section 1983 liability in Georgia

2003“Government officials, including police officers, are entitled to immunity from personal liability under 42 USC § 1983 if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Outlaw v. Nasworthy, 250 Ga. App. 362, 363 (1) ( 551 SE2d 785 ) (2001), citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (102 SC 2727, 73 LE2d 396) (1982).

2001Government officials, including police officers, are entitled to immunity from personal liability under 42 USC § 1983 if their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. [Cits.]” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (102 SC 2727, 73 LE2d 396) (1982).

1998Governmental officials performing discretionary functions are granted qualified immunity shielding them from the imposition of personal liability pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Citation omitted.) Bell v. City of Albany, 210 Ga. App. 371, 374 ( 436 SE2d 87 ) (1993).

1998Governmental officials performing discretionary functions are granted qualified immunity shielding them from the imposition of personal liability pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Citation omitted.) Bell v. City of Albany, 210 Ga. App. 371, 374 ( 436 SE2d 87 ) (1993).

1997J. posed a threat to the foster family or other foster children which the worker did not convey to the family.” (a) “Government officials performing discretionary functions are granted a qualified immunity shielding them from imposition of personal liability pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (102 SC 2727, 73 LE2d 396) (1982); Forney v. Pur-vis, 190 Ga. App. 192, 195-196 ( 378 SE2d 470 ) (1989).

1997J. posed a threat to the foster family or other foster children which the worker did not convey to the family.” (a) “Government officials performing discretionary functions are granted a qualified immunity shielding them from imposition of personal liability pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (102 SC 2727, 73 LE2d 396) (1982); Forney v. Pur-vis, 190 Ga. App. 192, 195-196 ( 378 SE2d 470 ) (1989).

2012In City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378 (109 SC 1197, 103 LE2d 412) (1989), the Supreme Court further explained: The inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train in a relevant respect amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. . . .

1998While local governments may be liable for employing individuals who deprive citizens of their constitutional rights by acting under color of state law and, while inadequacy of police training may serve as a basis for § 1983 liability, such inadequacy must amount to “deliberate indifference to the . . . rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378, 379 (109 SC 1197, 103 LE2d 412) (1989).

2016Monell v. Dept. of Social Svcs. of City of New York, 436 U. S. 658, 690-692 (II) ( 98 SCt 2018 , 56 LE2d 611) (1978).

2016Monell v. Dept. of Social Svcs. of City of New York, 436 U. S. 658, 690-692 (II) ( 98 SCt 2018 , 56 LE2d 611) (1978).

2012As Justice Brennan’s opinion in Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469, 483-484 [(106 SC 1292, 1300-1301, 89 LE2d 452)] (1986) (plurality) putit: “[M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where •—• and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives” by city policymakers.

1992In Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469, 480-483 (106 SC 1292, 89 LE2d 452) (1986), the Supreme Court set forth a three-part test for determining when the acts of a municipal officer subjects a municipality to liability under Section 1983: (1) the municipality officially sanctioned or ordered the act; (2) the actor was a municipal officer with final policy authority; or (3) the action was taken pursuant to a policy adopted by officials responsible under state law for making policy in that area.

2003“Government officials performing discretionary functions 4 are granted a qualified immunity shielding them from imposition of personal liability pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Thomas v. Holt, 221 Ga. App. 345, 347-348 (1) ( 471 SE2d 300 ) (1996).

2003“Government officials performing discretionary functions 4 are granted a qualified immunity shielding them from imposition of personal liability pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Thomas v. Holt, 221 Ga. App. 345, 347-348 (1) ( 471 SE2d 300 ) (1996).

1997“Section 1983 imposes liability where persons acting under color of state law have deprived an individual of a federal constitutional or statutory right. [Cit.]” Hendon v. DeKalb County, 203 Ga. App. 750, 757 (3) ( 417 SE2d 705 ) (1992) (physical precedent only).

1997“Section 1983 imposes liability where persons acting under color of state law have deprived an individual of a federal constitutional or statutory right. [Cit.]” Hendon v. DeKalb County, 203 Ga. App. 750, 757 (3) ( 417 SE2d 705 ) (1992) (physical precedent only).

1986What is required to be proved, directly or circumstantially, is that a governing body has worked constitutional deprivation of a citizen pursuant to an impermissible or corrupt policy which is intentional and deliberate.’ [Cit.] The Supreme Court formulated that construction in an attempt to reconcile the potentially expansive liability under 42 USC § 1983 ‘with our traditional, constitutional, and statutory doctrine of sovereign immunity.’ [Cit.]” Dinsmore v. Cherokee County, 177 Ga. App. 93, 94 ( 338 SE2d 523 ) (1985).

1986What is required to be proved, directly or circumstantially, is that a governing body has worked constitutional deprivation of a citizen pursuant to an impermissible or corrupt policy which is intentional and deliberate.’ [Cit.] The Supreme Court formulated that construction in an attempt to reconcile the potentially expansive liability under 42 USC § 1983 ‘with our traditional, constitutional, and statutory doctrine of sovereign immunity.’ [Cit.]” Dinsmore v. Cherokee County, 177 Ga. App. 93, 94 ( 338 SE2d 523 ) (1985).

2010Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 64, 71 (109 SC 2304, 105 LE2d 45) (1989); Jenkins v. Dept. of Corrections, 238 Ga. App. 336, 340-341 (3) ( 518 SE2d 730 ) (1999).

1996But see Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 66-70 (109 SC 2304, 105 LE2d 45) (1989) (state is not a “person” subject to liability under 42 USC § 1983 ).

2019Brown v. Dorsey, 276 Ga. App. 851, 857 (2) ( 625 SE2d 16 ) (2005) (footnotes and punctuation omitted). “[A] county is liable only when the county’s official policy causes a constitutional violation.” Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F3d 1326, 1329 (II) (A) (11th Cir. 2003) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019Brown v. Dorsey, 276 Ga. App. 851, 857 (2) ( 625 SE2d 16 ) (2005) (footnotes and punctuation omitted). “[A] county is liable only when the county’s official policy causes a constitutional violation.” Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F3d 1326, 1329 (II) (A) (11th Cir. 2003) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019Brown v. Dorsey, 276 Ga. App. 851, 857 (2) ( 625 SE2d 16 ) (2005) (footnotes and punctuation omitted). “[A] county is liable only when the county’s official policy causes a constitutional violation.” Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F3d 1326, 1329 (II) (A) (11th Cir. 2003) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2016Merritt v. Athens Clarke County, 233 Ga. App. 203, 205 (1) ( 504 SE2d 41 ) (1998) (lack of knowledge of medical needs eliminates § 1983 liability). (ii) Reinhart John Reinhart was a detention officer working the 5:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. shift on January 29 and 30.

2016Merritt v. Athens Clarke County, 233 Ga. App. 203, 205 (1) ( 504 SE2d 41 ) (1998) (lack of knowledge of medical needs eliminates § 1983 liability). (ii) Reinhart John Reinhart was a detention officer working the 5:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. shift on January 29 and 30.

2016“Government officials, including [jail personnel], are entitled to immunity from personal liability under 42 USC § 1983 if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Minor, supra, 264 Ga. App. at 332 (1).

2016“Government officials, including [jail personnel], are entitled to immunity from personal liability under 42 USC § 1983 if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Minor, supra, 264 Ga. App. at 332 (1).

2015None of those situations apply here. 2 “There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; rather, a plaintiff must point to some official policy or custom which resulted in the injury. . . . [Robinson] must prove that [MARTA] deprived him of a constitutional right pursuant to an impermissible or corrupt policy which is intentional and deliberate.” Carter v. Glenn, 243 Ga. App. 544, 545 (1) ( 533 SE2d 109 ) (2000).

2015None of those situations apply here. 2 “There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; rather, a plaintiff must point to some official policy or custom which resulted in the injury. . . . [Robinson] must prove that [MARTA] deprived him of a constitutional right pursuant to an impermissible or corrupt policy which is intentional and deliberate.” Carter v. Glenn, 243 Ga. App. 544, 545 (1) ( 533 SE2d 109 ) (2000).

2010Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 64, 71 (109 SC 2304, 105 LE2d 45) (1989); Jenkins v. Dept. of Corrections, 238 Ga. App. 336, 340-341 (3) ( 518 SE2d 730 ) (1999).

2010Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 64, 71 (109 SC 2304, 105 LE2d 45) (1989); Jenkins v. Dept. of Corrections, 238 Ga. App. 336, 340-341 (3) ( 518 SE2d 730 ) (1999).

2003“Unless a government agent’s act is so obviously wrong, in the light of pre-existing law, that only a plainly incompetent officer or one who was knowingly violating the law would have done such a thing, the government actor has immunity from suit.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Maxwell v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 226 Ga. App. 705, 707 (1) ( 487 SE2d 478 ) (1997).

2003“Unless a government agent’s act is so obviously wrong, in the light of pre-existing law, that only a plainly incompetent officer or one who was knowingly violating the law would have done such a thing, the government actor has immunity from suit.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Maxwell v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 226 Ga. App. 705, 707 (1) ( 487 SE2d 478 ) (1997).

2003“Government officials, including police officers, are entitled to immunity from personal liability under 42 USC § 1983 if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Outlaw v. Nasworthy, 250 Ga. App. 362, 363 (1) ( 551 SE2d 785 ) (2001), citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (102 SC 2727, 73 LE2d 396) (1982).

2003“Government officials, including police officers, are entitled to immunity from personal liability under 42 USC § 1983 if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Outlaw v. Nasworthy, 250 Ga. App. 362, 363 (1) ( 551 SE2d 785 ) (2001), citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (102 SC 2727, 73 LE2d 396) (1982).

2001See also Gardner v. Rogers, 224 Ga. App. 165, 167 ( 480 SE2d 217 ) (1996). *364 The test for determining whether a defendant is protected from suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity is the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law.

2001See also Gardner v. Rogers, 224 Ga. App. 165, 167 ( 480 SE2d 217 ) (1996). *364 The test for determining whether a defendant is protected from suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity is the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law.

2000See Wilson v. Strong, 156 F3d 1131 (11th Cir. 1998).

2000And the Eleventh Circuit has held that no Section 1983 liability exists for the suicide of an individual “who never had threatened or attempted suicide and who had never been considered a suicide risk.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 1540.

2000In other words, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; rather, a plaintiff must point to some official policy or custom which resulted in the injury.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Watson v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 223 Ga. App. 399, 401 (1) ( 477 SE2d 667 ) (1996). *544 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constit

2000In other words, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; rather, a plaintiff must point to some official policy or custom which resulted in the injury.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Watson v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 223 Ga. App. 399, 401 (1) ( 477 SE2d 667 ) (1996). *544 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constit

1998Since Officer McCain’s conduct did not cause the deceased or others to suffer a constitutional deprivation, we need not inquire into the City’s policy. “[A]n inquiry into a governmental entity’s custom or policy is relevant only when a constitutional deprivation has occurred.” Id. at 1381 (II); compare Vineyard v. County of Murray &c., 990 F2d 1207, 1211 (11th Cir.) (clear violation of specific rights required before question of § 1983 municipal liability arises).

1998Tillman v. Masten, 216 Ga. App. 3, 4 ( 453 SE2d 85 ) (1995).

1998Tillman v. Masten, 216 Ga. App. 3, 4 ( 453 SE2d 85 ) (1995).

1997See also Cleveland v. Fulton County, 196 Ga. App. 168, 169 (1) ( 396 SE2d 2 ) (1990).

1997See also Cleveland v. Fulton County, 196 Ga. App. 168, 169 (1) ( 396 SE2d 2 ) (1990).

1991Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991); Strickland, supra. (b) Under § 1983 civil liability is imposed upon one “ ‘who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. . . .’ The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws