employment-at-will doctrine in Arkansas

2026Hice v. City of Fort Smith, 75 Ark.

2023In Arkansas, an employer may terminate an employee for good cause, bad cause, or no reason at all under the employment at-will doctrine.14 The question of malice on the part of the employer is irrelevant.15 Under a public-policy exception, an at-will employee may sue for termination “in violation of a well-established public policy of the state.”16 This exception applies only when the reason alleged to be the basis for a discharge is so repugnant to the general good as to deserve the label “against public policy.”17 The limited public-policy exception does not “protect merely private or propri

1997Smith v. American Greetings Corp., 304 Ark. 596 , 804 S.W.2d 683 (1991).

1997Smith v. American Greetings Corp., 304 Ark. 596 , 804 S.W.2d 683 (1991).

1992In Griffin v. Erickson, 277 Ark. 433 , 642 S.W.2d 308 (1982), dictum of the opinion states that the employment-at-will doctrine is deeply embedded in our case law and that the doctrine expressly recognizes the right of either party to terminate at will even where the conditions of employment are that an employee would not be discharged except for good cause.

1992In Griffin v. Erickson, 277 Ark. 433 , 642 S.W.2d 38 (1982), dictum of the opinion states that the employment-at-will doctrine is deeply embedded in our case law and that the doctrine expressly recognizes the right of either party to terminate at will even where the conditions of employment are that an employee would not be discharged except for good cause.

1991In Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 282 Ark. 548 , 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984), we impliedly modified the rule by reversing the granting of summary judgment because the employer’s handbook provided for a three-month probationary period which was at least an implication that an employee could be dismissed for cause only.

1991In Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 282 Ark. 548 , 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984), we impliedly modified the rule by reversing the granting of summary judgment because the employer’s handbook provided for a three-month probationary period which was at least an implication that an employee could be dismissed for cause only.

2008Magic Touch Corp. v. Hicks, 99 Ark.

2007Cisco v. King, 90 Ark.

2003In Sterling, supra, and in Skrable, supra, the appellate courts recognized an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for wrongful discharge where the employee is fired in violation of a well-established public policy of the state.

2001The employment-at-will doctrine was most recently set forth in Palmer v. Council On Economic Education, 344 Ark. 461 , 468-69 , 40 S.W.3d 784 (2001): Our well-established rule is that when an employee's employment is for an indefinite term, either party may terminate the relationship without cause or at-will.

2001The employment-at-will doctrine was most recently set forth in Palmer v. Council On Economic Education, 344 Ark. 461 , 468-69 , 40 S.W.3d 784 (2001): Our well-established rule is that when an employee's employment is for an indefinite term, either party may terminate the relationship without cause or at-will.

1996Accord Webb v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 300 Ark. 613 , 780 S.W.2d 571 (1989); Koenighain v. Schilling Motors, Inc., 35 Ark.

1996In Newton v. Brown & Root, 280 Ark. 337 , 658 S.W.2d 370 (1983), the court stated: “It is generally held that, when the term of employment is indefinite, or at will (terminable by either party), either the employer or the employee may put an end to the relationship at will and without cause.” In Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hospital, 292 Ark. 130 , 728 S.W.2d 501 (1987), the supreme court modified the employment-at-will doctrine to provide that, where an employee hired for an indefinite term relies on a personnel manual or employment agreement that expressly states that he or she cannot be d

1996In Newton v. Brown & Root, 280 Ark. 337 , 658 S.W.2d 370 (1983), the court stated: “It is generally held that, when the term of employment is indefinite, or at will (terminable by either party), either the employer or the employee may put an end to the relationship at will and without cause.” In Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hospital, 292 Ark. 130 , 728 S.W.2d 501 (1987), the supreme court modified the employment-at-will doctrine to provide that, where an employee hired for an indefinite term relies on a personnel manual or employment agreement that expressly states that he or she cannot be d

1992Co., 305 Ark. 25 , 805 S.W.2d 948 (1991), deals with an attorney's alleged wrong act against his client. *879 As previously set out, the rationale of the employment-at-will doctrine is mutuality of obligation.

1992Co., 305 Ark. 25 , 805 S.W.2d 948 (1991), deals with an attorney's alleged wrong act against his client. *879 As previously set out, the rationale of the employment-at-will doctrine is mutuality of obligation.

1991Co., Inc. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 273 , 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980), in which the Court recognized certain exceptions to the at-will doctrine, including discharge for exercising a statutory right, for performing a duty required by law, or “that the reason for the discharge was in violation of another well established public policy.” In Sterling, this court noted the development of a case law in other states accepting the public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine.

1991Co., Inc. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 273 , 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980), in which the Court recognized certain exceptions to the at-will doctrine, including discharge for exercising a statutory right, for performing a duty required by law, or “that the reason for the discharge was in violation of another well established public policy.” In Sterling, this court noted the development of a case law in other states accepting the public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine.

1991Co. v. Matthews, 64 Ark. 398 , 42 S.W.902 (1897), we extended the employment-at-will doctrine to allow discharge for any reason, even if a contract stated the employee could be discharged only for cause.

1988The court stated, "[A] termination by the employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interests of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract." The court later construed Monge to apply "only to a situation where an employee is discharged because he performed an act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do that which public policy would condemn." Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295 , 414 A.2d 1273 (1980).

1988The court stated, "[A] termination by the employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interests of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract." The court later construed Monge to apply "only to a situation where an employee is discharged because he performed an act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do that which public policy would condemn." Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295 , 414 A.2d 1273 (1980).

1988The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130 , 316 A.2d 549 (1974), created an expansive exception to the employment-at-will doctrine by holding that an employer wrongfully discharged an employee when it fired her for refusing to "go out" with her foreman.

1988The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130 , 316 A.2d 549 (1974), created an expansive exception to the employment-at-will doctrine by holding that an employer wrongfully discharged an employee when it fired her for refusing to "go out" with her foreman.