51 Pennsylvania opinions name it 7 courts 1898–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shinal, M., et ux, Aplts. v. Toms M.D., S.green2 sentences2021As it is not possible to bring these matters to our attention, the trial judge’s view should be given great weight in determining the matters before him. - 13 - J-A07044-21 Shinal v. Toms, 640 Pa. 295 , 162 A.3d 429, 442 (2017) (citing Commonwealth v. Gelfi, 282 Pa. 434 , 128 A. 77, 79 (1925)) (quotation marks, quotations, and citations omitted). 2021As it is not possible to bring these matters to our attention, the trial judge’s view should be given great weight in determining the matters before him. - 13 - J-A07044-21 Shinal v. Toms, 640 Pa. 295 , 162 A.3d 429, 442 (2017) (citing Commonwealth v. Gelfi, 282 Pa. 434 , 128 A. 77, 79 (1925)) (quotation marks, quotations, and citations omitted). | 5 | 6 |
Commonwealth v. Reedgreen2 sentences2016Accord id. at 276-77 , 971 A.2d at 1227 (Saylor, J., dissenting). 2016Accord id. at 276-77 , 971 A.2d at 1227 (Saylor, J., dissenting). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen2 sentences2014The exception to waiver created in Brown was well-intended, I know, but I respectfully remain of the view that the rule was wrong when announced, see Brown, 872 A.2d at 1161 (Castille, J., concurring, joined by Eakin, J.), and the FCDO’s abuse of the rule in this case and in other recent cases reveals an unintended and harmful consequence of the rule set in Brown . 2014The exception was well-intended, as I understand, but I respectfully remain of the view that the rule was both unwise and insufficiently grounded when announced, see Brown, 872 A.2d at 1161 (Castille, J., concurring, joined by Eakin, J.), and it remains ill-advised today. | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Gelfigreen2 sentences2021As it is not possible to bring these matters to our attention, the trial judge’s view should be given great weight in determining the matters before him. - 13 - J-A07044-21 Shinal v. Toms, 640 Pa. 295 , 162 A.3d 429, 442 (2017) (citing Commonwealth v. Gelfi, 282 Pa. 434 , 128 A. 77, 79 (1925)) (quotation marks, quotations, and citations omitted). 2021As it is not possible to bring these matters to our attention, the trial judge’s view should be given great weight in determining the matters before him. - 13 - J-A07044-21 Shinal v. Toms, 640 Pa. 295 , 162 A.3d 429, 442 (2017) (citing Commonwealth v. Gelfi, 282 Pa. 434 , 128 A. 77, 79 (1925)) (quotation marks, quotations, and citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Sweigard v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences1975See e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry, 460 Pa. 581 , 333 A.2d 924 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix, J.); McCoy v. Commonwealth, 457 Pa. 513, 514-16 , 326 A.2d 396, 397-98 (1974) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix *424 & Manderino, JJ.); Sweigard v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 454 Pa. 32, 35-38 , 309 A.2d 374, 376-77 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & Manderino, JJ.); Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 577-79 , 305 A.2d 868, 871-72 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & 1975See e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry, 460 Pa. 581 , 333 A.2d 924 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix, J.); McCoy v. Commonwealth, 457 Pa. 513, 514-16 , 326 A.2d 396, 397-98 (1974) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix *424 & Manderino, JJ.); Sweigard v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 454 Pa. 32, 35-38 , 309 A.2d 374, 376-77 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & Manderino, JJ.); Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 577-79 , 305 A.2d 868, 871-72 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & | 2 | 2 |
BROWN v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1975See e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry, 460 Pa. 581 , 333 A.2d 924 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix, J.); McCoy v. Commonwealth, 457 Pa. 513, 514-16 , 326 A.2d 396, 397-98 (1974) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix *424 & Manderino, JJ.); Sweigard v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 454 Pa. 32, 35-38 , 309 A.2d 374, 376-77 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & Manderino, JJ.); Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 577-79 , 305 A.2d 868, 871-72 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & 1975See e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry, 460 Pa. 581 , 333 A.2d 924 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix, J.); McCoy v. Commonwealth, 457 Pa. 513, 514-16 , 326 A.2d 396, 397-98 (1974) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix *424 & Manderino, JJ.); Sweigard v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 454 Pa. 32, 35-38 , 309 A.2d 374, 376-77 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & Manderino, JJ.); Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 577-79 , 305 A.2d 868, 871-72 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & | 2 | 2 |
McCoy v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1975See e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry, 460 Pa. 581 , 333 A.2d 924 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix, J.); McCoy v. Commonwealth, 457 Pa. 513, 514-16 , 326 A.2d 396, 397-98 (1974) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix *424 & Manderino, JJ.); Sweigard v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 454 Pa. 32, 35-38 , 309 A.2d 374, 376-77 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & Manderino, JJ.); Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 577-79 , 305 A.2d 868, 871-72 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & 1975See e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry, 460 Pa. 581 , 333 A.2d 924 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix, J.); McCoy v. Commonwealth, 457 Pa. 513, 514-16 , 326 A.2d 396, 397-98 (1974) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix *424 & Manderino, JJ.); Sweigard v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 454 Pa. 32, 35-38 , 309 A.2d 374, 376-77 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & Manderino, JJ.); Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 577-79 , 305 A.2d 868, 871-72 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & | 2 | 2 |
Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Boardgreen2 sentences1975See e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry, 460 Pa. 581 , 333 A.2d 924 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix, J.); McCoy v. Commonwealth, 457 Pa. 513, 514-16 , 326 A.2d 396, 397-98 (1974) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix *424 & Manderino, JJ.); Sweigard v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 454 Pa. 32, 35-38 , 309 A.2d 374, 376-77 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & Manderino, JJ.); Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 577-79 , 305 A.2d 868, 871-72 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & 1975See e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry, 460 Pa. 581 , 333 A.2d 924 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix, J.); McCoy v. Commonwealth, 457 Pa. 513, 514-16 , 326 A.2d 396, 397-98 (1974) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix *424 & Manderino, JJ.); Sweigard v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 454 Pa. 32, 35-38 , 309 A.2d 374, 376-77 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & Manderino, JJ.); Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 577-79 , 305 A.2d 868, 871-72 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Capitologreen2 sentences2003Similarly, our Supreme Court has noted that § 503 “adopts the view that a principle of necessity, properly conceived, affords a general justification for conduct that otherwise would constitute an offense; and that such a qualification, like the requirements of culpability, is essential to the rationality and justice of all penal prohibitions.” Capitolo, 498 A.2d at 808 (emphasis added). 1992Our Crimes Code "adopts the view that a principle of necessity, properly conceived, affords a general justification for conduct that otherwise would constitute an offense. . ." Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 508 Pa. 372 , 498 A.2d 806 (1985). | 1 | 3 |
Kastigar v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1977This principle is premised upon the view that immunity leaves the witness and the government in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege. 5 See, e. g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1971); Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra. While we recognize that immunity can be a valuable prosecutorial tool, we must also consider, however, that it constitutes an extraordinary exercise of power. 1977This principle is premised upon the view that immunity leaves the witness and the government in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege. 5 See, e. g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1971); Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra. While we recognize that immunity can be a valuable prosecutorial tool, we must also consider, however, that it constitutes an extraordinary exercise of power. | 1 | 2 |
Bowling v. Office of Open Recordsgreen1 sentence2014Id. at n. 1. 16 More recently, this Court in Bowling observed that the current RTKL “does not expressly restrain a court from ... an in camera review of the documents at issue” and acknowledged “that several recent appellate decisions suggest that a court’s in camera review of public records sought under the former [Right to Know Act] is permissible.” 990 A.2d at 820-21 (collecting cases). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. duPontgreen1 sentence2011See N.T., Mar. 29, 2007, at 8-9, 27. [12] See also Gocial v. Independence Blue Cross, 827 A.2d 1216, 1222 (Pa.Super.2003) (citing Slater and Commonwealth v. duPont, 730 A.2d 970 (Pa.Super. 1999)); Commonwealth v. Hetzel, 822 A.2d 747, 757 (Pa.Super.2003) (citing duPont ). [13] In his dissent, Mr. Justice McCaffery finds no such inconsistency, relegating to the "occasional sentence taken out of context," Dissenting Opinion, at 62 (McCaffery, J.), all decisions which have expressed the broader view of the privilege. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hetzelgreen1 sentence2011See N.T., Mar. 29, 2007, at 8-9, 27. [12] See also Gocial v. Independence Blue Cross, 827 A.2d 1216, 1222 (Pa.Super.2003) (citing Slater and Commonwealth v. duPont, 730 A.2d 970 (Pa.Super. 1999)); Commonwealth v. Hetzel, 822 A.2d 747, 757 (Pa.Super.2003) (citing duPont ). [13] In his dissent, Mr. Justice McCaffery finds no such inconsistency, relegating to the "occasional sentence taken out of context," Dissenting Opinion, at 62 (McCaffery, J.), all decisions which have expressed the broader view of the privilege. | 1 | 1 |
Alexander v. Queengreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Search Warrant B-21778, 513 Pa. at 441 , 521 A.2d at 428 ("The purpose of this time-honored privilege is to protect confidential communications between the lawyer and his client, and to foster the free exchange of relevant information between them." (emphasis added)); Alexander, 253 Pa. at 203 , 97 A. at 1065 ("The general rule is, that all professional communications are sacred." (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Earle, 196 Pa. at 221 , 46 A. at 269 ; Sedat, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. at 35 , 641 A.2d at 1245 ("It is well settled that legal advice given by an attorney in his professiona 2011See, e.g., Search Warrant B-21778, 513 Pa. at 441 , 521 A.2d at 428 ("The purpose of this time-honored privilege is to protect confidential communications between the lawyer and his client, and to foster the free exchange of relevant information between them." (emphasis added)); Alexander, 253 Pa. at 203 , 97 A. at 1065 ("The general rule is, that all professional communications are sacred." (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Earle, 196 Pa. at 221 , 46 A. at 269 ; Sedat, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. at 35 , 641 A.2d at 1245 ("It is well settled that legal advice given by an attorney in his professiona | 1 | 1 |
Gocial v. Independence Blue Crossgreen1 sentence2011See N.T., Mar. 29, 2007, at 8-9, 27. [12] See also Gocial v. Independence Blue Cross, 827 A.2d 1216, 1222 (Pa.Super.2003) (citing Slater and Commonwealth v. duPont, 730 A.2d 970 (Pa.Super. 1999)); Commonwealth v. Hetzel, 822 A.2d 747, 757 (Pa.Super.2003) (citing duPont ). [13] In his dissent, Mr. Justice McCaffery finds no such inconsistency, relegating to the "occasional sentence taken out of context," Dissenting Opinion, at 62 (McCaffery, J.), all decisions which have expressed the broader view of the privilege. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Search Warrant B-21778green2 sentences2011See, e.g., Search Warrant B-21778, 513 Pa. at 441 , 521 A.2d at 428 ("The purpose of this time-honored privilege is to protect confidential communications between the lawyer and his client, and to foster the free exchange of relevant information between them." (emphasis added)); Alexander, 253 Pa. at 203 , 97 A. at 1065 ("The general rule is, that all professional communications are sacred." (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Earle, 196 Pa. at 221 , 46 A. at 269 ; Sedat, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. at 35 , 641 A.2d at 1245 ("It is well settled that legal advice given by an attorney in his professiona 2011See, e.g., Search Warrant B-21778, 513 Pa. at 441 , 521 A.2d at 428 ("The purpose of this time-honored privilege is to protect confidential communications between the lawyer and his client, and to foster the free exchange of relevant information between them." (emphasis added)); Alexander, 253 Pa. at 203 , 97 A. at 1065 ("The general rule is, that all professional communications are sacred." (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Earle, 196 Pa. at 221 , 46 A. at 269 ; Sedat, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. at 35 , 641 A.2d at 1245 ("It is well settled that legal advice given by an attorney in his professiona | 1 | 1 |
Sedat, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Resourcesgreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Search Warrant B-21778, 513 Pa. at 441 , 521 A.2d at 428 ("The purpose of this time-honored privilege is to protect confidential communications between the lawyer and his client, and to foster the free exchange of relevant information between them." (emphasis added)); Alexander, 253 Pa. at 203 , 97 A. at 1065 ("The general rule is, that all professional communications are sacred." (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Earle, 196 Pa. at 221 , 46 A. at 269 ; Sedat, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. at 35 , 641 A.2d at 1245 ("It is well settled that legal advice given by an attorney in his professiona 2011See, e.g., Search Warrant B-21778, 513 Pa. at 441 , 521 A.2d at 428 ("The purpose of this time-honored privilege is to protect confidential communications between the lawyer and his client, and to foster the free exchange of relevant information between them." (emphasis added)); Alexander, 253 Pa. at 203 , 97 A. at 1065 ("The general rule is, that all professional communications are sacred." (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Earle, 196 Pa. at 221 , 46 A. at 269 ; Sedat, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. at 35 , 641 A.2d at 1245 ("It is well settled that legal advice given by an attorney in his professiona | 1 | 1 |
Randolph v. Oklahoma Military Department Ex Rel. Stategreen1 sentence2003State, 895 P.2d 736, 741 (Okla.Ct.App. 1995) (expressing the view that inquiry into the National Guard’s internal personnel decisions would interfere with military functions and involve the courts in the “sensitive area of military expertise and discretion”) (quoting Costner v. Oklahoma Army Nat’l Guard, 833 F.2d 905 , 908 (10th Cir. 1987)); accord 6 C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
Pugar v. Grecogreen2 sentences1996See Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68 , 394 A.2d 542 (1978) (an order is considered final if it is separable and collateral to the main cause of action, too important to be denied review and will result in irreparable injury). . 1996See Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68 , 394 A.2d 542 (1978) (an order is considered final if it is separable and collateral to the main cause of action, too important to be denied review and will result in irreparable injury). . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Romerigreen2 sentences1989I continue to embrace the view that the standard set forth in Commonwealth v. Romeri, 504 Pa. 124, 132 , 470 A.2d 498, 502 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 1922 , 80 L.Ed.2d 469 (1984), is inappropriate for determining whether news coverage was so “inherently prejudicial” that prejudice can properly be presumed. 1989I continue to embrace the view that the standard set forth in Commonwealth v. Romeri, 504 Pa. 124, 132 , 470 A.2d 498, 502 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 1922 , 80 L.Ed.2d 469 (1984), is inappropriate for determining whether news coverage was so “inherently prejudicial” that prejudice can properly be presumed. | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Specter v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
CONSUMERS ED. & PRO. ASS'N v. Nolan
green
2 sentences1996In Consumers Association v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372 , 382, 368 A.2d 675 , 680-81 (1977), we addressed the speech and debate clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution and noted that it is essentially identical to a comparable clause in the United States Constitution, the scope of which has been interpreted in federal cases: [T]he Supreme Court of the United States recently held that the federal Speech and Debate Clause must be interpreted broadly in order to protect legislators from judicial interference with their legitimate legislative activities, and that even where the activity questioned is not l 1996In Consumers Association v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372 , 382, 368 A.2d 675 , 680-81 (1977), we addressed the speech and debate clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution and noted that it is essentially identical to a comparable clause in the United States Constitution, the scope of which has been interpreted in federal cases: [T]he Supreme Court of the United States recently held that the federal Speech and Debate Clause must be interpreted broadly in order to protect legislators from judicial interference with their legitimate legislative activities, and that even where the activity questioned is not l | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Arizona v. Fulminante
green
1 sentence2024The Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association also submitted an amicus brief supporting the Commonwealth’s view that the error in this matter was not structural because, unlike in the other cases relied on by the Superior Court in its decision in Taylor III discussed above, Taylor’s liberty was not directly affected by the error. [J-83-2022] - 19 protect against an unfair conviction but to protect “the foundational principle that a person should not face the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” Id. at 20 (quoting Taylor III, slip op. at 17). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
National Bank v. Earle
green
2 sentences2011See, e.g., Search Warrant B-21778, 513 Pa. at 441 , 521 A.2d at 428 ("The purpose of this time-honored privilege is to protect confidential communications between the lawyer and his client, and to foster the free exchange of relevant information between them." (emphasis added)); Alexander, 253 Pa. at 203 , 97 A. at 1065 ("The general rule is, that all professional communications are sacred." (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Earle, 196 Pa. at 221 , 46 A. at 269 ; Sedat, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. at 35 , 641 A.2d at 1245 ("It is well settled that legal advice given by an attorney in his professiona 2011See, e.g., Search Warrant B-21778, 513 Pa. at 441 , 521 A.2d at 428 ("The purpose of this time-honored privilege is to protect confidential communications between the lawyer and his client, and to foster the free exchange of relevant information between them." (emphasis added)); Alexander, 253 Pa. at 203 , 97 A. at 1065 ("The general rule is, that all professional communications are sacred." (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Earle, 196 Pa. at 221 , 46 A. at 269 ; Sedat, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. at 35 , 641 A.2d at 1245 ("It is well settled that legal advice given by an attorney in his professiona | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co.
green
2 sentences2011See, e.g., Search Warrant B-21778, 513 Pa. at 441 , 521 A.2d at 428 ("The purpose of this time-honored privilege is to protect confidential communications between the lawyer and his client, and to foster the free exchange of relevant information between them." (emphasis added)); Alexander, 253 Pa. at 203 , 97 A. at 1065 ("The general rule is, that all professional communications are sacred." (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Earle, 196 Pa. at 221 , 46 A. at 269 ; Sedat, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. at 35 , 641 A.2d at 1245 ("It is well settled that legal advice given by an attorney in his professiona 2011See, e.g., Search Warrant B-21778, 513 Pa. at 441 , 521 A.2d at 428 ("The purpose of this time-honored privilege is to protect confidential communications between the lawyer and his client, and to foster the free exchange of relevant information between them." (emphasis added)); Alexander, 253 Pa. at 203 , 97 A. at 1065 ("The general rule is, that all professional communications are sacred." (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Earle, 196 Pa. at 221 , 46 A. at 269 ; Sedat, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. at 35 , 641 A.2d at 1245 ("It is well settled that legal advice given by an attorney in his professiona | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Commonwealth v. White
green
1 sentence2006Commonwealth v. White, supra, 543 Pa. at 57 n. 5, 669 A.2d at 902 n. 5 (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Valentino
green
1 sentence2005This Court imposed a five-year suspension in Eilberg instead of disbarment because of Eilberg's "significant contributions to his constituents while a public servant and the numerous distinguished character witnesses who testified to his good character, high repute, and fitness to practice law notwithstanding his conviction.” Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
cluster 497367
green
2 sentences2003App.1995) (expressing the view that inquiry into the National Guard's internal personnel decisions would interfere with military functions and involve the courts in the "sensitive area of military expertise and discretion") (quoting Costner v. Oklahoma Army Nat'l Guard, 833 F.2d 905 , 908 (10th Cir.1987)); accord 6 C.J.S. 2003State, 895 P.2d 736, 741 (Okla.Ct.App. 1995) (expressing the view that inquiry into the National Guard’s internal personnel decisions would interfere with military functions and involve the courts in the “sensitive area of military expertise and discretion”) (quoting Costner v. Oklahoma Army Nat’l Guard, 833 F.2d 905 , 908 (10th Cir. 1987)); accord 6 C.J.S. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Ellerbe v. Hooks
green
2 sentences1995This is the direction of the Majority in Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363 , 416 A.2d 512 (1980). 1995This is the direction of the Majority in Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363 , 416 A.2d 512 (1980). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Commonwealth v. Elliott
green
2 sentences1992Believing that the object might materially obstruct the driver’s view through the windshield, a violation of section 4524(c) of the Motor Vehicle Code, Trooper Heckman pulled the vehicle over.” Id. at 540 , 546 A.2d at 656 . (emphasis added) In addition, the Elliott court stated that “Trooper Heckman had a reasonable belief based on his observations that the object hanging from the rearview mirror obstructed the driver’s view in violation of §4524 of the Vehicle Code. 1992Believing that the object might materially obstruct the driver’s view through the windshield, a violation of section 4524(c) of the Motor Vehicle Code, Trooper Heckman pulled the vehicle over.” Id. at 540 , 546 A.2d at 656 . (emphasis added) In addition, the Elliott court stated that “Trooper Heckman had a reasonable belief based on his observations that the object hanging from the rearview mirror obstructed the driver’s view in violation of §4524 of the Vehicle Code. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Royal Ins. Co.(UK) Ltd. v. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Woodberry v. Pierce
green
2 sentences1989I continue to embrace the view that the standard set forth in Commonwealth v. Romeri, 504 Pa. 124, 132 , 470 A.2d 498, 502 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 1922 , 80 L.Ed.2d 469 (1984), is inappropriate for determining whether news coverage was so “inherently prejudicial” that prejudice can properly be presumed. 1989I continue to embrace the view that the standard set forth in Commonwealth v. Romeri, 504 Pa. 124, 132 , 470 A.2d 498, 502 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 1922 , 80 L.Ed.2d 469 (1984), is inappropriate for determining whether news coverage was so "inherently prejudicial" that prejudice can properly be presumed. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Moore v. Wainwright green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Dixon v. United States green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Crawford v. Southern Fulton School District green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Commonwealth v. Strader green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Folcarelli v. Transportation Services neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| In Re Howard green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Temple University, Etc. v. Pa. Dept. Etc. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Estate of Flinn green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Commonwealth v. Dancer green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Commonwealth ex rel. Gitman v. Gitman green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Commonwealth v. May green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education red | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Hochman v. Mortgage Finance Corp. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Commonwealth v. Dravecz green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Carlson v. Sherwood green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| First National Bank v. Albright green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Cooper v. Potts neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Tasin v. Bastress neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Ventura v. Skylark Motel, Inc. green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Mudano v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co. green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Head v. Meloney green | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| McFarland v. Schultz green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Wilson v. Mitchell green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| American Car & Foundry Co. v. Alexandria Water Co. green | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Wilhelm v. Fayette County neutral | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.