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5 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1920–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bernard J. Lee, Platiff-Appellant v. Jenkins Brothers, Bernard J. Lee v. Farnham Yardleygreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d 357, 367 (2d Cir. 1959) (“It is generally settled that the president as part of the regular course of business has authority to hire and discharge employees[.]”); 2A Fletcher, supra, § 597 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 2017) (noting “the common-sense rule is that the president has implied power to hire necessary help” and that such power “may be implied by law as pertaining to the usual and customary duties of the president of a corporation[.]”); see also id. § 556 (“The modern view . . . tends to consider the president as the real head of the corporation with | 1 | 1 |
Divita v. Hopple Plasticsgreen2 sentences2008See Divita v. Hopple Plastics, 858 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Ky.a.App.1993) ("What seems to be emerging, in place of a conceptual approach relying on purely contractual tests, is a common-sense rule made up of a melange of contract, causation, and estoppel ingredients." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). [3] In North Carolina,"`[t]he law of estoppel applies in [workers'] compensation proceedings as in all other cases.'" Watkins v. Cent. 2008See Divita v. Hopple Plastics, 858 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (“What seems to be emerging, in place of a conceptual approach relying on purely contractual tests, is a common-sense rule made up of a melange of contract, causation, and estoppel ingredients.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 3 In North Carolina, “ ‘[t]he law of estoppel applies in [workers’] compensation proceedings as in all other cases.’ ” Watkins v. Cent. | 1 | 1 |
Watkins v. Central Motor Lines, Inc.green2 sentences2008Motor Lines, Inc., 279 N.C. 132, 139 , *395 181 S.E.2d 588, 593 (1971) (alterations added) (quoting Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 665 , 75 S.E.2d 777, 781 (1953)); see also Gore v. Myrtle/Mueller, 362 N.C. 27, 39 , 653 S.E.2d 400, 408 (2007) (noting "the general permissibility of estoppel under our workers' compensation law"). 2008Motor Lines, Inc., 279 N.C. 132, 139 , *395 181 S.E.2d 588, 593 (1971) (alterations added) (quoting Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 665 , 75 S.E.2d 777, 781 (1953)); see also Gore v. Myrtle/Mueller, 362 N.C. 27, 39 , 653 S.E.2d 400, 408 (2007) (noting "the general permissibility of estoppel under our workers' compensation law"). | 1 | 1 |
Gore v. Myrtle/Muellergreen2 sentences2008Motor Lines, Inc., 279 N.C. 132, 139 , *395 181 S.E.2d 588, 593 (1971) (alterations added) (quoting Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 665 , 75 S.E.2d 777, 781 (1953)); see also Gore v. Myrtle/Mueller, 362 N.C. 27, 39 , 653 S.E.2d 400, 408 (2007) (noting "the general permissibility of estoppel under our workers' compensation law"). 2008Motor Lines, Inc., 279 N.C. 132, 139 , *395 181 S.E.2d 588, 593 (1971) (alterations added) (quoting Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 665 , 75 S.E.2d 777, 781 (1953)); see also Gore v. Myrtle/Mueller, 362 N.C. 27, 39 , 653 S.E.2d 400, 408 (2007) (noting "the general permissibility of estoppel under our workers' compensation law"). | 1 | 1 |
Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc.green2 sentences2008Motor Lines, Inc., 279 N.C. 132, 139 , *395 181 S.E.2d 588, 593 (1971) (alterations added) (quoting Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 665 , 75 S.E.2d 777, 781 (1953)); see also Gore v. Myrtle/Mueller, 362 N.C. 27, 39 , 653 S.E.2d 400, 408 (2007) (noting "the general permissibility of estoppel under our workers' compensation law"). 2008Motor Lines, Inc., 279 N.C. 132, 139 , *395 181 S.E.2d 588, 593 (1971) (alterations added) (quoting Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 665 , 75 S.E.2d 777, 781 (1953)); see also Gore v. Myrtle/Mueller, 362 N.C. 27, 39 , 653 S.E.2d 400, 408 (2007) (noting "the general permissibility of estoppel under our workers' compensation law"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harrison v. North Carolina Railroad
green
2 sentences1928R., 194 N. C., 656 , 140 S. E., 598 . 1928R., 194 N. C., 656 , 140 S. E., 598 . | 2 | 1928–1928 |
Coleman v. . R. R.
neutral
1 sentence1920R., 153 N. C., 322 : “A writer in the Personal Injury Law Journal of July, 1910, declares that all conflicts of opinion on this subject may be avoided by adopting the common-sense rule that the traveler should look when about to enter upon the track. ‘A look when about to enter the zone of danger for an approaching car is not only the most availing, but it is then that the most accurate and reliable judgment can be formed as to the safety of an attempt to cross.’ Personal Injury Journal, page 11; see, also, Wexker v. R. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Wecker v. Brooklyn, Queens County & Suburban Railroad
neutral
1 sentence1920R., 120 N. Y. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.