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12 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.green2 sentences1988Under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social Service, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)), P.V.H. is considered a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . 1988Under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social Service, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)), P.V.H. is considered a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . | 2 | 3 |
Surplus Store and Exchange, Inc. v. City of Delphigreen2 sentences2003Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d at 257 (citing Surplus Store & Exch., Inc., 928 F.2d at 791-92 ). 2003See, e.g., Surplus Store and Exchange, Inc. v. City of Delphi, 928 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1991) (imposing no liability upon local officials enforcing state law); Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1222 (5th Cir. 1988) (the enforcement of state law by local officials does not give rise to § 1983 liability); cf, Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247, 251 (9 Cir. 1989) (finding that “the Monell doctrine did not intend to limit the reach of plaintiffs seeking prospective relief under § 1983 .. . under an allegedly unconstitutional “state statute”). | 1 | 1 |
McMillian v. Monroe Countygreen1 sentence2003Jd. at 663, n.7; see also McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997). . inflicts the injury the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 695 . | 1 | 1 |
Chaloux v. Killeengreen2 sentences2003Rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s ~ . position in Chaloux, supra, the-Strout-eourt held that “any municipal liability under section 1983, regardless of the relief sought, must be premised on some culpable act that can fairly be attributed to the municipality.” Jd. 2003See, e.g., Surplus Store and Exchange, Inc. v. City of Delphi, 928 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1991) (imposing no liability upon local officials enforcing state law); Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1222 (5th Cir. 1988) (the enforcement of state law by local officials does not give rise to § 1983 liability); cf, Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247, 251 (9 Cir. 1989) (finding that “the Monell doctrine did not intend to limit the reach of plaintiffs seeking prospective relief under § 1983 .. . under an allegedly unconstitutional “state statute”). | 1 | 1 |
Willie Bigford, Jr. v. Joe Max Taylor, Individually and as Sheriff of Galveston County, Texasgreen1 sentence2003See, e.g., Surplus Store and Exchange, Inc. v. City of Delphi, 928 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1991) (imposing no liability upon local officials enforcing state law); Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1222 (5th Cir. 1988) (the enforcement of state law by local officials does not give rise to § 1983 liability); cf, Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247, 251 (9 Cir. 1989) (finding that “the Monell doctrine did not intend to limit the reach of plaintiffs seeking prospective relief under § 1983 .. . under an allegedly unconstitutional “state statute”). | 1 | 1 |
Yeo v. Town of Lexingtongreen2 sentences2003Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 257 (1st Cir. 1997).’ In his concurring opinion, Judge Stahl wrote, 7 Judge Lynch, writing for an en banc court, noted that [t]he Town’s freedom from liability flows less from the fact that the [plaintiffs] are private actors than from the fact that the [plaintiffs’] actions were not caused by Town policy or custom . . . it seems obvious that, as an action taken in what appears to have been good faith reliance upon state law... . cannot give rise to municipal liability under § 1983. 2003Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 257 (1st Cir. 1997).’ In his concurring opinion, Judge Stahl wrote, 7 Judge Lynch, writing for an en banc court, noted that [t]he Town’s freedom from liability flows less from the fact that the [plaintiffs] are private actors than from the fact that the [plaintiffs’] actions were not caused by Town policy or custom . . . it seems obvious that, as an action taken in what appears to have been good faith reliance upon state law... . cannot give rise to municipal liability under § 1983. | 1 | 1 |
Andrews v. Department of Environmental Protectiongreen2 sentences1999Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability under section 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Andrews, 1998 ME 198, ¶ 11 , 716 A.2d 212, 217 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). 1999Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability under section 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Andrews, 1998 ME 198, ¶ 11 , 716 A.2d 212, 217 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). | 1 | 1 |
Beaulieu v. City of Lewistongreen1 sentence1988Id. 436 U.S. at 691 , 98 S.Ct. at 2036 ; see also Beaulieu v. City of Lewiston, 440 A.2d 334 , 338 n. 5 (Me.1982). 8 . 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads in part as follows: § 1983 Civil action for deprivation of rights Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, *300 shall be liable to the party | 1 | 1 |
Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Kasselgreen1 sentence1986Consolidated Freightways, 730 F.2d at 1144 (footnotes omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gorham v. Androscoggin County
green
1 sentence2015More recently in Gorham v. Androscoggin County, the Law Court reversed dismissal of an independent due process claim under Section 1983 brought together with a Rule 80B appeal. 2011 1\ffi 63, ~ 25, 21 A.3d 115 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
James Chongris and George Chongris v. Board of Appeals of the Town of Andover
green
1 sentence2009Specifically the opening paragraph of § 20-9 states: "The municipal officers, or the city clerk, as may be applicable, in addition to other provisions of this code authorizing such action, may deny, suspend, or revoke a license upon one or more of the [grounds under § 20-9]." II victualler's license such as would entitle them to the prophylaxis of procedural due process relief under 42 USc. § 1983." Clwngris, 811 F.2d at 44 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Harlow v. Fitzgerald
green
2 sentences1999Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability under section 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Andrews, 1998 ME 198, ¶ 11 , 716 A.2d 212, 217 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). 1999Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability under section 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Andrews, 1998 ME 198, ¶ 11 , 716 A.2d 212, 217 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Farmer v. Brennan
green
2 sentences1996In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 , 114 S.Ct. 1970 , 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), the Court held that for a plaintiff to recover under an Eighth Amendment claim, she must demonstrate both the existence of a substantial risk of serious harm and show that officials acted or failed to act despite knowledge of that risk. 1996In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 , 114 S.Ct. 1970 , 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), the Court held that for a plaintiff to recover under an Eighth Amendment claim, she must demonstrate both the existence of a substantial risk of serious harm and show that officials acted or failed to act despite knowledge of that risk. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit
green
2 sentences1995The Court, however, had "no occasion to consider whether [its] qualified immunity jurisprudence would require a heightened pleading in cases involving individual government officials." Leatherman , 507 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1162 , 122 L.Ed.2d at 523 . 8 . 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1994) provides in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, or any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by t 1995The Court, however, had "no occasion to consider whether [its] qualified immunity jurisprudence would require a heightened pleading in cases involving individual government officials." Leatherman , 507 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1162 , 122 L.Ed.2d at 523 . 8 . 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1994) provides in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, or any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by t | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Owen v. City of Independence
green
2 sentences1994Somerset County is not entitled to either an absolute or a qualified immunity for its alleged omissions. 9 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 , 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1409 , 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). 1994Somerset County is not entitled to either an absolute or a qualified immunity for its alleged omissions. 9 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 , 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1409 , 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
City of Canton v. Harris
red
2 sentences1994In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 , 109 S.Ct. 1197 , 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that in order for inadequate training to form the *330 basis for municipal liability pursuant to section 1983, the failure to train must amount to “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Id. at 388 , 109 S.Ct. at 1204 . 1994In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 , 109 S.Ct. 1197 , 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that in order for inadequate training to form the *330 basis for municipal liability pursuant to section 1983, the failure to train must amount to “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Id. at 388 , 109 S.Ct. at 1204 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
green
2 sentences1992Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 , 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311 , 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). 1992Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 , 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311 , 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Monroe v. Pape
red
2 sentences1988Under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social Service, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)), P.V.H. is considered a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . 1988Under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social Service, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)), P.V.H. is considered a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.