employment-at-will doctrine in Connecticut

1999In addition, this court has recognized the existence of a common-law “public policy exception to the employment at-will rule in an effort to balance the competing interests of employer and employee.” Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 492 , 642 A.2d 699 (1994) (application of doctrine appropriate where defendant is accused of discharging plaintiff in order to be able to violate statute), citing Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 179 Conn. 471 (creating tort of wrongful discharge where defendant allegedly discharged plaintiff because he insisted that defendant comply with Connectic

1999In addition, this court has recognized the existence of a common-law “public policy exception to the employment at-will rule in an effort to balance the competing interests of employer and employee.” Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 492 , 642 A.2d 699 (1994) (application of doctrine appropriate where defendant is accused of discharging plaintiff in order to be able to violate statute), citing Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 179 Conn. 471 (creating tort of wrongful discharge where defendant allegedly discharged plaintiff because he insisted that defendant comply with Connectic

2001In Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66 , 700 A.2d 655 (1997), our Supreme Court again revisited the public policy limitation on the employment at-will doctrine.

2001In Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66 , 700 A.2d 655 (1997), our Supreme Court again revisited the public policy limitation on the employment at-will doctrine.

2003While our Supreme Court has "recognized a public policy limitation on the traditional employment at-will doctrine in an effort to balance the competing interests of employers and employees"; Daley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co. , 249 Conn. 766 , 798 , 734 A.2d 112 (1999); "the public policy exception to the general rule allowing unfettered termination of an at-will employment relationship is a narrow one . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burnham v. Karl Gelb, P.C. , 252 Conn. 153 , 159 , 745 A.2d 178 (2000).

2003While our Supreme Court has "recognized a public policy limitation on the traditional employment at-will doctrine in an effort to balance the competing interests of employers and employees"; Daley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co. , 249 Conn. 766 , 798 , 734 A.2d 112 (1999); "the public policy exception to the general rule allowing unfettered termination of an at-will employment relationship is a narrow one . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burnham v. Karl Gelb, P.C. , 252 Conn. 153 , 159 , 745 A.2d 178 (2000).

2016Moreover, although this court has the discretion to address an abandoned claim; Ward v. Greene, 267 Conn. 539 , 546, 839 A.2d 1259 (2004) ; we should be particularly cautious of addressing a claim that, in essence, asks the court to recognize a new and broad public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine without adequate briefing because of the narrowness of the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.

2016Moreover, although this court has the discretion to address an abandoned claim; Ward v. Greene, 267 Conn. 539 , 546, 839 A.2d 1259 (2004) ; we should be particularly cautious of addressing a claim that, in essence, asks the court to recognize a new and broad public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine without adequate briefing because of the narrowness of the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.

2016In evaluating claims, [courts should] look to see whether the plaintiff has ... alleged that his discharge violated any explicit statutory or constitutional provision ... or whether he alleged that his dismissal contravened any judicially conceived notion of public policy." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, supra, 260 Conn. at 700 -701 , 802 A.2d 731 .

2016In evaluating claims, [courts should] look to see whether the plaintiff has ... alleged that his discharge violated any explicit statutory or constitutional provision ... or whether he alleged that his dismissal contravened any judicially conceived notion of public policy." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, supra, 260 Conn. at 700 -701 , 802 A.2d 731 .

2008In this case, the plaintiff claims that the defendant violated the public policy underlying the ADA by requiring her to undergo a return to work medical examination and draws our attention to a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to support her position, i.e., Conroy v. Dept. of Correctional Services, 333 F.3d 88 , 97 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary judgment reversed as questions of material fact exist as to business necessity defense).

2003While our Supreme Court has "recognized a public policy limitation on the traditional employment at-will doctrine in an effort to balance the competing interests of employers and employees"; Daley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co. , 249 Conn. 766 , 798 , 734 A.2d 112 (1999); "the public policy exception to the general rule allowing unfettered termination of an at-will employment relationship is a narrow one . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burnham v. Karl Gelb, P.C. , 252 Conn. 153 , 159 , 745 A.2d 178 (2000).

2003While our Supreme Court has "recognized a public policy limitation on the traditional employment at-will doctrine in an effort to balance the competing interests of employers and employees"; Daley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co. , 249 Conn. 766 , 798 , 734 A.2d 112 (1999); "the public policy exception to the general rule allowing unfettered termination of an at-will employment relationship is a narrow one . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burnham v. Karl Gelb, P.C. , 252 Conn. 153 , 159 , 745 A.2d 178 (2000).

1998Although the court recognized that the prevailing authority is that no private right of action for an unlawful discharge exists under 29 U.S.C. § 660 (c), it observed that the employee was not alleging a private right of action pursuant to this section, but rather, was seeking to recover damages for wrongful discharge under a tort theory. 632 F. Supp. at 637 n.1.

1997In Sheets, we sanctioned a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in situations in which the reason for the discharge involved “impropriety . . . derived from some important violation of public policy.” Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 475; see Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 679 , 513 A.2d 66 (1986); Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 572 , 479 A.2d 781 (1984).

1997In Sheets, we sanctioned a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in situations in which the reason for the discharge involved “impropriety . . . derived from some important violation of public policy.” Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 475; see Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 679 , 513 A.2d 66 (1986); Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 572 , 479 A.2d 781 (1984).

1997See Hentzel v. Singer Co. 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 298 , 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982) (“[i]t requires little analysis to perceive that the legislative purpose underlying these provisions would be substantially undermined if employers were permitted to discharge employees simply for protesting working conditions which they reasonably believe constitute a hazard to their own health or safety”); Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 511 , 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985) (“[t]he protection of the lives and property of citizens from . . . hazards ... is as important and fundamental as protecting the

1997See Hentzel v. Singer Co. 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 298 , 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982) (“[i]t requires little analysis to perceive that the legislative purpose underlying these provisions would be substantially undermined if employers were permitted to discharge employees simply for protesting working conditions which they reasonably believe constitute a hazard to their own health or safety”); Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 511 , 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985) (“[t]he protection of the lives and property of citizens from . . . hazards ... is as important and fundamental as protecting the

1995In Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc. , 179 Conn. 471 , 427 A.2d 383 (1980), the Connecticut Supreme Court carved out an exception to the employment-at-will rule where "a former employee can prove a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal, a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important violation of public policy." Id., 475 .

1995In Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc. , 179 Conn. 471 , 427 A.2d 383 (1980), the Connecticut Supreme Court carved out an exception to the employment-at-will rule where "a former employee can prove a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal, a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important violation of public policy." Id., 475 .

1992However, the public policy exception to the general rule of the employment at-will doctrine is narrowly constructed CT Page 8519 to serve a limited purpose, that is, to "`draw the line between claims that genuinely involve the mandates of public policy and are actionable, and ordinary disputes between employee and employer that are not.'" Battista v. United Illuminating Co., 10 Conn. App. 486 , 497 , 5223 A.2d 1356 (1987) quoting Sheets at 477 .