section 1983 liability in South Carolina

2023See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 , 53-54 (1998) ("[W]e now make explicit what was implicit in our precedents: Local legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for their legislative activities.").

2020Specifically, a private corporation is not liable under § 1983 for torts committed by special police officers when such liability is predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior."); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) ("In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be 'affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.

2020In particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory."); Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715 , 727-28 (4th Cir. 1999) ("We have recognized, as has the Second Circuit, that the principles of § 1983 municipal liability articulated in Monell and its progeny apply equally to a private corporation that employs special police officers.

2017See Spence v. Wingate , 381 S.C. 487 , 489, 674 S.E.2d 169 , 170 (2009) (finding that because the circuit court's order **401 granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on precisely the grounds argued by respondents at the summary judgment hearing, the ruling was sufficient to preserve petitioner's argument on appeal). 8 The three elements of a § 1983 supervisory liability cause of action are: (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed "a pervasive and unreasonable risk" of constitutional injury to citizens like the

2017See Spence v. Wingate , 381 S.C. 487 , 489, 674 S.E.2d 169 , 170 (2009) (finding that because the circuit court's order **401 granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on precisely the grounds argued by respondents at the summary judgment hearing, the ruling was sufficient to preserve petitioner's argument on appeal). 8 The three elements of a § 1983 supervisory liability cause of action are: (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed "a pervasive and unreasonable risk" of constitutional injury to citizens like the

2004See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 , 106 S.Ct. 1292 , 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where deliberate choice to follow course of action is made from among various alternatives by official responsible for establishing final policy with respect to subject matter in question); Moore v. City of Columbia, supra (municipality may be subjected to liability due to its de facto policies as well as its de jure policies; de facto policies may be established by omissions of municipality or supervisory officials where their unreasonable failure to make rules c

2004See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 , 106 S.Ct. 1292 , 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where deliberate choice to follow course of action is made from among various alternatives by official responsible for establishing final policy with respect to subject matter in question); Moore v. City of Columbia, supra (municipality may be subjected to liability due to its de facto policies as well as its de jure policies; de facto policies may be established by omissions of municipality or supervisory officials where their unreasonable failure to make rules c

2004In addressing the issue of whether a plaintiff may claim liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an affirmative duty *249 theory, the court, in Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1174 (4th Cir.1995) recognized: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require governmental actors to affirmatively protect life, liberty, or property against intrusion by private third parties.