33 Florida opinions name it 5 courts 1939–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burns v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., Burns, 170 So. 3d at 94 n.3 (“The record in the present case reflects nothing more than what the cases term unknowing acquiescence.”) (citing numerous cases); Williams v. State, 145 So. 3d 997, 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“Nothing supports the view that defense counsel affirmatively agreed to the omission, knowing that the instructions were incomplete.”). | 1 | 1 |
United Automobile Insurance Company v. Hallandale Open MRI, LLCgreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., Burns, 170 So. 3d at 94 n.3 (“The record in the present case reflects nothing more than what the cases term unknowing acquiescence.”) (citing numerous cases); Williams v. State, 145 So. 3d 997, 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“Nothing supports the view that defense counsel affirmatively agreed to the omission, knowing that the instructions were incomplete.”). | 1 | 1 |
Van Loan v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 72 So.3d 227, 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), quashed on other grounds, 121 *1004 So.3d 409 (Fla.2013) (concluding defense counsel’s acquiescence, silence, or argument in favor of the standard instruction on manslaughter did not constitute waiver or invited error); Paul v. State, 63 So.3d 828, 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), quashed on other grounds, 137 So.3d 1021 (Fla.2014) (concluding defense counsel’s statements and failure to object did not waive fundamental error in jury instructions); Beckham v. State, 884 So.2d 969, 973 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (rejecting argument that claim o | 1 | 1 |
Ortiz v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 72 So.3d 227, 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), quashed on other grounds, 121 *1004 So.3d 409 (Fla.2013) (concluding defense counsel’s acquiescence, silence, or argument in favor of the standard instruction on manslaughter did not constitute waiver or invited error); Paul v. State, 63 So.3d 828, 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), quashed on other grounds, 137 So.3d 1021 (Fla.2014) (concluding defense counsel’s statements and failure to object did not waive fundamental error in jury instructions); Beckham v. State, 884 So.2d 969, 973 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (rejecting argument that claim o | 1 | 1 |
Beckham v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 72 So.3d 227, 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), quashed on other grounds, 121 *1004 So.3d 409 (Fla.2013) (concluding defense counsel’s acquiescence, silence, or argument in favor of the standard instruction on manslaughter did not constitute waiver or invited error); Paul v. State, 63 So.3d 828, 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), quashed on other grounds, 137 So.3d 1021 (Fla.2014) (concluding defense counsel’s statements and failure to object did not waive fundamental error in jury instructions); Beckham v. State, 884 So.2d 969, 973 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (rejecting argument that claim o | 1 | 1 |
Daniels v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 72 So.3d 227, 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), quashed on other grounds, 121 *1004 So.3d 409 (Fla.2013) (concluding defense counsel’s acquiescence, silence, or argument in favor of the standard instruction on manslaughter did not constitute waiver or invited error); Paul v. State, 63 So.3d 828, 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), quashed on other grounds, 137 So.3d 1021 (Fla.2014) (concluding defense counsel’s statements and failure to object did not waive fundamental error in jury instructions); Beckham v. State, 884 So.2d 969, 973 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (rejecting argument that claim o | 1 | 1 |
Paul v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 72 So.3d 227, 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), quashed on other grounds, 121 *1004 So.3d 409 (Fla.2013) (concluding defense counsel’s acquiescence, silence, or argument in favor of the standard instruction on manslaughter did not constitute waiver or invited error); Paul v. State, 63 So.3d 828, 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), quashed on other grounds, 137 So.3d 1021 (Fla.2014) (concluding defense counsel’s statements and failure to object did not waive fundamental error in jury instructions); Beckham v. State, 884 So.2d 969, 973 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (rejecting argument that claim o | 1 | 1 |
Stephens v. Stategreen1 sentence2013First, it noted that McCoy failed to rely upon any legal authority prohibiting the use of the phrase “God given common sense.” Second, the postconviction court found that the phrase was not objectionable and, in fact, noted “in the Jacksonville community, any objection by defense counsel to the State’s mention of ‘God given common sense,’ could have adversely affected the panel’s view of the defense.” To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to object to statements by the prosecution, a defendant “must first show that the comments were improper or objectionable and | 1 | 1 |
Gibson v. Brewergreen1 sentence2012Malicki, 814 So.2d at 358 ; see, e.g., Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Department of Revenue v. Leadership Housing, Inc.green2 sentences2010Appellant compounded its error by including in its motion new arguments related to an issue already addressed in its briefs and at oral argument. "[L]egal arguments... must be made between the parties before a judicial decision is rendered; not between one litigant and a tribunal which has already ruled." Dep't of Revenue v. Leadership Housing, Inc., 322 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla.1975); see also Cartee v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. 2010Appellant compounded its error by including in its motion new arguments related to an issue already addressed in its briefs and at oral argument. “[L]egal arguments ... must be made between the parties before a judicial decision is rendered; not between one litigant and a tribunal which has already ruled.” Dep’t of Revenue v. Leadership Housing, Inc., 322 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla.1975); see also Cartee v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Jaytex Realty Co. v. Greengreen2 sentences2010Jaytex Realty Co. v. Green, 105 So.2d 817, 818-19 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); see also Ayala v. Gonzalez, 984 So.2d 523, 526 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (reiterating the court's view that the privilege to seek a rehearing is not "an open invitation for an unhappy litigant or attorney to reargue the same points previously presented, or to discuss the bottomless depth of the displeasure that one might feel ... as a result of having unsuccessfully sought appellate relief."). 2010Jaytex Realty Co. v. Green, 105 So.2d 817, 818-19 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); see also Ayala v. Gonzalez, 984 So.2d 523, 526 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (reiterating the court’s view that the privilege to seek a rehearing is not “an open invitation for an unhappy litigant or attorney to reargue the same points previously presented, or to discuss the bottomless depth of the displeasure that one might feel ... as a result of having unsuccessfully sought appellate relief.”). | 1 | 1 |
Ayala v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2010Jaytex Realty Co. v. Green, 105 So.2d 817, 818-19 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); see also Ayala v. Gonzalez, 984 So.2d 523, 526 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (reiterating the court's view that the privilege to seek a rehearing is not "an open invitation for an unhappy litigant or attorney to reargue the same points previously presented, or to discuss the bottomless depth of the displeasure that one might feel ... as a result of having unsuccessfully sought appellate relief."). 2010Jaytex Realty Co. v. Green, 105 So.2d 817, 818-19 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); see also Ayala v. Gonzalez, 984 So.2d 523, 526 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (reiterating the court’s view that the privilege to seek a rehearing is not “an open invitation for an unhappy litigant or attorney to reargue the same points previously presented, or to discuss the bottomless depth of the displeasure that one might feel ... as a result of having unsuccessfully sought appellate relief.”). | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Roberts v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1018 (Ind.App.2008) (holding that “a party, who has rendered a witness unavailable for cross-examination through a criminal act, including homicide, may not object to the introduction of hearsay statements by the witness as being inadmissible”); State v. Mason, 160 Wash.2d 910 , 162 P.3d 396 (2007) (holding that equity compelled the adoption of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing when the defendant was unable to confront a witness who was unavailable due to defendant’s own action); State v. Jensen, 299 Wis.2d 267 , 727 N.W.2d 518 (2007); People v. Bauder, | 1 | 1 |
Braxton v. Morrisgreen1 sentence2006See, e.g., Braxton v. Morris, 914 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Lyn v. Lyn, 884 So.2d 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). | 1 | 1 |
Provident Mgmt. v. City of Treas. Islandgreen1 sentence2001Justice Wells wrote a concurring opinion in which he expressed the view that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not implicated when a court assesses against a governmental entity damages flowing from a wrongful injunction because "a governmental body waives sovereign immunity when it takes the affirmative action of invoking a court's equitable jurisdiction." Provident I, 718 So.2d at 741 (Wells, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Blue v. Malonegreen1 sentence1993See Blue v. Malone & Hyde, 575 So.2d 292, 293 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) ("[T]he rule (4.110) contemplates record and nonrecord activity as sufficient ... | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Harold Wayne Masongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jarrard v. Associates Discount Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Giffen Industries, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Dade County v. United Resources, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Baccinogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bryant v. Atlantic Car Rental, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Malicki v. Doe
green
1 sentence2012Malicki, 814 So.2d at 358 ; see, e.g., Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo.1997). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Giles v. California
green
2 sentences2009Despite this fact, the State urges this court to adopt a broad view of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, and points to the United States Supreme Court case of Giles v. California, — U.S. -, -, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2687 , 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008), as support for its argument that the common-law doctrine applies, even without evidence of Appellant’s specific intent to make his wife unavailable as a witness. 2009Despite this fact, the State urges this court to adopt a broad view of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, and points to the United States Supreme Court case of Giles v. California, — U.S. -, -, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2687 , 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008), as support for its argument that the common-law doctrine applies, even without evidence of Appellant’s specific intent to make his wife unavailable as a witness. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Jensen
green
2 sentences2009See Roberts v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1018 (Ind.App.2008) (holding that “a party, who has rendered a witness unavailable for cross-examination through a criminal act, including homicide, may not object to the introduction of hearsay statements by the witness as being inadmissible”); State v. Mason, 160 Wash.2d 910 , 162 P.3d 396 (2007) (holding that equity compelled the adoption of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing when the defendant was unable to confront a witness who was unavailable due to defendant’s own action); State v. Jensen, 299 Wis.2d 267 , 727 N.W.2d 518 (2007); People v. Bauder, 2009See Roberts v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1018 (Ind.App.2008) (holding that “a party, who has rendered a witness unavailable for cross-examination through a criminal act, including homicide, may not object to the introduction of hearsay statements by the witness as being inadmissible”); State v. Mason, 160 Wash.2d 910 , 162 P.3d 396 (2007) (holding that equity compelled the adoption of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing when the defendant was unable to confront a witness who was unavailable due to defendant’s own action); State v. Jensen, 299 Wis.2d 267 , 727 N.W.2d 518 (2007); People v. Bauder, | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Mason
green
1 sentence2009See Roberts v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1018 (Ind.App.2008) (holding that “a party, who has rendered a witness unavailable for cross-examination through a criminal act, including homicide, may not object to the introduction of hearsay statements by the witness as being inadmissible”); State v. Mason, 160 Wash.2d 910 , 162 P.3d 396 (2007) (holding that equity compelled the adoption of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing when the defendant was unable to confront a witness who was unavailable due to defendant’s own action); State v. Jensen, 299 Wis.2d 267 , 727 N.W.2d 518 (2007); People v. Bauder, | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Mason
green
1 sentence2009See Roberts v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1018 (Ind.App.2008) (holding that “a party, who has rendered a witness unavailable for cross-examination through a criminal act, including homicide, may not object to the introduction of hearsay statements by the witness as being inadmissible”); State v. Mason, 160 Wash.2d 910 , 162 P.3d 396 (2007) (holding that equity compelled the adoption of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing when the defendant was unable to confront a witness who was unavailable due to defendant’s own action); State v. Jensen, 299 Wis.2d 267 , 727 N.W.2d 518 (2007); People v. Bauder, | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Bauder
green
1 sentence2009See Roberts v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1018 (Ind.App.2008) (holding that “a party, who has rendered a witness unavailable for cross-examination through a criminal act, including homicide, may not object to the introduction of hearsay statements by the witness as being inadmissible”); State v. Mason, 160 Wash.2d 910 , 162 P.3d 396 (2007) (holding that equity compelled the adoption of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing when the defendant was unable to confront a witness who was unavailable due to defendant’s own action); State v. Jensen, 299 Wis.2d 267 , 727 N.W.2d 518 (2007); People v. Bauder, | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Emery
neutral
1 sentence2009See Roberts v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1018 (Ind.App.2008) (holding that “a party, who has rendered a witness unavailable for cross-examination through a criminal act, including homicide, may not object to the introduction of hearsay statements by the witness as being inadmissible”); State v. Mason, 160 Wash.2d 910 , 162 P.3d 396 (2007) (holding that equity compelled the adoption of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing when the defendant was unable to confront a witness who was unavailable due to defendant’s own action); State v. Jensen, 299 Wis.2d 267 , 727 N.W.2d 518 (2007); People v. Bauder, | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Lyn v. Lyn
green
1 sentence2006See, e.g., Braxton v. Morris, 914 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Lyn v. Lyn, 884 So.2d 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Atlantic Asphalt & Equip. Co., Inc. v. Mairena
green
1 sentence2004The dissent contends that Cinkat Transportation, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 596 So.2d 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), Atlantic Asphalt & Equipment Co. v. Mairena, 578 So.2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), and Apolaro, 566 So.2d 815 , establish the principle that "prompt informal notice to plaintiff's counsel of the defendant's intention to seek relief from the default justifies enlarging the period of time for allowing the defendant to file the motion to set aside the default." The dissent further expresses the view that this principle "is dispositive of this case." The dissent's attempt to apply the hold | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Apolaro v. Falcon
green
1 sentence2004The dissent contends that Cinkat Transportation, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 596 So.2d 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), Atlantic Asphalt & Equipment Co. v. Mairena, 578 So.2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), and Apolaro, 566 So.2d 815 , establish the principle that "prompt informal notice to plaintiff's counsel of the defendant's intention to seek relief from the default justifies enlarging the period of time for allowing the defendant to file the motion to set aside the default." The dissent further expresses the view that this principle "is dispositive of this case." The dissent's attempt to apply the hold | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Cinkat Transp., Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co.
green
1 sentence2004The dissent contends that Cinkat Transportation, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 596 So.2d 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), Atlantic Asphalt & Equipment Co. v. Mairena, 578 So.2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), and Apolaro, 566 So.2d 815 , establish the principle that "prompt informal notice to plaintiff's counsel of the defendant's intention to seek relief from the default justifies enlarging the period of time for allowing the defendant to file the motion to set aside the default." The dissent further expresses the view that this principle "is dispositive of this case." The dissent's attempt to apply the hold | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Carawan v. State
red
1 sentence1989Under the Carawan analysis, the determination of whether there is any reasonable basis for concluding that there exists an intent contrary to the Blockburger presumption seems to turn heavily on whether the two offenses address essentially the same evil. 515 So.2d at 168 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. McManus
green
1 sentence1987The Fourth District in State v. McManus, 404 So.2d 757 , cert. denied, 412 So.2d 468 , upheld an authorized intercept even though the Circuit Judge had not dated or signed the order in question. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin
green
1 sentence1986Upon further reflection, I am now of the view that the doctrine of selective enforcement as adopted by the supreme court in White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1979) does not require a showing of detrimental reliance. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| United States v. Santana green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Morgan green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Agrico Chemical Co. v. STATE, ETC. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Thomas green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Hornsby v. State yellow | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Sanford v. Rubin green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Bassett v. Braddock green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Southern Gulf Utilities, Inc. v. Boca Ciega Sanitary District green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Hogg v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| East v. East green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Poranski v. Millings green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Carr v. Stockton green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Lingefelt v. Hanner green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Florida Board of Pharmacy v. Levin green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Corporation Commission neutral | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Butler v. Carter green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Bartlett v. Bartlett green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Spector v. Weisman neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Union Trust Co. v. Glunt neutral | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Cowdery v. Herring green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Green v. State green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Simmons v. Defiance Box Co. green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Stroehmann v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of NY green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.