section 1983 liability in Massachusetts

2003“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials who are performing discretionary functions, not ministerial in nature, from civil liability in § 1983 actions if at the time of the performance of the discretionary act, the constitutional or statutory right allegedly infringed was not ‘clearly established.’ ” Laubinger v. Department of Rev., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 598, 603 (1996), quoting from Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

2001“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials who are performing discretionary functions, not ministerial in nature., from civil liability in § 1983 [and MCRA] actions if at the time of the performance of the discretionary act, the constitutional or statutory right allegedly infringed was not ‘clearly established.’ ” Laubinger v. Department of Rev., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 598, 603 (1996), citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

2003See Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Commrs. of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26, 31-32 (1987), cert. denied sub nom.

2001See Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Commrs. of Springfield, 401 Mass. 26, 31-32 (1987), cert. denied sub nom.

2018Although the defendants are correct that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, MPCH could still be held liable for any unconstitutional acts of the individual defendants if those acts "may fairly be said to represent official policy." Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of the City of N.Y. , 436 U.S. 658 , 694 (1978).

1999The Court of Appeals concluded that the Legislature intended to exclude vicarious liability under the MCRA because it modeled the statute after 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and presumably was aware that a year earlier, in Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), the Supreme Court had construed § 1983 as excluding vicarious liability. 9 The Court of Appeals in Lyons reasoned that the Supreme Judicial Court had held in Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass, at 823, that the MCRA is “coextensive with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . except that the Federal statute requires State a

2012Municipalities can be held liable only if municipal employees commit unconstitutional acts and those actions are shown to have been caused by a ‘policy or custom’ of the government.” Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 177 (1st Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds, Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263 (1st Cir. 2009). “[T]he inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 .

2001See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (determining that inadequacy of training may serve as basis of § 1983 liability where failure to train amounts to “deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights of person with whom police may come into contact).

2011See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (§1983 liability attaches only when the “official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”); Sires v. Berman, 834 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1987) (in cases alleging deliberate indifference to medical risk, “(t]he care provided must have been so inadequate as to shock the conscience” (quoting Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 231 (1st Cir. 1991)).

1993To establish DuBois’s personal liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983 on the grounds that DuBois violated the federal Eighth Amendment, Perry must show “a serious medical need and prove the defendant’s purposeful indifference thereto.” Sires v. Berman, 834 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1987); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).

2003“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials who are performing discretionary functions, not ministerial in nature, from civil liability in § 1983 actions if at the time of the performance of the discretionary act, the constitutional or statutory right allegedly infringed was not ‘clearly established.’ ” Laubinger v. Department of Rev., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 598, 603 (1996), quoting from Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

2001“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials who are performing discretionary functions, not ministerial in nature., from civil liability in § 1983 [and MCRA] actions if at the time of the performance of the discretionary act, the constitutional or statutory right allegedly infringed was not ‘clearly established.’ ” Laubinger v. Department of Rev., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 598, 603 (1996), citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

1993To establish DuBois’s personal liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983 on the grounds that DuBois violated the federal Eighth Amendment, Perry must show “a serious medical need and prove the defendant’s purposeful indifference thereto.” Sires v. Berman, 834 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1987); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).

1990Cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).” Youngberg v. Romeo, supra. We shall apply the Youngberg standard, as did the motion judge. 4 *628 With the applicable principles concerning § 1983 liability described, we can now consider facts presented on the summary judgment record.

1985See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-357 (1978) (judge immune from damages liability unless he acted in “clear absence of all jurisdiction”); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (“public officers are entitled to a qualified immunity from damages liability under § 1983); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (superintendent of State hospital has qualified immunity); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (Governor and other State executive officials have *130 qualified immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-555 (1967) (§ 1983 did not abolish the “settled principle of law” o

1982See, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1977); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980).

2004We note that there is no significant difference between cases that utilize the standard of “gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference” and those that employ “reckless or callous indifference.” See Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, supra. “Indifference that rises to the level of being defiberate, reckless, or callous suffices to establish [supervisory] liability under § 1983.” FebusRodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, supra at 92 n.4, quoting Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, supra. “To demonstrate defiberate indifference a plaintiff must show (1) a grave risk of harm, (2) [McCabe’s] act

2004We note that there is no significant difference between cases that utilize the standard of “gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference” and those that employ “reckless or callous indifference.” See Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, supra. “Indifference that rises to the level of being defiberate, reckless, or callous suffices to establish [supervisory] liability under § 1983.” FebusRodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, supra at 92 n.4, quoting Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, supra. “To demonstrate defiberate indifference a plaintiff must show (1) a grave risk of harm, (2) [McCabe’s] act

2022See Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. 311, 317 (2004), quoting Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 1994) ("there must be an 'affirmative link' between the supervisory official's acts or omissions and his subordinate's violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights").

2004We note that there is no significant difference between cases that utilize the standard of “gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference” and those that employ “reckless or callous indifference.” See Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, supra. “Indifference that rises to the level of being defiberate, reckless, or callous suffices to establish [supervisory] liability under § 1983.” FebusRodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, supra at 92 n.4, quoting Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, supra. “To demonstrate defiberate indifference a plaintiff must show (1) a grave risk of harm, (2) [McCabe’s] act

2018The doctrine of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), applies equally to MCRA claims, Duarte v. Healy , 405 Mass. 43 , 46-47 (1989), shielding government officials performing nonministerial, discretionary functions from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

1999The Court of Appeals concluded that the Legislature intended to exclude vicarious liability under the MCRA because it modeled the statute after 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and presumably was aware that a year earlier, in Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), the Supreme Court had construed § 1983 as excluding vicarious liability. 9 The Court of Appeals in Lyons reasoned that the Supreme Judicial Court had held in Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass, at 823, that the MCRA is “coextensive with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . except that the Federal statute requires State a

1999L. c. 71, § 37H, to adopt security policies expose them to liability under § 1983. “[I]n light of DeShaney , the Court cannot rely on state laws that impose on state agents an affirmative duty of protection as the premise for federal constitutional liability when the injury is caused by a private third person.” Arroyo, supra at 60 .

1998Dist., 38 F.3d 198 ,202 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1017 (1995); Arroyo v. Pla, 748 F. Supp. 56, 59-61 (D.P.R. 1990) (involving a claim by a parent whose son was shot to death by another student during class); and (d) the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability in light of the existing state of the law as it applied to school situations, since it did not clearly establish a student’ s constitutional right to be free from attack by private parties during the school day.

1999See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986), quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (Fourteenth Amendment not a “font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States”); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (“not every injury in which a state official has played some part is actionable” under § 1983).

1982In Martin v. State of California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a California immunity statute could not immunize a parole officer from liability under § 1983.

2025Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 807, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) ("foster children have a substantive due process right to be free from harm at the hands of state-regulated foster parents").

2024Furthermore, the claim against Wellpath properly was dismissed "because there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983." Layne v. Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 471 (1st Cir. 1981). 6 facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint as well as any favorable inferences that reasonably can be drawn from them" (quotation omitted).

2024See O'Malley v. Sheriff of Worcester County, 415 Mass. 132, 141-142 (1993).

2022See Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. 311, 317 (2004), quoting Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 1994) ("there must be an 'affirmative link' between the supervisory official's acts or omissions and his subordinate's violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights").

2020See also Rivera v. R.I., 402 F.3d 27, 39 (1st Cir. 2005) (§ 1983 liability for failure to train or for inadequately training employees premised on underlying constitutional violation of plaintiff's rights [citation omitted]); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581-582 (1st Cir. 1994) (to establish supervisory liability, plaintiff must first show underlying constitutional violation).

2020See also Rivera v. R.I., 402 F.3d 27, 39 (1st Cir. 2005) (§ 1983 liability for failure to train or for inadequately training employees premised on underlying constitutional violation of plaintiff's rights [citation omitted]); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581-582 (1st Cir. 1994) (to establish supervisory liability, plaintiff must first show underlying constitutional violation).

2020That is, "[a]lthough a supervisor need not personally engage in the subordinate's misconduct in order to be held liable, his own acts or omissions must work a constitutional violation." Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2019).

2015Supervisory liability under this federal statute arises if a supervisor directly participates in a rights-violating incident, or if the official “supervises, trains, or hires a subordinate with deliberate indifference toward the possibility that deficient performance of the task may con tribute to a civil rights deprivation.” Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F. 3d 31, 49 (1st Cir. 2009), quoting Camilo-Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1999).

2015See Whiffield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005).

2015Supervisory liability under this federal statute arises if a supervisor directly participates in a rights-violating incident, or if the official “supervises, trains, or hires a subordinate with deliberate indifference toward the possibility that deficient performance of the task may con tribute to a civil rights deprivation.” Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F. 3d 31, 49 (1st Cir. 2009), quoting Camilo-Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1999).