view defense in Kentucky

2025Our Supreme Court utilized the same basic framework in Wright, 550 S.W.2d at 491 , by stressing that it analyzed whether a crossing was extra-hazardous “from a topographical standpoint.” Consequently, the instructional definition of extra-hazardous should have focused solely upon the physical characteristics of the crossing. 2 Cooper & Cetrulo, Kentucky Jury Instructions § 25.01(1)(d) (2024) (allowing a jury to find a crossing is extra- hazardous “by reason of its location and surrounding physical conditions”).

2025Our Supreme Court utilized the same basic framework in Wright, 550 S.W.2d at 491 , by stressing that it analyzed whether a crossing was extra-hazardous “from a topographical standpoint.” Consequently, the instructional definition of extra-hazardous should have focused solely upon the physical characteristics of the crossing. 2 Cooper & Cetrulo, Kentucky Jury Instructions § 25.01(1)(d) (2024) (allowing a jury to find a crossing is extra- hazardous “by reason of its location and surrounding physical conditions”).

2025Only a crossing’s physical characteristics determine whether it is extra-hazardous. -24- Over a century ago Kentucky’s then-highest court explained that a crossing may be found to be extra-hazardous (otherwise known as “exceptionally dangerous”) “on account of the contour of the surface of the ground or on account of obstructions, which obstruct the view or hearing in an exceptional way, and which renders the usual and statutory signals of the approach of a train [inadequate] for the protection of travelers upon the crossing . . . .” Piersall’s Adm’r, 203 S.W. at 553 .

2025Only a crossing’s physical characteristics determine whether it is extra-hazardous. -24- Over a century ago Kentucky’s then-highest court explained that a crossing may be found to be extra-hazardous (otherwise known as “exceptionally dangerous”) “on account of the contour of the surface of the ground or on account of obstructions, which obstruct the view or hearing in an exceptional way, and which renders the usual and statutory signals of the approach of a train [inadequate] for the protection of travelers upon the crossing . . . .” Piersall’s Adm’r, 203 S.W. at 553 .

2010In Stout v. City of Martin, 395 S.W.2d 591 (Ky.1965), the Court summarized the prevailing view when considering a motion to amend a pleading when it stated: Under liberal modern practice a change in the theory on which relief is demanded is not an obstacle to amendment, nor is the assertion of a new claim that could have been joined in the first instance with the claim stated in the complaint, per CR 18.01.

2008Indeed, the Court in Quarles took the view that the exception to giving the Miranda protections was permissible because the police “were confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun which they had every reason to believe the suspect had just re moved from his empty holster and discarded in the supermarket.” Id. at 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626 . (emphasis added).

2008Indeed, the Court in Quarles took the view that the exception to giving the Miranda protections was permissible because the police "were confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun which they had every reason to believe the suspect had just removed *204 from his empty holster and discarded in the supermarket." Id. at 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626 . (emphasis added).

1986Cf. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 , 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 , 86 A.L.R. 249 (1932); Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d 433 (4th Cir.1951).

1986Cf. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 , 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 , 86 A.L.R. 249 (1932); Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d 433 (4th Cir.1951).

1986Cf. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 , 53 S.Ct. 210 , 77 L.Ed. 413 , 86 A.L.R. 249 (1932); Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d 433 (4th Cir.1951).

1964Kansas City v. Rathford, 353 Mo. 1130 , 186 S.W.2d 570 ; also see, Schessler v. Keck, 125 Cal.App.2d 827 , 271 P.2d 588 .

1964Kansas City v. Rathford, 353 Mo. 1130 , 186 S.W.2d 570 ; also see, Schessler v. Keck, 125 Cal.App.2d 827 , 271 P.2d 588 .

1964Kansas City v. Rathford, 353 Mo. 1130 , 186 S.W.2d 570 ; also see, Schessler v. Keck, 125 Cal.App.2d 827 , 271 P.2d 588 .

1964Kansas City v. Rathford, 353 Mo. 1130 , 186 S.W.2d 570 ; also see, Schessler v. Keck, 125 Cal.App.2d 827 , 271 P.2d 588 .

1959We may note that in Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337 , the rule as to contributory negligence of an adult was applied in the case of a 12 year old bicyclist without the question of a distinction between a child and adult having been raised or discussed.

1959We may note that in Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337 , the rule as to contributory negligence of an adult was applied in the case of a 12 year old bicyclist without the question of a distinction between a child and adult having been raised or discussed.

1955Stein v. Louisville Water Co., Ky., 249 S.W.2d 750 ; Cain v. Stevens, Ky., 274 S.W.2d 480 .

1955Stein v. Louisville Water Co., Ky., 249 S.W.2d 750 ; Cain v. Stevens, Ky., 274 S.W.2d 480 .

1954In Beauchamp v. Willis, 300 Ky. 630 , 189 S.W.2d 938 , we expressed the view that the requirement in KRS 117.310, similar to KRS 117.745, that a voter sign his name on the signature book before He cast his vote, was mandatory.

1954In Beauchamp v. Willis, 300 Ky. 630 , 189 S.W.2d 938 , we expressed the view that the requirement in KRS 117.310, similar to KRS 117.745, that a voter sign his name on the signature book before He cast his vote, was mandatory.

1953The rule has generally been relaxed in this country, either by statute or judicial construction, and the weight of authority, including Kentucky, since the opinion in Wilson v. Wilson, 174 Ky. 771 , 193 S.W. 7 , now supports the view that the presumption of legitimacy may be rebutted.

1953The rule has generally been relaxed in this country, either by statute or judicial construction, and the weight of authority, including Kentucky, since the opinion in Wilson v. Wilson, 174 Ky. 771 , 193 S.W. 7 , now supports the view that the presumption of legitimacy may be rebutted.

1930For instance, in Melcher v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 226 N. Y. 51 , 123 N. E. 81 , where a workman, hit by an elevator, said he was not hurt but later made a claim for damages, the doctrine of trivial accident was applied, and yet in the case of Haas Tobacco Co. v. American Fidelity Co., 226 N. Y. 343 , 123 N. E. 755, 756 , 13 A. L.

1930For instance, in Melcher v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 226 N. Y. 51 , 123 N. E. 81 , where a workman, hit by an elevator, said he was not hurt but later made a claim for damages, the doctrine of trivial accident was applied, and yet in the case of Haas Tobacco Co. v. American Fidelity Co., 226 N. Y. 343 , 123 N. E. 755, 756 , 13 A. L.

1930For instance, in Melcher v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 226 N. Y. 51 , 123 N. E. 81 , where a workman, hit by an elevator, said he was not hurt but later made a claim for damages, the doctrine of trivial accident was applied, and yet in the case of Haas Tobacco Co. v. American Fidelity Co., 226 N. Y. 343 , 123 N. E. 755, 756 , 13 A. L.

1930For instance, in Melcher v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 226 N. Y. 51 , 123 N. E. 81 , where a workman, hit by an elevator, said he was not hurt but later made a claim for damages, the doctrine of trivial accident was applied, and yet in the case of Haas Tobacco Co. v. American Fidelity Co., 226 N. Y. 343 , 123 N. E. 755, 756 , 13 A. L.

1920In Cooley on Torts the text is as follows: “The general rule supported by authorities is that the owner or occupant of premises owes no duty to licensees and trespassers further than to refrain from willful acts of injury,” and in commenting upon this text this court in the case of Indian Refining Company v. Moberly, 134 Ky. 822 , said, “If this general rule is recognized as the principle applied in this case there could be no recovery, for it is not claimed much less shown that the injury to plaintiff resulted from the willful act of the defendant or its agents.” The case of Johnson v. Paduca

1920In Cooley on Torts the text is as follows: “The general rule supported by authorities is that the owner or occupant of premises owes no duty to licensees and trespassers further than to refrain from willful acts of injury,” and in commenting upon this text this court in the case of Indian Refining Company v. Moberly, 134 Ky. 822 , said, “If this general rule is recognized as the principle applied in this case there could be no recovery, for it is not claimed much less shown that the injury to plaintiff resulted from the willful act of the defendant or its agents.” The case of Johnson v. Paduca

1913In support of the view that the instruction was correct, we are referred to¡ the cases of Yellow Poplar Lumber Co. v. Rule, 106 Ky., 455 ; and Kelly v. Peter & Burghard Stone Co., 130 Ky., 530 , and Louisville & Nashville R.

1913In support of the view that the instruction was correct, we are referred to¡ the cases of Yellow Poplar Lumber Co. v. Rule, 106 Ky., 455 ; and Kelly v. Peter & Burghard Stone Co., 130 Ky., 530 , and Louisville & Nashville R.