employment-at-will doctrine in Ohio

2025“Under this doctrine, a general or indefinite hiring is terminable at the will of either the employee or the employer; thus, a discharge without cause does not give rise to an action for damages.” Id., citing Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 (1995); see also Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St.3d 100 (1985), paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 26} However, in response to perceived abuses of the employment-at-will doctrine, and following the trend of other states, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.

2021We disagree. {¶16} “An ‘exception to the employment at-will doctrine is an express or implied contract altering the terms for discharge.’” Squire v. Carlisle Twp., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 18CA011435, 2019-Ohio-3984 , ¶ 22, quoting Shetterly v. WHR Health Sys., 9th Dist. Medina No. 08CA0026-M, 2009-Ohio-673 , ¶ 12. “[E]vidence of the character of the employment, custom, the course of dealing between the parties, company policy, or other circumstances may transform an employment at- -10- will agreement into an implied contract for a definite term.” Ventre v. Bd. of Trustees of Green Twp., 1st Dist.

2026“Clear public policy” justifying exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine “is not limited to public policy expressed by the General Assembly in the form of statutory enactments.” Painter v. Graley, 70 Ohio St.3d 377, 383-384 (1994).

2021However, “an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is justified where an employer has discharged his employee in contravention of a ‘sufficiently clear public policy.’” Painter v. Graley, 70 Ohio St.3d 377, 384 , 639 N.E.2d 51 (1994). {¶20} The elements necessary to demonstrate a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are: {¶21} “‘1.

2026But in Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc., the Supreme Court of Ohio carved out a public policy exception to this rule: “Public policy warrants an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an employee is discharged or disciplined for a reason which is prohibited by statute.” 49 Ohio St.3d 228 (1990), paragraph one of the syllabus.

2025In Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 234-35 (1990), the Court recognized a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine based on a violation of a specific statute. “[A]fter Greeley, an employee terminated in violation of a statute could maintain a common-law action for damages.” Wiles at ¶ 5 . {¶ 27} Subsequent to Greeley, the Supreme Court expanded and refined the scope of the tort of wrongful discharge, holding that “a valid Greeley claim is not limited to situations where the discharge violates a statute.” Wiles at ¶ 6 .

2025“Under this doctrine, a general or indefinite hiring is terminable at the will of either the employee or the employer; thus, a discharge without cause does not give rise to an action for damages.” Id., citing Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 (1995); see also Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St.3d 100 (1985), paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 26} However, in response to perceived abuses of the employment-at-will doctrine, and following the trend of other states, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.

2025“The employment-at-will doctrine, the rule that general or indefinite hiring is terminable at the will of either party for any cause or no cause, is the traditional rule in Ohio.” House v. Iacovelli, 2020-Ohio-435, ¶ 11 , citing Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 67-68 (1995).

2021This general rule is "commonly known as the employment-at-will doctrine, which was judicially created and thus may be judicially abolished." Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 129 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2011-Ohio-2723, ¶ 7 , citing Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 161 (1997).

2011Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 161 , 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 8} In 1990, this court recognized an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine that applies when an at-will employee is discharged or disciplined for reasons that contravene clear public policy expressed by the legislature in its statutes.

2021Research Council of Am., 45 Ohio St.2d 249, 255 , 344 N.E.2d 118 (1976). “[T]he existence of an express or implied contract can overcome the employment at-will presumption.

2021Research Council of Am., 45 Ohio St.2d 249, 255 , 344 N.E.2d 118 (1976). “[T]he existence of an express or implied contract can overcome the employment at-will presumption.

2015Phung v. Waste Mgt., Inc., 23 Ohio St.3d 100 , 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986). {¶17} Promissory estoppel is an exception to the employment at-will doctrine.

2015Phung v. Waste Mgt., Inc., 23 Ohio St.3d 100 , 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986). {¶17} Promissory estoppel is an exception to the employment at-will doctrine.

2021At least two exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine have been recognized by the Supreme Court of Ohio including "(1) the existence of implied or express contractual provisions which alter the terms of discharge; and (2) the existence of promissory estoppel where representations or promises have been made to an employee." Wright v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 73 Ohio St.3d 571 , 574 (1995), citing Mers at 104-05 .

2008Condon v. Body, Vickers Daniels (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 12 , 18 . {¶ 22} The Supreme Court of Ohio has noted two exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine: "(1) the existence of implied or express contractual provisions which alter the terms of discharge; and (2) the existence of promissory estoppel where representations or promises have been made to an employee." Wright , supra, at 574 ; Daup , supra. "Consistent with the presumption of at-will employment, it is recognized that `the party asserting an implied contract of employment has a heavy burden. * * * [Plaintiff] must prove the exist

2025“Under this doctrine, a general or indefinite hiring is terminable at the will of either the employee or the employer; thus, a discharge without cause does not give rise to an action for damages.” Id., citing Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 (1995); see also Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St.3d 100 (1985), paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 26} However, in response to perceived abuses of the employment-at-will doctrine, and following the trend of other states, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.

2018See Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts , 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 .

2012See Haynes v. Zoological Soc. of Cincinnati, 73 Ohio St.3d 254 , 652 N.E.2d 948 (1995), syllabus. {¶16} Schmitt’s complaint alleged that she was hired in 2002 and continued her employment with BCS and ESC until her termination, an allegation that could reasonably be construed to mean that her employment was at-will.

2012See Haynes v. Zoological Soc. of Cincinnati, 73 Ohio St.3d 254 , 652 N.E.2d 948 (1995), syllabus. {¶16} Schmitt’s complaint alleged that she was hired in 2002 and continued her employment with BCS and ESC until her termination, an allegation that could reasonably be construed to mean that her employment was at-will.

2018See Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts , 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 .

2006See Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts , 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 .

2015See Collins v. Rizanka, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 652 N.E.2d 653 (1995); see also Dohme v. Eurand America, Inc., 130 Ohio St.3d 168 , 2011-Ohio-4609 , 956 N.E.2d 825 , ¶ 11. {¶15} But in Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 228 , 551 N.E.2d 981 (1990), the Ohio Supreme Court recognized an exception to this employment-at-will doctrine.

2015See Collins v. Rizanka, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 652 N.E.2d 653 (1995); see also Dohme v. Eurand America, Inc., 130 Ohio St.3d 168 , 2011-Ohio-4609 , 956 N.E.2d 825 , ¶ 11. {¶15} But in Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 228 , 551 N.E.2d 981 (1990), the Ohio Supreme Court recognized an exception to this employment-at-will doctrine.

2021To prevail on such a claim, a discharged employee "must demonstrate a promise, clear and unambiguous in its terms, made by the employer, which the employer should reasonably and foreseeably expect to induce reliance by the employee; the employee must have actually relied on the promise and suffered injury as a result." Sidenstricker v. Miller Pavement Maintenance, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 00AP-1146, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4793 , 2001-Ohio- 4111 (Oct. 25, 2001), citing Mers at 105 . {¶ 14} "A promise of future benefits or opportunities without a specific promise of continued employment does not suppo

2008Such illuminates the ambiguous nature of what appellant alleges occurred, and therefore, is insufficient to constitute a meeting of the minds to create a contract so as to alter the employment relationship from one of at-will to one of indefiniteness. {¶ 40} Further, "[a] promise of future benefits or opportunities without a specific promise of continued employment does not support a promissory estoppel exception to the employment-at-will doctrine." Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108 , paragraph two of the syllabus. .

2007(Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. [1992], 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , overruled.) {¶ 15} In Kulch, the Ohio Supreme Court again acknowledged the exception to the employment-at-will doctrine: Greeley and Painter recognize an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an at-will employee is discharged or disciplined for a reason that contravenes clear public policy.

2007(Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. [1992], 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , overruled.) {¶ 15} In Kulch, the Ohio Supreme Court again acknowledged the exception to the employment-at-will doctrine: Greeley and Painter recognize an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an at-will employee is discharged or disciplined for a reason that contravenes clear public policy.

2004See, also, Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 131 , 136 ("a demonstration of detrimental reliance on specific promises of job security can create an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine"). {¶ 21} Appellee argues that promissory estoppel is inapplicable in the present case because appellant was employed by Battelle under a written, rather than oral, employment agreement which specifically provided that the employment relationship was at-will, and that the agreement could not be modified except in writing by an officer of Battelle.

1993Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 131 , 543 N.E.2d 1212 , at paragraph three of the syllabus. *647 Furthermore, for the theory of an implied contract exception to the employment-at-will doctrine to apply there must be a meeting of the minds between the parties as to the underlying terms that concern a discharge.

2008Helle v. Landmark, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio App.3d 1 , 8 .

2005Mers v. Dispatch Printing (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 100 , 103 . {¶ 14} The Ohio Supreme Court in Mers , noted that "[e]mployee handbooks, company policy, and oral representations have been recognized in some situations as comprising components or evidence of the employment contract." Mers at 104 , citing Hedrick v. Ctr. for Comprehensive Alcoholism Treatment (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 211 ; and Helle v. Landmark, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio App.3d 1 .