Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Petersongreen2 sentences2004In fact, the challenges may be based on [the challenging attorney’s] ‘legitimate hunches and past experience.’ Id. [Counsel] must, however, articulate ‘legitimate race-neutral reasons that are clear, reasonably specific, and related to the particular case to be tried.’ State v. Peterson, 344 N.C. 172, 176 , 472 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1996). ‘Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in [the challenging attorney’s] explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral at this secondary stage of the inquiry.’ Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 . 2004In fact, the challenges may be based on [the challenging attorney’s] ‘legitimate hunches and past experience.’ Id. [Counsel] must, however, articulate ‘legitimate race-neutral reasons that are clear, reasonably specific, and related to the particular case to be tried.’ State v. Peterson, 344 N.C. 172, 176 , 472 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1996). ‘Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in [the challenging attorney’s] explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral at this secondary stage of the inquiry.’ Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 . | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1974Aguilar is relevant at this stage of the inquiry as well because the tests it establishes were designed to implement the long-standing.principle that probable cause must be determined by a‘neutral and detached magistrate,’ and not by ‘the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’ Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co.
green
2 sentences2022At this stage of the analysis, “[t]he burden is upon the State . . . to justify an otherwise unconstitutional impairment of contract.” Id. (citing U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 31 ). ¶ 65 In its order granting the Retirees’ partial motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that the State’s impairment “was neither reasonable nor necessary to serve an important public purpose.” However, underlying this determination are genuine disputes about material facts which require further development at trial. 2022At this stage of the analysis, “[t]he burden is upon the State . . . to justify an otherwise unconstitutional impairment of contract.” Id. (citing U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 31 ). ¶ 65 In its order granting the Retirees’ partial motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that the State’s impairment “was neither reasonable nor necessary to serve an important public purpose.” However, underlying this determination are genuine disputes about material facts which require further development at trial. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2022At this stage of the analysis, “[t]he burden is upon the State . . . to justify an otherwise unconstitutional impairment of contract.” Id. (citing U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 31 ). ¶ 65 In its order granting the Retirees’ partial motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that the State’s impairment “was neither reasonable nor necessary to serve an important public purpose.” However, underlying this determination are genuine disputes about material facts which require further development at trial. 2022At this stage of the analysis, “[t]he burden is upon the State . . . to justify an otherwise unconstitutional impairment of contract.” Id. (citing U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 31 ). ¶ 65 In its order granting the Retirees’ partial motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that the State’s impairment “was neither reasonable nor necessary to serve an important public purpose.” However, underlying this determination are genuine disputes about material facts which require further development at trial. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Hernandez v. New York
green
2 sentences2004In fact, the challenges may be based on [the challenging attorney’s] ‘legitimate hunches and past experience.’ Id. [Counsel] must, however, articulate ‘legitimate race-neutral reasons that are clear, reasonably specific, and related to the particular case to be tried.’ State v. Peterson, 344 N.C. 172, 176 , 472 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1996). ‘Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in [the challenging attorney’s] explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral at this secondary stage of the inquiry.’ Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 . 1998“Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in [defense counsel’s] explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral [at this secondary stage of the inquiry].” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 , 114 L. | 2 | 1998–2004 |
State v. Barnes
green
1 sentence2004In fact, the challenges may be based on [the challenging attorney’s] ‘legitimate hunches and past experience.’ Id. [Counsel] must, however, articulate ‘legitimate race-neutral reasons that are clear, reasonably specific, and related to the particular case to be tried.’ State v. Peterson, 344 N.C. 172, 176 , 472 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1996). ‘Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in [the challenging attorney’s] explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral at this secondary stage of the inquiry.’ Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Cofield
green
1 sentence2004Colfield, 129 N.C. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Kirby v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1979Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 411 , 92 S.Ct. 1877 (1972); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 882 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , rehearing denied sub nom., 385 U.S. 890 (1966). 1979Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 411 , 92 S.Ct. 1877 (1972); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 882 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , rehearing denied sub nom., 385 U.S. 890 (1966). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Johnson v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences1979Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 411 , 92 S.Ct. 1877 (1972); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 882 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , rehearing denied sub nom., 385 U.S. 890 (1966). 1979Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 411 , 92 S.Ct. 1877 (1972); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 882 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , rehearing denied sub nom., 385 U.S. 890 (1966). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.