employment-at-will doctrine in Texas

2025MHHS explained that in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985), “the Texas Supreme Court recognized a very narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine: ‘That narrow exception covers only the discharge of an employee for the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act.’” Cingular Wireless, L.L.C. v. Lee, No. 13-07-132-CV, 2009 WL 866796 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 2, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

2019One "very narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine," which we adopted in Sabine Pilot , prohibits employers from terminating at-will employees "for the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act." 687 S.W.2d at 735 .

2012Wrongful Termination Claim In Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735 , the Texas Supreme Court recognized a narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for an employee discharged Afor the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act.@ See Ed Rachal Found. v. D’Unger, 207 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ=g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. 1999) (both describing exception).

2010Texas has long followed the employment-at-will doctrine: “[E]mployment for an indefinite term may be terminated at will and without cause.” Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 723 (Tex.1990) (citing E.

2018See Hancock v. Express One Int’l, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied) (“It is not for an intermediate appellate court to undertake to enlarge or extend the grounds for wrongful discharge under the employment-at-will doctrine.”).

2012Dist., 322 S.W.3d 396, 400 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (“[I]t is not an appropriate role for this court to further erode the employment-at-will doctrine through additional exceptions.”); Hancock v. Express One Int'l, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied) (“It is not for an intermediate appellate court to undertake to enlarge or extend the grounds for wrongful discharge under the employment-at-will doctrine.

2012Jenkins v. Guardian Industries Corp., 16 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied).

2011Lozoya v. Air Systems Components, Inc., 81 S.W.3d 344, 347 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.); Jenkins v. Guardian Industries Corp., 16 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied).

2001The Texas Supreme Court also attempted to expand the employment-at-will doctrine in McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex.1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 , 111 S.Ct. 478 , 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990), op. withdrawn, 807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.1991).

1999Wegner relies on McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. in support of his contention that his situation represents an additional exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 779 S.W.2d 69, 70-71 (Tex. 1989) (employees can recover if principal reason for discharge was employer's desire to avoid paying pension benefits), rev'd , 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (holding this cause of action preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974), opinion withdrawn on remand , 807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991).

2011Lozoya v. Air Systems Components, Inc., 81 S.W.3d 344, 347 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.); Jenkins v. Guardian Industries Corp., 16 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied).

2010Lozoya v. Air Systems Components, Inc., 81 S.W.3d 344, 347 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2002, no pet.); Jenkins v. Guardian Industries Corp., 16 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex.App.--Waco 2000, pet. denied).

2004Terry v. Southern Floral Co., 927 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).

2003Terry v. S. Floral Co. , 927 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).

2001Schroeder v. Tex. Iron Works, Inc. , 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991).

2001Schroeder v. Tex. Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex.1991).

2019See D’Unger, 207 S.W.3d at 332 (“Sabine Pilot protects employees who are asked to commit a crime”); Mayfield, 970 S.W.2d at 187 (“To prevail on the Sabine Pilot exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, the terminated employee must prove his discharge was solely because he refused to perform an illegal act that could result in criminal penalties against him.”); Ran Ken, Inc. v. Schlapper, 963 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied) (“Necessary to the employee’s proof is evidence that the act could have resulted in criminal penalties against the employee.”).

2012Wrongful Termination Claim In Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735 , the Texas Supreme Court recognized a narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for an employee discharged Afor the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act.@ See Ed Rachal Found. v. D’Unger, 207 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ=g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. 1999) (both describing exception).

2015App.—Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord, Simmons Airlines v. Lagrotte, 50 S.W.3d 748, 752 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (stating that “[i]t is not for an intermediate appellate court to undertake to enlarge or extend the grounds for wrongful discharge under the employment-at-will doctrine.

2015Burroughs v. APS Int'l Ltd., 93 S.W.3d 155, 161 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); Bernard Johnson, Inc. v. Continental Constructors, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 365, 375 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord, Simmons Airlines v. Lagrotte, 50 S.W.3d 748, 752 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (stating that “[i]t is not for an intermediate appellate court to undertake to enlarge or extend the grounds for wrongful discharge under the employment-at-will doctrine.

2004But if we accept [the employee’s] arguments in this case, employers would be subjected to a potential jury trial in connection with virtually every discharge, and ‘there would be little left of the employment-at-will doctrine.’ ” Wornick Co. v. Casas , 856 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex. 1993) (citing Diamond Shamrock Refining and Marketing Co. v. Mendez , 844 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. 1992)).

1997Citing Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex.1993), it observes that the termination of an at-will employee under conditions that do not raise an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine cannot, as a matter of law, constitute outrageous behavior.

2003See Massey v. Houston Baptist Univ. , 902 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).

2002Massey v. Houston Baptist Univ., 902 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).

2002Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc., 51 F.3d 583, 589 (5th Cir.1995); see also Continental Coffee Prod.

2002Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc. , 51 F.3d 583, 589 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Continental Coffee Prod.

2019The Texas Supreme Court adopted the employment-at-will doctrine in East Line and Red River Railroad Company v. Scott.,See 10 S.W. at 102 .; see also Montgomery Cnty.

2001Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70 , 10 S.W. 99, 102 (Tex.1888).

2020This is consistent with the policy of Sabine Pilot that its exception to the employment-at-will doctrine was “to prevent employers from forcing employees to choose between illegal activity and their livelihoods.” Id. at 659 .

2019The Texas Supreme Court recognized this narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine because of the public policies expressed in our criminal laws and to prevent employers from forcing employees “to choose between risking criminal liability and being discharged from [their] livelihood.” See Safeshred, Inc., 365 S.W.3d at 659 ; Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., 795 S.W.3d 723 , 724 (Tex. 1990).

2010See Austin, 967 S.W.2d at 401-03 (noting that, rather than crafting a general common-law whistle-blower action, it is more appropriate to “leave to the Legislature the task of crafting remedies for retaliation by employers”).

2010See Austin , 967 S.W.2d at 401–03 (noting that, rather than crafting a general common-law whistleblower action, it is more appropriate to “leave to the Legislature the task of crafting remedies for retaliation by employers”).

2004But if we accept [the employee’s] arguments in this case, employers would be subjected to a potential jury trial in connection with virtually every discharge, and ‘there would be little left of the employment-at-will doctrine.’ ” Wornick Co. v. Casas , 856 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex. 1993) (citing Diamond Shamrock Refining and Marketing Co. v. Mendez , 844 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. 1992)).

2002Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex.1992) (stating “there would be little left of the employment-at-will doctrine if an employer’s public statement of the reason for termination was, so long as the employee disputed that reason, in and of itself some evidence that a tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress had been committed”); cf. GTE Southwest, 998 S.W.2d at 617 (holding that supervisor’s conduct could be considered extreme and outrageous when he regularly assaulted, intimidated, and threatened employees, creating a “den of terror” through a pattern of ongoing harassment and

1993Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc. , 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App.--Austin 1989, writ denied).

1990See Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 500-502 (Tex.App.—Austin 1989, writ denied) (court refused to create an exception to the doctrine on the grounds of public policy, to enable an employee to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief, restraining employer from administering ran *786 dom urinalysis drug tests on employees); Berry v. Doctor’s Health Facilities, 715 S.W.2d 60, 61, 62-63 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, no writ) (court declined to create an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine on the grounds of public policy, to encompass a cause of action asserting wrongful

2023Du Pont De Nemours and Co., 430 S.W.3d 396, 400 (Tex. 2014); Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v. Solomon, 106 S.W.3d 705, 715 (Tex. 2003); Sears, 84 S.W.3d at 609 ; Farone v. Bag’n Baggage, Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2005, no pet.) (“The employment-at-will doctrine, generally, absent a specific agreement otherwise, provides that an employer may terminate an employee for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.”).

2023Petitioners note that should employers assume control over testing programs, it 50 Id. at 162. 51See Mission Petroleum, 106 S.W.3d at 710-711 (noting that Texas courts have rejected a laboratory’s duty of care because “drug-testing companies have a direct relationship only with the employer and not the employee”); see also infra Part V. 15 may erode the employment-at-will doctrine.

2012See Currey v. Lone Star Steel Co., 676 S.W.2d 205 , 212–13 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1984, no writ); see also Sadler v. Scott Felder, Inc., No. 03-96-00325-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4567 , at *6 (Tex.App.—Austin Oct. 16, 1996, no writ) (recognizing that it is ―possible for a plaintiff to plead facts that affirmatively negate his cause of action‖ and citing Tex. Dep‘t of Corr. v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. 1974)).

2012See Currey v. Lone Star Steel Co., 676 S.W.2d 205 , 212 - 13 (Tex.App. -- Fort Worth 1984, no writ); see also Sadler v. Scott Felder, Inc., No. 03-96-00325-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4567 , at *6 (Tex.App. -- Austin Oct. 16, 1996, no writ) (recognizing that it is "possible for a plaintiff to plead facts that affirmatively negate his cause of action" and citing Tex. Dep't of Corr. v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. 1974)).

2012Compare Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis.2d 561 , 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (1983) (contract), and Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130 , 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974) (same), with Thompson v. St.

2012Compare Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis.2d 561 , 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (1983) (contract), and Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130 , 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974) (same), with Thompson v. St.

2012See Currey v. Lone Star Steel Co., 676 S.W.2d 205 , 212–13 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1984, no writ); see also Sadler v. Scott Felder, Inc., No. 03-96-00325-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4567 , at *6 (Tex.App.—Austin Oct. 16, 1996, no writ) (recognizing that it is ―possible for a plaintiff to plead facts that affirmatively negate his cause of action‖ and citing Tex. Dep‘t of Corr. v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. 1974)).

2012See Currey v. Lone Star Steel Co., 676 S.W.2d 205 , 212 - 13 (Tex.App. -- Fort Worth 1984, no writ); see also Sadler v. Scott Felder, Inc., No. 03-96-00325-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4567 , at *6 (Tex.App. -- Austin Oct. 16, 1996, no writ) (recognizing that it is "possible for a plaintiff to plead facts that affirmatively negate his cause of action" and citing Tex. Dep't of Corr. v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. 1974)).

2010If such an exception is to be created, the Texas Supreme Court should do so.”); Brunner v. Al Attar, 786 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Jennings v. Minco Tech.

2010If such an exception is to be created, the Texas Supreme Court should do so.”); Brunner v. Al Attar , 786 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Jennings v. Minco Tech.

2023Du Pont De Nemours and Co., 430 S.W.3d 396, 400 (Tex. 2014); Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v. Solomon, 106 S.W.3d 705, 715 (Tex. 2003); Sears, 84 S.W.3d at 609 ; Farone v. Bag’n Baggage, Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2005, no pet.) (“The employment-at-will doctrine, generally, absent a specific agreement otherwise, provides that an employer may terminate an employee for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.”).

2003See Sears, 84 S.W.3d at 609 (noting that “the employment-at-will doctrine does not require an employer to be reasonable, or even careful, in making its termination decisions.

2024In Yanofsky’s summary judgment response, he argued “Sutton and Guideboat breached the contract on November 4, 2019.” He included with his response a declaration stating, among other things, “On November 4, 2019, Sutton called me and told me I was no longer needed.” Yanofsky identified no other alleged breach in his summary judgment response. –8– “Texas follows the employment-at-will doctrine, and employment for an indefinite term may be terminated at will and without cause.” Williams v. First Tennessee Nat’l Corp., 97 S.W.3d 798 , 802–03 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.).

2023He contends that “an employment agreement existed,” evidenced by his testimony at the SOAH hearing about a letter from the City offering him employment that set out a schedule of 4 “Texas follows the employment-at-will doctrine, and employment for an indefinite term may be terminated at will and without cause.” Williams v. First Tennessee Nat’l Corp., 97 S.W.3d 798 , 802–03 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.).

2021Reyna, 55 S.W.3d at 71 .

2003Reyna v. First Nat’l Bank in Edinburg, 55 S.W.3d 58, 71 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).