section 1983 liability in Arkansas

2020Louis: Although a single act of a city official “whose acts or edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy” may give rise to municipal liability under § 1983, Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 , 98 S. Ct. 2018 , a municipality will only be liable under § 1983, where a city official “responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question” makes a deliberate choice among competing alternatives that results in the violation of constitutional rights.

2020Louis: Although a single act of a city official “whose acts or edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy” may give rise to municipal liability under § 1983, Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 , 98 S. Ct. 2018 , a municipality will only be liable under § 1983, where a city official “responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question” makes a deliberate choice among competing alternatives that results in the violation of constitutional rights.

2014We turn then to what that standard entails. 112Prison officials are required by the Eighth Amendment to take “reasonable measures to guarantee the safely of inmates[;] [i]n particular, ... prison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 , 114 S.Ct. 1970 , 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).

2014We turn then to what that standard entails. 112Prison officials are required by the Eighth Amendment to take “reasonable measures to guarantee the safely of inmates[;] [i]n particular, ... prison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 , 114 S.Ct. 1970 , 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).

2026It authorizes suits for violations of rights secured by the Arkansas Constitution, and courts interpret it in light of federal § 17 Greer did not file a cross-appeal challenging the dismissal of her federal §1983 individual capacity claims and so that ruling is not before us. 18 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . 19 See, e.g., Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999). 10 1983 precedent.20 Thus, the same defects that defeat Greer’s official-capacity § 1983 claim defeat her official-capacity ACRA claim as well.

2020Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 , 483–84, 106 S. Ct. 1292 , 89 L.

2020Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 , 483–84, 106 S. Ct. 1292 , 89 L.

2013In Gentry v. Robinson, 2009 Ark. 634 , 361 S.W.3d 788 , we noted that a plaintiff may establish ... liability under § 1983 by showing that her constitutional rights were violated by an action pursuant to official municipal policy or by misconduct so pervasive among employees of the county as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.

2013In Gentry v. Robinson, 2009 Ark. 634 , 361 S.W.3d 788 , we noted that a plaintiff may establish ... liability under § 1983 by showing that her constitutional rights were violated by an action pursuant to official municipal policy or by misconduct so pervasive among employees of the county as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.

2005See, e.g., Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069 , 1076-77 (8 th Cir. 1996) (finding sufficient attendance at training academy and two weeks of on-the-job training); Smith v. Watkins, 159 F.3d 1137 , 1138 (8 th Cir. 1998); Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994 (8 th Cir. 1994); and Williams-El v. Johnson, 872 F.2d 224 , 230 (8 th Cir. 1989).

2005The Supreme Court case you reference in your request is Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), which addressed whether a municipality might, under certain circumstances, be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of federal law resulting from its failure adequately to train its employees.

2005See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 , 642 (1999); Board of Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 , 403 . 2 Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 3 With respect to the question of potential exposure to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , I will note that courts regularly consider a municipality's requiring its law enforcement officers to attend a police academy a strong indicium of compliance with the training requirements at issue in Canton.

2005See, e.g., Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069 , 1076-77 (8 th Cir. 1996) (finding sufficient attendance at training academy and two weeks of on-the-job training); Smith v. Watkins, 159 F.3d 1137 , 1138 (8 th Cir. 1998); Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994 (8 th Cir. 1994); and Williams-El v. Johnson, 872 F.2d 224 , 230 (8 th Cir. 1989).

2005See, e.g., Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069 , 1076-77 (8 th Cir. 1996) (finding sufficient attendance at training academy and two weeks of on-the-job training); Smith v. Watkins, 159 F.3d 1137 , 1138 (8 th Cir. 1998); Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994 (8 th Cir. 1994); and Williams-El v. Johnson, 872 F.2d 224 , 230 (8 th Cir. 1989).

2001As stated in Rainey v. Hartness, 339 Ark. 293 , 299 , 5 S.W.3d 410 (1999): Generally, government officials performing discretionary functions are granted a qualified immunity from suit under section 1983 and are "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Wilson v. Layne, No. 98-83, 526 U.S. ___ , ___, slip op. at 4-5 (May 24, 1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 818 (1982)).

2001As stated in Rainey v. Hartness, 339 Ark. 293 , 299 , 5 S.W.3d 410 (1999): Generally, government officials performing discretionary functions are granted a qualified immunity from suit under section 1983 and are "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Wilson v. Layne, No. 98-83, 526 U.S. ___ , ___, slip op. at 4-5 (May 24, 1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 818 (1982)).

2001As stated in Rainey v. Hartness, 339 Ark. 293 , 299 , 5 S.W.3d 410 (1999): Generally, government officials performing discretionary functions are granted a qualified immunity from suit under section 1983 and are "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Wilson v. Layne, No. 98-83, 526 U.S. ___ , ___, slip op. at 4-5 (May 24, 1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 818 (1982)).

1998In Wells, 852 F.2d 368 , the court recognized that where the state actors used an individual’s place of business for the purpose of releasing paroled prisoners, liability attaches under section 1983, as the state actors were said to have affirmatively placed the individual in an unique confrontational encounter with potentially dangerous persons.

1998In Cornelius, 880 F.2d 348 , the court held that state actors may be liable upon a showing of a “special relationship” between the individual victim and the third party or between the victim and the government actors.

1998The Court’s decision in Martinez, 444 U.S. 277 , established that any claim pursuant to section 1983 must state facts demonstrating that the conduct of a state actor deprived a particular individual of his or her constitutional rights without due process of law.

1993Landstrom v. Illinois Dept. of Children Family Services 892 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1990).

1993It is therefore my opinion that absent malicious conduct or improper motives ( see, e.g., Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1990)), school officials will not be subject to § 1983 liability solely for admitting social workers to school grounds for the purpose of interviewing children to discover suspected child abuse.