36 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Morriss v. Coleman Co.green2 sentences2016COMMON-LAW RETALIATORY DISCHARGE "Kansas historically adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine, which holds that employees and employers may terminate an employment relationship at any time for any reason, unless there is an express or implied contract governing the employment's duration." Campbell v. Husky Hogs, 292 Kan. 225, 227 , 255 P.3d 1 (2011) (citing Morriss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 510 , 738 P.2d 841 [1987]). 2016COMMON-LAW RETALIATORY DISCHARGE "Kansas historically adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine, which holds that employees and employers may terminate an employment relationship at any time for any reason, unless there is an express or implied contract governing the employment's duration." Campbell v. Husky Hogs, 292 Kan. 225, 227 , 255 P.3d 1 (2011) (citing Morriss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 510 , 738 P.2d 841 [1987]). | 2 | 11 |
Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co.green2 sentences2019The employment-at-will doctrine holds that employees and employers may terminate an employment relationship at any time for any reason, unless there is an express or implied contract governing the terms of employment. **470 Lumry v. State , 305 Kan. 545 , 562, 385 P.3d 479 (2016) ; see Johnson , 220 Kan. 52 , Syl. ¶ 1, 551 P.2d 779 ("In the absence of a contract, express or implied, between an employee and his employer covering the duration of employment, the employment is terminable at the will of either party, and the employee states no cause of action for breach of contract by alleging that 2019The employment-at-will doctrine holds that employees and employers may terminate an employment relationship at any time for any reason, unless there is an express or implied contract governing the terms of employment. **470 Lumry v. State , 305 Kan. 545 , 562, 385 P.3d 479 (2016) ; see Johnson , 220 Kan. 52 , Syl. ¶ 1, 551 P.2d 779 ("In the absence of a contract, express or implied, between an employee and his employer covering the duration of employment, the employment is terminable at the will of either party, and the employee states no cause of action for breach of contract by alleging that | 1 | 5 |
Ortega v. IBP, Inc.green2 sentences2000Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 255 Kan. 513, 516 , 874 P.2d 1188 (1994)..Under the employment-at-will doctrine, an employer can terminate an employee for good cause, for no cause, and even for a wrong cause. 255 Kan. at 516 . 2000Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 255 Kan. 513, 516 , 874 P.2d 1188 (1994)..Under the employment-at-will doctrine, an employer can terminate an employee for good cause, for no cause, and even for a wrong cause. 255 Kan. at 516 . | 1 | 2 |
Fowler v. Criticare Home Health Services, Inc.green1 sentence2002See Fowler v. Criticare Home Health Services, Inc., 271 Kan. 715 , 26 P.3d 69 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McDonaldgreen1 sentence2002See Fowler v. Criticare Home Health Services, Inc., 271 Kan. 715 , 26 P.3d 69 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 536143green2 sentences1998Polson concluded: “It appears that we must investigate the adequacy of the alternative remedy before classifying a situation as being under the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.” 895 F.2d at 709. 1998Poison reasoned that this court would adopt the view that KAAD provides an adequate and exclusive state remedy for violations of the public policy at issue. 895 F.2d at 709. | 1 | 1 |
Kastner v. BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD OF KANSASgreen1 sentence1996See Kastner, 21 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
Mildfelt v. Lairgreen2 sentences1985See Mildfelt v. Lair, 221 Kan. 557, 563 , 561 P.2d 805 (1977). 1985See Mildfelt v. Lair, 221 Kan. 557, 563 , 561 P.2d 805 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Murphy v. City of Topeka
green
2 sentences2004Kansas courts adopted a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine in Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan. 2002One exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is recognized when an employee is discharged in retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim, Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan. | 7 | 1985–2004 |
Campbell v. Husky Hogs, L.L.C.
green
2 sentences2019Historically, Kansas adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine, "'which holds that employees and employers may terminate an employment relationship at any time for any reason, unless there is an express or implied contract governing the employment's duration.'" Lumry v. State, 305 Kan. 545 , 562, 385 P.3d 479 (2016) (quoting Husky Hogs, 292 Kan. at 227 ). 2016COMMON-LAW RETALIATORY DISCHARGE "Kansas historically adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine, which holds that employees and employers may terminate an employment relationship at any time for any reason, unless there is an express or implied contract governing the employment's duration." Campbell v. Husky Hogs, 292 Kan. 225, 227 , 255 P.3d 1 (2011) (citing Morriss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 510 , 738 P.2d 841 [1987]). | 6 | 2012–2019 |
Palmer v. Brown
green
2 sentences2000Before courts are justified in declaring the existence of public policy, “ ‘it should be so thoroughly established as a state of public mind so united and so definite and fixed that its existence is not subject to any substantial doubt.’ ” Palmer v. Brown, 242 Kan. 893, 897 , 752 P.2d 685 (1988). 2000Before courts are justified in declaring the existence of public policy, “ ‘it should be so thoroughly established as a state of public mind so united and so definite and fixed that its existence is not subject to any substantial doubt.’ ” Palmer v. Brown, 242 Kan. 893, 897 , 752 P.2d 685 (1988). | 4 | 1993–2000 |
Brown v. United Methodist Homes for the Aged
green
2 sentences1997As such, the cause of action is strictly limited and would likewise prevent “excessive judicial entanglement.” In Brown v. United Methodist Homes for the Aged, 249 Kan. 124, 134 , 815 P.2d 72 (1991), this court noted: “The employment-at-will doctrine is not strictly adhered to when the employer’s conduct undermines an important public policy. 1997As such, the cause of action is strictly limited and would likewise prevent “excessive judicial entanglement.” In Brown v. United Methodist Homes for the Aged, 249 Kan. 124, 134 , 815 P.2d 72 (1991), this court noted: “The employment-at-will doctrine is not strictly adhered to when the employer’s conduct undermines an important public policy. | 3 | 1994–1998 |
Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Hall argues that his termination constitutes a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, as recognized in Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804 , 752 P.2d 645 (1988). 2002Hall argues that his termination constitutes a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, as recognized in Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804 , 752 P.2d 645 (1988). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Noel Ex Rel. Noel v. Menninger Foundation
green
2 sentences1995“Before courts are justified in declaring the existence of public policy, however, ‘it should be so thoroughly established as a state of public mind so united and so definite and fixed that its existence is not subject to any substantial doubt.’ ” Palmer, 242 Kan. at 897 (quoting Noel v. Menninger, 175 Kan. 751 , Syl. ¶ 4, 267 P.2d 934 [1954]). 1995“Before courts are justified in declaring the existence of public policy, however, ‘it should be so thoroughly established as a state of public mind so united and so definite and fixed that its existence is not subject to any substantial doubt.’ ” Palmer, 242 Kan. at 897 (quoting Noel v. Menninger, 175 Kan. 751 , Syl. ¶ 4, 267 P.2d 934 [1954]). | 2 | 1995–1995 |
Allegri v. Providence-St. Margaret Health Center
green
2 sentences1991In deciding whether an implied contract existed in Allegri , the Court of Appeals recognized that Kansas traditionally followed the employment-at-will doctrine as set forth in Johnson , but the determination of whether an implied contract of employment existed required a factual inquiry. 9 Kan. 1991In deciding whether an implied contract existed in Allegri , the Court of Appeals recognized that Kansas traditionally followed the employment-at-will doctrine as set forth in Johnson , but the determination of whether an implied contract of employment existed required a factual inquiry. 9 Kan. | 2 | 1988–1991 |
Anco Construction Co. v. Freeman
green
2 sentences1987Co. v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 626 , 693 P.2d 1183 (1985), it is stated in Syl. ¶ 4 as follows: "The employment-at-will doctrine in Kansas stems from the judicial determination that, in the absence of a contract covering the duration of employment, the employment is terminable at the will of either party, and the employee has no cause of action by alleging he was discharged." The rule established in Murphy and subsequently followed in Kansas was a judicially created rule applicable only to at-will employees in order to protect the at-will employees from discharge in violation of some public policy o 1987Co. v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 626 , 693 P.2d 1183 (1985), it is stated in Syl. ¶ 4 as follows: "The employment-at-will doctrine in Kansas stems from the judicial determination that, in the absence of a contract covering the duration of employment, the employment is terminable at the will of either party, and the employee has no cause of action by alleging he was discharged." The rule established in Murphy and subsequently followed in Kansas was a judicially created rule applicable only to at-will employees in order to protect the at-will employees from discharge in violation of some public policy o | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Riddle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023In the absence of an express or implied contract of duration or where recognized public policy concerns are raised, employment is terminable at the will of either party." Riddle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 27 Kan. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Pfeifer v. Federal Express Corp.
green
2 sentences2021Pfeifer v. Federal Express Corporation, 297 Kan. 547, 554 , 304 P.3d 1226 (2013). 2021Pfeifer v. Federal Express Corporation, 297 Kan. 547, 554 , 304 P.3d 1226 (2013). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Peters v. Deseret Cattle Feeders, LLC
green
2 sentences2020The GRA Intent to Appoint states any employment for the GRA position "would be 'at will.'" The employment-at-will doctrine generally holds that "employees and employers may terminate an employment relationship at any time for any reason, unless there is an express or implied contract governing the terms of employment." Peters v. Deseret Cattle Feeders, LLC, 309 Kan. 462, 469 , 437 P.3d 976 (2019). 2020The GRA Intent to Appoint states any employment for the GRA position "would be 'at will.'" The employment-at-will doctrine generally holds that "employees and employers may terminate an employment relationship at any time for any reason, unless there is an express or implied contract governing the terms of employment." Peters v. Deseret Cattle Feeders, LLC, 309 Kan. 462, 469 , 437 P.3d 976 (2019). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019By contrast, in the Illinois Supreme Court's plurality decision in Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill. 2d 29, 39 , 645 N.E.2d 877 (1994), rejecting the expansion of the common-law retaliation tort to include any action short of retaliatory discharge, the court reasoned, "We decline plaintiff's request to extrapolate from the rationale of [caselaw recognizing a common-law retaliatory discharge tort] a cause of action predicated on retaliatory demotion. [The caselaw] created an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 2019By contrast, in the Illinois Supreme Court's plurality decision in Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill. 2d 29, 39 , 645 N.E.2d 877 (1994), rejecting the expansion of the common-law retaliation tort to include any action short of retaliatory discharge, the court reasoned, "We decline plaintiff's request to extrapolate from the rationale of [caselaw recognizing a common-law retaliatory discharge tort] a cause of action predicated on retaliatory demotion. [The caselaw] created an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Hill v. State
green
1 sentence2019Hill, 53 Kan. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Company
green
2 sentences2004The court said: “The Supreme Court of Indiana, in Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249 , 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973), supplied the first judicial recognition that discharge of an employee in retaliation for filing a workmen’s compensation claim is actionable at law and may support an award of both actual and punitive damages. 2004The court said: “The Supreme Court of Indiana, in Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249 , 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973), supplied the first judicial recognition that discharge of an employee in retaliation for filing a workmen’s compensation claim is actionable at law and may support an award of both actual and punitive damages. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Bracken v. Dixon Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence2003Bracken, 272 Kan. at 1275 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Frye v. IBP, Inc.
green
1 sentence2000Frye, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1046 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Brigham v. Dillon Companies, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1997Declaring itself to be “duty bound to follow the law as established by our Supreme Court decisions, absent some indication that the Supreme Court is departing from its previously expressed position,” 22 Kan. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Pagdilao v. Maui Intercontinental Hotel
green
2 sentences1996Hawaii law recognizes the implied contract exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will. 703 F. Supp. at 866 . 1996Thus, “the 'unfettered right of employers to discharge employees “can be contractually modified and, thus, qualified by statements contained in employee policy handbooks issued by employers to their employees.” ’ [Citation omitted.]” 703 F. Supp. at 866 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Chavez v. Manville Products Corp.
green
2 sentences1994There, the court held that because the tort of retaliatory discharge is the sole exception to the employment-at-will doctrine in the state, “requiring the at-will employee to show the discharge contravened a clear mandate of public policy . . . sufficiently limits the exception to at-will employment.” 108 N.M. at 649 . 1994Further, the court stated that, because retaliatory discharge is an intentional tort, “the standard of proof required in retaliatory discharge cases should be consistent with the majority of other intentional torts — proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” 108 N.M. at 649 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Morton Buildings, Inc. v. Department of Human Resources
green
1 sentence1988In Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Department of Human Resources, 10 Kan. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Swart v. Huston
green
2 sentences1987In Swart v. Huston, 154 Kan. 182 , 117 P.2d 576 (1941), it was held that, in the absence of an express or implied contract between an employee and his employer covering the duration of such employment, no action for discharging the employee from service can be maintained against the employer. 1987In Swart v. Huston, 154 Kan. 182 , 117 P.2d 576 (1941), it was held that, in the absence of an express or implied contract between an employee and his employer covering the duration of such employment, no action for discharging the employee from service can be maintained against the employer. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.