view rule in Louisiana

2013We further noted that the Supreme Court in Tate extensively reviewed the out-of-state jurisprudence on waiver; rejected the then-majority view that “waiver cannot be invoked to broaden coverage to include risks not included or expressly excluded from the insurance contract,” Id.; and held that “ ‘the best view is that waiver may apply to any provision of an insurance contract under which the insurer knowingly and voluntarily elects to relinquish his right, power or privilege to avoid liability, even though the effect may bring within coverage risks originally excluded or not covered.’ ” Id. (q

2013We further noted that the Supreme Court in Tate extensively reviewed the out-of-state jurisprudence on waiver; rejected the then-majority view that “waiver cannot be invoked to broaden coverage to include risks not included or expressly excluded from the insurance contract,” Id.; and held that “ ‘the best view is that waiver may apply to any provision of an insurance contract under which the insurer knowingly and voluntarily elects to relinquish his right, power or privilege to avoid liability, even though the effect may bring within coverage risks originally excluded or not covered.’ ” Id. (q

2017The court expressed the view that the presumption is “almost irrebuttable,” but that “this was the obvious intention of the legislature when it drafted the Heart and Lung Act.” Id.

2012The court expressed the view that the presumption is “almost irrebuttable,” but that “this was the obvious intention of the legislature when it drafted the Heart and Lung Act.” Id. at p. 9, 688 So.2d at 702 .

1987The consideration for the insurer's undertaking with respect to the mortgagee under the standard clause is the consideration for which the policy was itself issued to the mortgagor, and a standard mortgage clause creates a separate contract between the insurer and the mortgagee, and is enforceable by the mortgagee, even though it is merely engrafted onto the policy delivered to the mortgagor. [Footnotes omitted.] The jurisprudence of this state is in accord with the view that a standard mortgage clause creates a separate contract of insurance between the insurer and the mortgagee. [Footnote om

1986The consideration for the insurer's undertaking with respect to the mortgagee under the standard clause is the consideration for which the policy was itself issued to the mortgagor, and a standard mortgage clause creates a separate contract between the insurer and the mortgagee, and is enforceable by the mortgagee, even though it is merely engrafted onto the policy delivered to the mortgagor. [Footnotes omitted.] The jurisprudence of this state is in accord with the view that a standard mortgage clause creates a separate contract of insurance between the insurer and the mortgagee. [footnote om

1985In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Slaydon, 376 So.2d 97 (La.1979), the Supreme Court held the Louisiana Department of Highways liable for personal injuries caused in a collision between a vehicle and a cow on Interstate 59.

1978Co., 186 So.2d 328 (3rd Cir. 1966), writ ref. [ 249 La. 486 ], 187 So.2d 451 (1966), in which such limitations on an insurer's interest liability were upheld.

1978See, e. g., McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 , 47 S.Ct. 259 , 71 L.Ed. 556 (1927); State v. Bryant, La., 325 So.2d 255 (1975); 68 Am.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 13, p. 670.

1978Co., 186 So.2d 328 (3rd Cir. 1966), writ ref. [ 249 La. 486 ], 187 So.2d 451 (1966), in which such limitations on an insurer's interest liability were upheld.

1978Co., 186 So.2d 328 (3rd Cir. 1966), writ ref. [ 249 La. 486 ], 187 So.2d 451 (1966), in which such limitations on an insurer's interest liability were upheld.

1961Gomez v. Pope Park, La.App., Orleans, 1952, 56 So.2d 229 .

1957Nevertheless, we think that it has been overlooked and we feel that its application requires that such a plaintiff should be required to pay his own costs and the “costs recoverable by the other parties to the action.” Our conclusion that heretofore Section 4 of the act of 1912 has been so often overlooked is largely based on the fact that in not one of the fourteen cited decisions of Courts of Appeal in which it was held that a pauper plaintiff could not be condemned for costs, was Section 4 even referred to, whereas in the four cases cited, White v. Walker, 136 La. 464 , 67 So. 332 , Singlet

1957Nevertheless, we think that it has been overlooked and we feel that its application requires that such a plaintiff should be required to pay his own costs and the “costs recoverable by the other parties to the action.” Our conclusion that heretofore Section 4 of the act of 1912 has been so often overlooked is largely based on the fact that in not one of the fourteen cited decisions of Courts of Appeal in which it was held that a pauper plaintiff could not be condemned for costs, was Section 4 even referred to, whereas in the four cases cited, White v. Walker, 136 La. 464 , 67 So. 332 , Singlet

1908Williams v. Railroad Co., 153 Mo., loc. cit. 534, 54 S. W. 689 .

1908The same view of the rule of evidence on the subject was expressed by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Laclede Construction Co. v. Moss Tie Co., 185 Mo. 25 , 84 S. W. 76 , in which that court, after mentioning the rule that parol testimony could not be heard to add to or to change a contract, used the following language: “Along with this general rule, however, a rule of interpretation is equally well settled that the writing or contract should he read in the light of surrounding circumstances, in order the more perfectly to understand and explain the intent and meaning of the parties.

1908The same view of the rule of evidence on the subject was expressed by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Laclede Construction Co. v. Moss Tie Co., 185 Mo. 25 , 84 S. W. 76 , in which that court, after mentioning the rule that parol testimony could not be heard to add to or to change a contract, used the following language: “Along with this general rule, however, a rule of interpretation is equally well settled that the writing or contract should he read in the light of surrounding circumstances, in order the more perfectly to understand and explain the intent and meaning of the parties.

1880Blackstone IV, Art. 286 ; Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 7 ; Cooley on Torts, p. 424; 36 Ind. 196 ; 1 Salk. 84; Strange 185, 564; 1 Yeates Penn.