transaction test (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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transaction test in Ohio

11 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1925–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Ashe v. Swensongreen
scotus · 1970 · cited in 2 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 1975–1976
2 sentences

1976See Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, at page 448 of Ashe, supra-, State v. Ferguson (1964), 175 Ohio St. 390 , 394.

1975See Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, at page 448 of Ashe, supra; State v. Ferguson (1964), 175 Ohio St. 390 , 394.

22
Bank of Am. v. Merlogreen
ohioctapp · 2013 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021Trumbull No. 2012-T-0103, 2013-Ohio-5266, ¶ 27 (the witness authenticating a business record need not have firsthand knowledge of the transaction and the only requirement is “the witness be sufficiently familiar with the operation of the business and with the circumstances of the record’s preparation and maintenance that he can reasonably testify, on the basis of this knowledge, that the record is what it purports to be and that it was made in the ordinary course of business”).

11
State v. Cabralesgreen
ohio · 2008 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008See State v. Kaszas (Sept. 10, 1998), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 72546 and 72547. 4 *Page 54 {¶ 198} I would find that firing at the automobile was one continuous transaction, and that although multiple victims were involved, justifying a charge for each victim in the car, only one eight-year gun specification could be run consecutively to the consecutively sentenced base charges. *Page 55 {¶ 199} I likewise dissent from the majority's reading and application of State v. Cabrales , 118 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2008-Ohio-1625 , 886 N.E.2d 181 , as regards their analysis of allied offenses of similar import.

2008See State v. Kaszas (Sept. 10, 1998), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 72546 and 72547. 4 *Page 54 {¶ 198} I would find that firing at the automobile was one continuous transaction, and that although multiple victims were involved, justifying a charge for each victim in the car, only one eight-year gun specification could be run consecutively to the consecutively sentenced base charges. *Page 55 {¶ 199} I likewise dissent from the majority's reading and application of State v. Cabrales , 118 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2008-Ohio-1625 , 886 N.E.2d 181 , as regards their analysis of allied offenses of similar import.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America v. Fairbanks Steam Shovel Co. green
ohio · 1925
1 sentence

2005Co. v. Fairbanks Steam Shovel Co. (1925), 112 Ohio St. 136 , 146 , 147 N.E. 329 .

12005–2005
Wyle v. Bank Melli of Tehran, Iran green
cand · 1983
1 sentence

2002Thus, the UCP’s silence on the issue of fraud “should not be construed as preventing relief under the ‘fraud in the transaction’ doctrine, where applicable law permits it.” (Emphasis sic.) Wyle v. Bank Melli of Tehran, Iran (N.D.Ca.1983), 577 F.Supp. 1148, 1164 . {¶ 108} In fact, the overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that Article 5’s fraud exception continues to apply in credit transactions made subject to the UCP.

12002–2002
Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp. green
nysupct · 1941
2 sentences

2002Proponents of this view would argue that the fraud committed in the Sztejn case [ 177 Misc. 719 , 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 ] equals fraud in the credit transaction because the documents the beneficiary presented to the issuer actively misrepresented the underlying transaction. {¶ 122} “In contrast, advocates who argue that the word ‘transaction’ refers to the underlying transaction read Sztejn as a case in which the fraud existed in the underlying sales transaction because the buyer was going to receive rubbish instead of the goods he contracted for.

2002Proponents of this view would argue that the fraud committed in the Sztejn case [ 177 Misc. 719 , 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 ] equals fraud in the credit transaction because the documents the beneficiary presented to the issuer actively misrepresented the underlying transaction. {¶ 122} “In contrast, advocates who argue that the word ‘transaction’ refers to the underlying transaction read Sztejn as a case in which the fraud existed in the underlying sales transaction because the buyer was going to receive rubbish instead of the goods he contracted for.

12002–2002
Blockburger v. United States green
scotus · 1931
1 sentence

2000The test this court must apply was first set forth in the case of Blockberger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299 .

12000–2000
Clemens v. Duwel green
ohioctapp · 1995
1 sentence

1999Specifically, in reliance on Clemens v. Duwell (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 423 , appellants contend the evidence presented was insufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that appellees had a "business establishment." R.C. 1345.21 (A) provides that a Home Solicitation Sale does not include a transaction in which: (4) The buyer initiates the contact between the parties for the purpose of negotiating a purchase and the seller has a business establishment at a fixed location in this state where the goods and services involved in the transaction are regularly offered or exhibited for sale; "T

11999–1999
Lamb v. Ulrich neutral
okla · 1923
2 sentences

1932Ulrich, 94 Okla., 240 , 221 Pac. 741 , it was held: “Where a day before a bank is suspended, its cashier delivered securities to a depositor, taking his check therefor when the depositor and the cashier knew of the serious financial condition of the bank, a finding that the transaction was entered into in contemplation of insolvency and with intent to prefer the depositor over other creditors of the bank was justified.” Counsel for the defendant refer to and quote quite freely from the United States Supreme Court decision in McDonald, Receiver, vs.

1932Ulrich, 94 Okla., 240 , 221 Pac. 741 , it was held: “Where a day before a bank is suspended, its cashier delivered securities to a depositor, taking his check therefor when the depositor and the cashier knew of the serious financial condition of the bank, a finding that the transaction was entered into in contemplation of insolvency and with intent to prefer the depositor over other creditors of the bank was justified.” Counsel for the defendant refer to and quote quite freely from the United States Supreme Court decision in McDonald, Receiver, vs.

11932–1932
Ruple ex rel. Lewis v. Bindley green
pa · 1879
1 sentence

1927Applicable in principle to the transaction at bar is the authority of our own Supreme Court in Shanklin v. Bd. of Com’rs. of Madison County, 21 Ohio St., 575 , the first and second paragraphs of the syllabus of which we quote: “(1) The liability of a county treasurer, in - curred by his embezzlement of the public funds in his custody, is a sufficient consideration to support the assignment of a banker’s certificate of deposit to the county, in reimbursement of the loss. “(2) The transfer of such certificate by de livery, without indorsement, is a valid assignment, effectual to pass the propert

11927–1927
Fountain v. Bigham neutral
pa · 1912
2 sentences

1927Fountain v. Bigham, 235 Pa., 35 , 84 A., 131 , Ann.

1927Fountain v. Bigham, 235 Pa., 35 , 84 A., 131 , Ann.

11927–1927
Arkansas Valley Town & Land Co. v. Lincoln neutral
kan · 1895
1 sentence

1925Arkansas Valley Town & Land Co. v. Lincoln, 56 Kan., 145 , 42 P., 706 ; Western & Southern Fire Ins.

11925–1925

Where else courts name it

NY 150 (1886–2026) GA 78 (1975–2020) AZ 74 (1947–2024) MI 56 (1927–2025) FL 55 (1953–2024) CT 51 (1961–2025) MT 38 (1996–2026) MO 38 (1870–2017) CA 29 (1915–2026) TX 26 (1886–2017) PA 21 (1894–2024) IL 20 (1874–2013) MD 16 (1922–2020) NJ 15 (1882–2024) LA 14 (1905–2015) WV 13 (1914–2021) OH 11 (1925–2021) AL 11 (1912–2005) OK 10 (1929–2004) OR 9 (1903–1998) TN 9 (1944–2009) NM 8 (1938–1991) MS 7 (1878–2016) CO 7 (1916–2004) NC 6 (1913–1989) VA 6 (1992–2008) AR 6 (1922–1979) IA 5 (1882–2016) WY 5 (1935–1991) ND 5 (1901–2002) DE 5 (1969–2025) IN 5 (1924–1999) KS 5 (1903–2019) WI 4 (1927–2019) ME 4 (1974–2021) MN 4 (1914–1997) NE 4 (1963–2025) WA 3 (1957–1995) SD 3 (1968–2023) MA 3 (1980–2017) AK 3 (1973–2026) NH 2 (2000–2014) ID 2 (1979–1997) KY 2 (1937–1951) HI 2 (1970–2001) NV 2 (2017–2017)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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