employment-at-will doctrine in Tennessee

2019The employment-at-will doctrine preserves the “right of either the employer or the employee to terminate the employment relationship at any time, for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all, without being guilty of a legal wrong.” Id.

2019The term “illegal activities” is defined at Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (a)(3) as “activities that are in violation of the criminal or civil code of this state or the United States or any regulation intended to protect the public health, safety or welfare.” Tennessee courts have emphasized that the retaliatory discharge “exception to the employment-at-will doctrine must be narrowly applied.” Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714 , 717 n.3 (Tenn. 1997); Chism, 762 S.W.2d at 556 ; Sykes, 343 S.W.3d at -9- 26 (describing the Whistleblower Act as a “narrowly crafted exception”); Williams, 465

2021However, this “public policy exception” to the employment-at-will doctrine “must be narrowly construed to prevent it from ‘consum[ing] or eliminat[ing] the general rule.”’ Id. (quoting Chism v. Mid-S. Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552, 556 (Tenn. 1988)).

2019One exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is that an at-will employee may not be fired for taking an action encouraged by public policy. [Williams v. City of Burns, 465 S.W.3d 96, 108 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting Mason, 942 S.W.2d at 474 )] (citing Chism v. Mid–South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552, 556 (Tenn. 1988), superseded by statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (g) (2014), as recognized in Williams, 465 S.W.3d at 109 - 10).

2015“Retaliatory discharge is ‘an important, but narrow, exception to the employment-at-will doctrine’ applicable only in limited circumstances.” VanCleave v. Reelfoot Bank, No. W2008-01559-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3518211 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2009) (quoting Franklin, 210 S.W.3d at 530 (citing Stein v. Davidson Hotel, 945 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tenn. 1997); Chism, 762 S.W.2d at 556 )).

2015Co., 210 S.W.3d 521, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)) (noting that, the employment-at-will doctrine is “a bedrock of Tennessee common law”).

2025Under the employment-at-will doctrine, “employment for an indefinite period of time may be terminated by either the employer or the employee at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all.” Williams v. City of Burns, 465 S.W.3d 96, 108 (Tenn. 2015).

2020“The employment-at-will doctrine is a bedrock of Tennessee common law.” Williams v. City of Burns, 465 S.W.3d 96, 108 (Tenn. 2015) (citation omitted).

2015In Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., this Court recognized an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine in the form of a common law cause of action for retaliatory discharge. 677 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tenn.1984).

2007As an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, the Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that “[a]n employer’s ability to discharge at-will employees [is] significantly tempered by our recognition . . . of a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.” Id. at 858 (citing Clanton v. Cain-Sloan, 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984)).

2020Id. (citations omitted); Crews, 78 S.W.3d at 857–58 (citations omitted); Forrester v. Stockstill, 869 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn. 1994) (citations omitted).

2009Under the employment-at-will doctrine, both the employer and the employee are generally permitted, with certain exceptions,4 to terminate the employment relationship “at any time for good cause, bad cause, or no cause.” Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569, 574 (Tenn. 1999)).

2019This cause of action “defines the balance point between the employment-at-will doctrine and rights granted employees under well-defined public policy.” Anderson v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tenn. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Perkins v. Metro.

2001A claim for retaliatory discharge “defines the balance point between the employment- at-will doctrine and rights granted employees under well-defined public policy.” Anderson v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tenn. 1993).

2020The employment-at-will doctrine “is the fundamental principle controlling the relationship between employers and employees.” Williams, 465 S.W.3d at 108 (quoting Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tenn. 1997)).

2020The employment-at-will doctrine “recognizes that employers need the freedom to make -9- their own business judgments without interference from the courts.” Id. (quoting Mason, 942 S.W.2d at 474 ).

2015Chism, 762 S.W.2d at 555-57 ; see also Guy, 79 S.W.3d at 535 ; Mason, 942 S.W.2d at 474 . “[T]he law of retaliatory discharge stems from Tennessee public policy that an employee should not be placed in the moral, ethical and legal dilemma of being forced to choose between reporting or participating in illegal activities and keeping his job.” Franklin, 210 S.W.3d at 530 .

2012The employment-at-will doctrine “provides that an employment contract for an indefinite term is terminable at the will of either the employer or the employee for any cause or for no cause.” Id.

2020The employment-at-will doctrine “recognizes that employers need the freedom to make -9- their own business judgments without interference from the courts.” Id. (quoting Mason, 942 S.W.2d at 474 ).

2017Harney v. Meadowbrook Nursing Ctr., 784 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tenn. 1990).

2007The employment-at-will doctrine “has been a part of Tennessee’s common-law legal tapestry for more than a century.” Bennett v. Steiner-Liff Iron & Metal Co., 826 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tenn.1992).

1994“We know of no court decision, nor have we been referred to one, which holds that an employee has a contractual right [to continued employment] under the employment at-will doctrine.” Bennett v. Steiner-Liff Iron and Metal, 826 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tenn.1992).

2014“Illegal activities” is defined at Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (a)(3) as “activities that are in violation of the criminal or civil code of this state or the United States or any regulation intended to protect the public health, safety or welfare.” Tennessee courts have emphasized that the retaliatory discharge “exception to the employment-at-will doctrine must be narrowly applied.” Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714 , 717 n.3 (Tenn. 1997); Chism, 762 S.W.2d at 556 ; Sykes, 343 S.W.3d at 26 (describing the Whistleblower Act as a “narrowly crafted exception”); Franklin, 210 S.W.3d at 53

2014Tennessee courts have emphasized that the retaliatory discharge “exception to the employment-at-will doctrine must be narrowly applied.” Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714 , 717 n.3 (Tenn. 1997); Chism, 762 S.W.2d at 556 ; Sykes, 343 S.W.3d at 26 (describing the Whistleblower Act as a “narrowly crafted exception”); Franklin, 210 S.W.3d at 530 ( “the earliest Tennessee cases recognizing retaliatory discharge have emphasized that it is an important, but narrow, exception to the employment-at-will doctrine”).

2009Under the employment-at-will doctrine, both the employer and the employee are generally permitted, with certain exceptions,4 to terminate the employment relationship “at any time for good cause, bad cause, or no cause.” Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569, 574 (Tenn. 1999)).

2007As an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, the Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that “[a]n employer’s ability to discharge at-will employees [is] significantly tempered by our recognition . . . of a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.” Id. at 858 (citing Clanton v. Cain-Sloan, 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984)).

2025In Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., for example, the Tennessee Court of Appeals acknowledged that the employment-at-will doctrine faced increasing criticism and that many courts had adopted exceptions to it. 621 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).

2025Even so, the court declared that the employment-at-will doctrine was “still viable in Tennessee, except where modified by statute.” Id.

2015Because retaliatory discharge is an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, the employer’s proffered non-retaliatory reason for discharging the employee need not be a sound one; it need only be a reason other than retaliation.19 Versa v. Policy Studies, Inc., 45 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

2015Because retaliatory discharge is an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, the employer’s proffered non-retaliatory reason for discharging the employee need not be a sound one; it need only be a reason other than retaliation. 19 Versa v. Policy Studies, Inc., 45 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000).

2012See Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 437-38 (Tenn. 2011); Franklin v. Swift Transp.

2012The burden is on the plaintiff asserting a claim of common law retaliatory discharge to demonstrate: (1) the existence of an employment-at-will relationship; (2) that the employee was discharged; (3) that the employee was discharged for attempting “to -8- exercise a statutory or constitutional right, or for any other reason which violates a clear public policy evidenced by an unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision;” and (4) that the employee’s exercise of those protected rights or compliance with that clear public policy was a “substantial factor in the employer’s decis

1998According to the Supreme Court in Mason: “The cause of action for retaliatory discharge defines the balance point between the employment-at-will doctrine and rights granted employees under well-defined public policy.” Anderson v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d at 556; Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tenn. 1994).

1997“The cause of action for retaliatory discharge defines the balance point between the employment-at-will doctrine and rights granted employees under well-defined public policy.” Anderson v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d at 556 ; Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tenn.1994).

2025See, e.g., Haney v. Caldwell, 35 Ark. 156 , 168–69 (1879); E.

2025See, e.g., Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist.

2020Id. (citations omitted); Crews, 78 S.W.3d at 857–58 (citations omitted); Forrester v. Stockstill, 869 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn. 1994) (citations omitted).

2019Co., 210 S.W.3d 521, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), which “recognizes that employers need the freedom to make their own business judgments without interference from the courts.” Moore-Pennoyer v. State, 515 S.W.3d 271, 278 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting Williams v. City of Burns, 465 S.W.3d 96, 108 (Tenn. 2015)).

2017Thus, in this area, the Tennessee Supreme Court retains exclusive supervisory authority to establish and interpret personnel policies applicable to Judicial Department employees, including the employment status of a trial judge’s secretarial assistant. 8 We begin this task by reiterating the well-established principle that “Tennessee recognizes the employment-at-will doctrine as ‘the fundamental principle controlling the relationship between employers and employees.’” Yardley v. Hosp. *278 Housekeeping Sys., 470 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting Mason v. Seaton, 942 S,W.2d 470, 474 (Tenn.

2016See Williams v. Greater Chattanooga Public Television Corp., 349 S.W.3d 501, 513 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).

2015Bd. of Educ., 180 S.W.3d 479, 484 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that no cause of action exists under Kentucky public policy for retaliatory failure to hire); see also Peck v. Elyria Foundry Co., 347 Fed.Appx. 139, 148 (6th Cir. 2009) (declining to recognize failure-to-hire claims as a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine under Ohio law); Sanchez v. Philip Morris, Inc., 992 F.2d 244, 249 (10th Cir. 1993) (declining to recognize common law failure-to-hire claims under Oklahoma law); Wordelc-emper v. W.

2015See, e.g., Fowler, 10 P.3d at 15 ; Drummond, 358 S.W.3d at 169. 6 IV.

2015Iowa Homes & Equip., Inc., 262 F.Supp.2d 973, 988 (N.D.

2015Bd. of Educ., 180 S.W.3d 479, 484 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that no cause of action exists under Kentucky public policy for retaliatory failure to hire); see also Peck v. Elyria Foundry Co., 347 Fed.Appx. 139, 148 (6th Cir. 2009) (declining to recognize failure-to-hire claims as a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine under Ohio law); Sanchez v. Philip Morris, Inc., 992 F.2d 244, 249 (10th Cir. 1993) (declining to recognize common law failure-to-hire claims under Oklahoma law); Wordelc-emper v. W.

2015See, e.g., Fowler, 10 P.3d at 15 ; Drummond, 358 S.W.3d at 169. 6 IV.

2015Ms. Yardley also argues that the establishment of the Second Injury Fund, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208 , Supports her position because it is intended to encourage the hiring of workers who 'have suffered previous injuries by relieving employers of part of théir workers’ compensation liability, Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Tenn. 1993).