constitutional law, see People v. White, 390 Mich. 245 , 212 N.W.2d 222, 228 (1973) (holding that offenses committed in a continuous time sequence and displaying a single intent and goal must be joined in a single prosecution); Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A. 2d 432 (1973), vacated and remanded, 414 U. S. 808 , 94 S. Ct. 73 , 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), aff'd, 455 Pa. 622 , 314 A. 2d 854 (1974).

1976The principles established in State v. Brown relating to the same transaction test were later reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Oregon in State v. Boyd, 271 Ore. 558 , 533 P. 2d 795 (1975), and State v. Hammang, 271 Ore. 749 , 534 P. 2d 501 (1975).

1976The principles established in State v. Brown relating to the same transaction test were later reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Oregon in State v. Boyd, 271 Ore. 558 , 533 P. 2d 795 (1975), and State v. Hammang, 271 Ore. 749 , 534 P. 2d 501 (1975).

1976The principles established in State v. Brown relating to the same transaction test were later reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Oregon in State v. Boyd, 271 Ore. 558 , 533 P. 2d 795 (1975), and State v. Hammang, 271 Ore. 749 , 534 P. 2d 501 (1975).

1976The principles established in State v. Brown relating to the same transaction test were later reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Oregon in State v. Boyd, 271 Ore. 558 , 533 P. 2d 795 (1975), and State v. Hammang, 271 Ore. 749 , 534 P. 2d 501 (1975).

1976State v. Brown, supra, 497 P. 2d at 1199 . 2 For other cases adopting the same transaction test as a matter of state constitutional law, see People v. White, 390 Mich. 245 , 212 N.W.2d 222, 228 (1973) (holding that offenses committed in a continuous time sequence and displaying a single intent and goal must be joined in a single prosecution); Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A. 2d 432 (1973), vacated and remanded, 414 U. S. 808 , 94 S. Ct. 73 , 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), aff'd, 455 Pa. 622 , 314 A. 2d 854 (1974).

1976State v. Brown, supra, 497 P. 2d at 1199 . 2 For other cases adopting the same transaction test as a matter of state constitutional law, see People v. White, 390 Mich. 245 , 212 N.W.2d 222, 228 (1973) (holding that offenses committed in a continuous time sequence and displaying a single intent and goal must be joined in a single prosecution); Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A. 2d 432 (1973), vacated and remanded, 414 U. S. 808 , 94 S. Ct. 73 , 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), aff'd, 455 Pa. 622 , 314 A. 2d 854 (1974).

1976In United States v. Wilder, 463 F. 2d 1263 (D.C.

1976The court specifically noted that the Supreme Court had not adopted the same transaction test advocated by Mr. Justice Brennan, 463 F. 2d at 1266 n. 9.

1976See also United States v. Cala, 521 F. 2d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 1975); Bell v. State of Kansas, 452 F. 2d 783, 792 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 974 , 92 S. Ct. 2421 , 32 L.Ed.2d 674 (1972); Hattaway v. United States, 399 F. 2d 431, 432-433 (5th Cir. 1968).

1976See also United States v. Cala, 521 F. 2d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 1975); Bell v. State of Kansas, 452 F. 2d 783, 792 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 974 , 92 S. Ct. 2421 , 32 L.Ed.2d 674 (1972); Hattaway v. United States, 399 F. 2d 431, 432-433 (5th Cir. 1968).