employment-at-will doctrine in Missouri

2009However, Missouri courts have recognized public policy exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine in Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.App.

2009However, Missouri courts have recognized public policy exceptions to *800 the employment at-will doctrine in Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.App.

2010See Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. banc 1985) (holding that the prima facie tort theory may not be used to circumvent the employment-at-will doctrine); Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 663 (refusing to consider whether to create a public-policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine because the employee did not implicate a constitutional provision, statute, or regulation based on a statute); Johnson v. Kraft Gen.

1998Although the Missouri Supreme Court has not specifically adopted all of the public policy exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine, it acknowledged that various Court of Appeals decisions had recognized other public policy exceptions in Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. banc 1988), and Luethans v. Washington Univ., 894 S.W.2d 169 , 171 n. 2 (Mo. banc 1995). 3 .

2010See Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. banc 1985) (holding that the prima facie tort theory may not be used to circumvent the employment-at-will doctrine); Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 663 (refusing to consider whether to create a public-policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine because the employee did not implicate a constitutional provision, statute, or regulation based on a statute); Johnson v. Kraft Gen.

1997However, it must be remembered that the Missouri Supreme Court has emphatically declared Missouri to be an employment-at-will doctrine state, Dake, supra, and Johnson, supra, and that the public policy exception to the doctrine, which was fashioned by the Missouri Court of Appeals and never expressly approved and adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court, is a narrow and limited exception, Adolphsen, 907 S.W.2d at 336 ; Cole, 884 S.W.2d at 21 ; Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 878 , which should not be expanded without clear justification.

2015Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., PC., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Mo.banc 2010).

2012Applicable Law & Principles of Review A public-policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine provides that an employer may be liable for damages if the employer terminates an at-will employee “(1) for refusing to violate the law or any well-established and clear mandate of public policy as expressed in the constitution, statutes, regulations promulgated pursuant to statute, or rules created by a governmental body or (2) for reporting wrongdoing or violations of law to superiors or public authorities.” Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Mo. banc 2010). 1 The employe

2012See Clark v. Beverly Enters.-Mo., Inc., 872 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Mo.App.

1998Clark v. Beverly Enterprises-Missouri, supra, summarized four categories of cases in which Missouri has recognized the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine; circumstances in which a discharged at-will employee has an action for wrongful discharge.

2006To survive a motion to dismiss, Sivigliano “must plead ... the elements of a cause of action under an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.” Adolphsen, 907 S.W.2d at 335 (Mo.App.1995).

1997However, it must be remembered that the Missouri Supreme Court has emphatically declared Missouri to be an employment-at-will doctrine state, Dake, supra, and Johnson, supra, and that the public policy exception to the doctrine, which was fashioned by the Missouri Court of Appeals and never expressly approved and adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court, is a narrow and limited exception, Adolphsen, 907 S.W.2d at 336 ; Cole, 884 S.W.2d at 21 ; Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 878 , which should not be expanded without clear justification.

1999Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo. banc 1998).

1998See, e.g., Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. banc 1998). 2 This Court and the other districts of the Court of Appeals have recognized three additional public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, however, in cases such as Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.App.1985).

1998Lynch v. Blanke Baer & Bowey Krimko, Inc., 901 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Mo.App.1995).

1997Adcock v. Newtec, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 426, 428-29 (Mo.App.1996); Shawcross v. Pyro Prod., Inc., 916 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Mo.App.1995); Adolphsen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Mo.App.1995); Lynch v. Blanke Baer & Bowey Krimko, Inc., 901 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Mo.App.1995); Cole v. Conservation Com’n, 884 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Mo.App.1994); Clark v. Beverly Enterprises-Missouri, Inc., 872 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Mo.App.1994); Kirk v. Mercy Hosp.

1997“Employees who do not have a contract for a definite period of time are considered ‘employees-at-will’ Amaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo. banc 1981), cert. den., 454 U.S. 1084 , 102 S.Ct. 642 , 70 L.Ed.2d 619 (1981).” McCloskey v. Eagleton, 789 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Mo.App.1990).

1989If appellant’s action were one for wrongful discharge, the directed verdict against appellant would clearly have been proper because the employment-at-will rule bars a cause of action for wrongful discharge. "[I]n the absence of a contract for employment for a definite term or a contrary statutory provision, an employer may discharge an employee at any time, without cause or reason, or for any reason and in such cases no action can be obtained for wrongful discharge.” Amaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo. banc), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1084 , 102 S.Ct. 642 , 70 L.Ed.2d 619 (1981).

1995That doctrine states that “an employer can discharge—for cause or without cause—an at-will employee ... and still not be subject to liability for wrongful discharge.” Luethans v. Washington Univ., 838 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Mo.App.1992), (quoting Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Mo. banc 1988)).

1993See Luethans v. Washington Univ., 838 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Mo.App.1992); Petersimes v. Crane Co., 835 S.W.2d 514, 517 (Mo.App.1992); Rothweil v. Wetterau, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Mo.App.1991); Crockett v. Mid-America Health Serv., 780 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo.App. 1989); Loomstein v. Medicare Pharmacies, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 106, 112 (Mo.App. 1988). *620 We hold that the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is alive and well.

1993See Luethans v. Washington Univ., 838 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Mo.App.1992); Petersimes v. Crane Co., 835 S.W.2d 514, 517 (Mo.App.1992); Rothweil v. Wetterau, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Mo.App.1991); Crockett v. Mid-America Health Serv., 780 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo.App. 1989); Loomstein v. Medicare Pharmacies, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 106, 112 (Mo.App. 1988). *620 We hold that the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is alive and well.

1992See Rothweil v. Wetterau, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Mo.App.1991).

1993Crockett v. Mid-America Health Services, 780 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo.App.1989).

1993See Luethans v. Washington Univ., 838 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Mo.App.1992); Petersimes v. Crane Co., 835 S.W.2d 514, 517 (Mo.App.1992); Rothweil v. Wetterau, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Mo.App.1991); Crockett v. Mid-America Health Serv., 780 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo.App. 1989); Loomstein v. Medicare Pharmacies, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 106, 112 (Mo.App. 1988). *620 We hold that the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is alive and well.

2008Dunn, 170 S.W.3d at 6 .

2007Dunn v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 170 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo.App.

2004The employment at-will doctrine cannot be so easily subverted. 2 Hanrahan v. Nashua Corp., 752 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Mo.App.1988); Neighbors, 694 S.W.2d at 824 .

1997See also Alfano v. AAIM Management Ass’n, 770 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Mo.App.1989); Hanrahan, 752 S.W.2d at 883-84 .

2020See Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1988); Goodman v. Wesley Med.

2017After first recognizing a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that, “[although the contours of an exception are important to all employees at will, this case focuses on- the special considerations arising out of the right to fire an employee at -will who is a member of a recognized profession.” Id. at 511.

2014Northeast Northwest, 315 S.W.3d 342, 345-46 (Mo. banc 2010) (citation omitted).

2013“A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is solely a test of the adequacy of the plaintiffs petition.” Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, N.A., 220 S.W.3d 758, 768 (Mo. banc 2007).

2010Id. at 254. 9 .

2010In its amicus brief, the National Employment Lawyers Association argues that this Court recognized the public-policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine in Smith v. Arthur Baue Funeral Home, 370 S.W.2d 249 (Mo.1963).

2008While typically an at-will employee may be discharged with or without cause, "Missouri recognizes a narrow public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, holding an employer who discharges an employee in violation of a clear mandate of public policy to be liable for wrongful discharge." Grimes v. City of Tarkio, 246 S.W.3d 533, 536 (Mo.App.

2008See Kelly, 218 S.W.3d at 524 ; Bishop, 129 S.W.3d at 506 .