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43 Texas opinions name it 5 courts 1909–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re MDSgreen2 sentences2007See In re M.D.S. , 1 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1999, no pet.). 2001See In re M.D.S., 1 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.). | 7 | 7 |
John David Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, Llcgreen2 sentences2021The supreme court has instructed courts to take a broad view of error preservation in TCPA cases due to the statute’s “unique language.” Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890 , 896–97 (Tex. 2018) (“In TCPA appeals, we have decided whether communications are matters of public concern under a de novo standard of review, suggesting that the determination is one of law. 2021Moreover, the supreme court has instructed courts to take a broad view of error preservation in TCPA cases due to the statute’s “unique language.” Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 897 (Tex. 2018). | 4 | 6 |
United States v. Cortezgreen2 sentences2007Maldonado's testimony establishes only that Tanner came "from a dark area behind the bar." The U.S. Supreme Court has also taken the view that factors related to the suspect's surroundings alone are not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, stating that there are two elements that must be present before a stop is permissible: (1) there must be an assessment "based upon all of the circumstances," which include "the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers," from which "a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions," and (2) this assessment must "raise a s 2007Maldonado's testimony establishes only that Tanner came "from a dark area behind the bar." The U.S. Supreme Court has also taken the view that factors related to the suspect's surroundings alone are not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, stating that there are two elements that must be present before a stop is permissible: (1) there must be an assessment "based upon all of the circumstances," which include "the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers," from which "a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions," and (2) this assessment must "raise a s | 2 | 3 |
Arkoma Basin Exploration Co. v. FMF Associates 1990-A, Ltd.green1 sentence2019Co. v. FMF Assocs. 1990-A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. 2008) (“[T]he cardinal rule for preserving error is that an objection must be clear enough to give the trial court an opportunity to correct it.”); see also Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. 2018) (warning appellate courts against imposing “too strict a view of error preservation”). | 1 | 1 |
Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc. v. Uristagreen1 sentence2018All it says is that accidents may be nobody’s ‘fault’ in the legal sense.” Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc. v. Urista, 211 S.W.3d 753, 760 (Tex. 2006) (Brister, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (citing Dillard, 157 S.W.3d at 433 ). | 1 | 1 |
Owens Corning v. Cartergreen2 sentences2010I I begin, as the Court does, with the twin goals served by the Retroactivity Clause: (1) it protects individuals against legislative enactments that unfairly deprive them of legitimate expectations, Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 572 (Tex.1999), and (2) it ensures that legislative enactments do not single out individuals for preferential or arbitrary treatment. 2010I I begin, as the Court does, with the twin goals served by the Retroactivity Clause: (1) it protects individuals against legislative enactments that unfairly deprive them of legitimate expectations, Owens Corning *151 v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 572 (Tex.1999), and (2) it ensures that legislative enactments do not single out individuals for preferential or arbitrary treatment. | 1 | 1 |
Hitt v. Mabrygreen1 sentence2003See id. | 1 | 1 |
Cane v. Stategreen2 sentences1986Believing that on discretionary review this Court should not concern itself with such trivial matters, particularly when there is no indication that it formed any part of the reason for decision of a court of appeals to overrule the ground of error, but nevertheless being of the view a claim (as identified in the majority opinion) that the trial court denied him a fair and impartial jury by including "Objectives of Law" in its penalty charge is consonant enough with his trial objections to present the issue for appellate consideration, on the basis of my dissenting opinion in Cane v. State, 69 1986Believing that on discretionary review this Court should not concern itself with such trivial matters, particularly when there is no indication that it formed any part of the reason for decision of a court of appeals to overrule the ground of error, but nevertheless being of the view a claim (as identified in the majority opinion) that the trial court denied him a fair and impartial jury by including “Objectives of Law” in its penalty charge is consonant enough with his trial objections to present the issue for appellate consideration, on the basis of my dissenting opinion in Cane v. State, 69 | 1 | 1 |
Bush v. Stategreen2 sentences1956See, also, the case of Bush v. State, [ 68 Tex.Cr.R. 299 ] 151 S.W. 554 , decided at the present term of this court." Without regard to whether this Court, in deciding Davis v. State, supra, held the view that the defense of entrapment was not available in this State under any set of facts, later opinions of this Court where the defense of entrapment was relied upon, viewed in the light of the record showing the issues raised, indicate that had the facts supported the plea or claim, entrapment would have been held to be a defense. 1956See, also, the case of Bush v. State, 151 S. W. 554 , decided at the present term of this court.” Without regard to whether this court, in deciding Davis v. State, supra, held the view that the defense of entrapment was not available in this state under any set of facts, later opinions of this court where the defense of entrapment was relied upon, viewed in the light of the record showing the issues raised, indicate that had the facts supported the plea or claim, entrapment would have been held to be a defense. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bauder v. Statered2 sentences2022Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), overruled by Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Ahn, 2015 WL 4940053 , at *1. 2015Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Beck v. Browning
green
2 sentences1971Co., 150 Tex. 528 , 243 S.W.2d 386 (1951) where we said: * * * It is respondent’s theory that “the doctrine of imminent peril is a *192 principle or basis of liability.” An expression in this court’s opinion in Beck v. Browning, 129 Tex. 7 , 101 S.W.2d 545 , seems to lend support to the view that the doctrine of imminent peril is a basis of liability. 1958Co., 150 Tex. 528 , 243 S.W.2d 386, 387 , Chief Justice Hickman, speaking for our Supreme Court, discussed this question at length and stated as follows: "Much is written in the briefs on the subject of `Liability under the doctrine of imminent peril.' It is respondent's theory that `the doctrine of imminent peril is a principle or basis of liability.' An expression in this court's opinion in Beck v. Browning, 129 Tex. 7 , 101 S.W.2d 545 , seems to lend support to the view that the doctrine of imminent peril is a basis of liability. | 3 | 1951–1971 |
Beck v. Browning
neutral
2 sentences1971Co., 150 Tex. 528 , 243 S.W.2d 386 (1951) where we said: * * * It is respondent’s theory that “the doctrine of imminent peril is a *192 principle or basis of liability.” An expression in this court’s opinion in Beck v. Browning, 129 Tex. 7 , 101 S.W.2d 545 , seems to lend support to the view that the doctrine of imminent peril is a basis of liability. 1958Co., 150 Tex. 528 , 243 S.W.2d 386, 387 , Chief Justice Hickman, speaking for our Supreme Court, discussed this question at length and stated as follows: "Much is written in the briefs on the subject of `Liability under the doctrine of imminent peril.' It is respondent's theory that `the doctrine of imminent peril is a principle or basis of liability.' An expression in this court's opinion in Beck v. Browning, 129 Tex. 7 , 101 S.W.2d 545 , seems to lend support to the view that the doctrine of imminent peril is a basis of liability. | 3 | 1951–1971 |
Goolsbee v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad
green
2 sentences1971Co., 150 Tex. 528 , 243 S.W.2d 386 (1951) where we said: * * * It is respondent’s theory that “the doctrine of imminent peril is a *192 principle or basis of liability.” An expression in this court’s opinion in Beck v. Browning, 129 Tex. 7 , 101 S.W.2d 545 , seems to lend support to the view that the doctrine of imminent peril is a basis of liability. 1971Co., 150 Tex. 528 , 243 S.W.2d 386 (1951) where we said: * * * It is respondent’s theory that “the doctrine of imminent peril is a *192 principle or basis of liability.” An expression in this court’s opinion in Beck v. Browning, 129 Tex. 7 , 101 S.W.2d 545 , seems to lend support to the view that the doctrine of imminent peril is a basis of liability. | 2 | 1958–1971 |
Ex Parte Lewis
green
1 sentence2022Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), overruled by Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Ahn, 2015 WL 4940053 , at *1. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Levin
green
1 sentence2019This question turns on what we meant in Cox by "substantial threat of physical harm." The court of appeals took a narrow view of that standard and required a showing that disclosure of the requested information would "give rise to [a] substantial (i.e., more likely than not) threat of physical harm." Id. at 240 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Dillard v. Texas Electric Cooperative
green
2 sentences2018All it says is that accidents may be nobody’s ‘fault’ in the legal sense.” Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc. v. Urista, 211 S.W.3d 753, 760 (Tex. 2006) (Brister, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (citing Dillard, 157 S.W.3d at 433 ). 2018She relies on cases pre-dating Dillard in 3 “An inferential rebuttal defense operates to rebut an essential element of the plaintiff’s case by proof of other facts.” Dillard, 157 S.W.3d at 430 . 4 advocating for a narrow view of this instruction, limiting its application to its historical association with defendants who blame children or the weather.4 But “that is not what it says. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Gage v. Railroad Commission
green
1 sentence2015Gage, 582 S.W.2d at 414 . applies only to findings of fact in the A mere conclusion or a recital of evidence is inadequate. commissioner's orders which are “set Thompson v. Railroad Commission, 150 Tex. 307 , 240 forth in statutory language.” [footnote S.W.2d 759, 761–62 (1951). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Thompson v. Railroad Commission
green
1 sentence2015Gage, 582 S.W.2d at 414 . applies only to findings of fact in the A mere conclusion or a recital of evidence is inadequate. commissioner's orders which are “set Thompson v. Railroad Commission, 150 Tex. 307 , 240 forth in statutory language.” [footnote S.W.2d 759, 761–62 (1951). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Roberts v. State
green
1 sentence1996Roberts, 849 S.W.2d at 410 ; Grigsby, 833 S.W.2d at 576 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Grigsby v. State
green
1 sentence1996Roberts, 849 S.W.2d at 410 ; Grigsby, 833 S.W.2d at 576 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Liggon v. State
neutral
1 sentence1996Id. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Gibson v. State
green
2 sentences1984Gibson v. State, 512 P.2d 1399 (Okl.Cr.App.1973). 1984Gibson v. State, 512 P.2d 1399 (Okl.Cr.App.1973). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
In Re GAULT
green
2 sentences1976The Supreme Court passed up an opportunity to decide this question in McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 , 92 S.Ct. 2083 , 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972), although Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, seems to adopt the view that the privilege is applicable. 5 Any adequate analysis of the problem must take into account the decision of the Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42-57 , 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1451-59 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). 1976The Supreme Court passed up an opportunity to decide this question in McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 , 92 S.Ct. 2083 , 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972), although Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, seems to adopt the view that the privilege is applicable. 5 Any adequate analysis of the problem must take into account the decision of the Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42-57 , 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1451-59 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution
green
2 sentences1976The Supreme Court passed up an opportunity to decide this question in McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 , 92 S.Ct. 2083 , 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972), although Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, seems to adopt the view that the privilege is applicable. 5 Any adequate analysis of the problem must take into account the decision of the Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42-57 , 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1451-59 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). 1976The Supreme Court passed up an opportunity to decide this question in McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 , 92 S.Ct. 2083 , 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972), although Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, seems to adopt the view that the privilege is applicable. 5 Any adequate analysis of the problem must take into account the decision of the Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42-57 , 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1451-59 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Yanowski v. Fort Worth Transit Co.
neutral
1 sentence1961Butt Grocery Co. v. Johnson, Tex.Civ.App., 226 S.W.2d 501, 504 , writ ref., n. r. e.; Yanowski v. Fort Worth Transit Co., Tex.Civ.App., 204 S.W.2d 1001, 1005 , writ ref., n. r. e. We are of the view that the error pointed up is harmful under Rules 434 and 503, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
H. E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1961Butt Grocery Co. v. Johnson, Tex.Civ.App., 226 S.W.2d 501, 504 , writ ref., n. r. e.; Yanowski v. Fort Worth Transit Co., Tex.Civ.App., 204 S.W.2d 1001, 1005 , writ ref., n. r. e. We are of the view that the error pointed up is harmful under Rules 434 and 503, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Cliff v. State
neutral
2 sentences1956In Cliff v. State, 144 Tex.Cr.R. 340 , 162 S.W.2d 712, 713 , the State's case of procuring was made by the officer claimed to have been guilty of entrapment. 1956In Cliff v. State, 162 S. W. 2d 712 , the state’s case of procuring was made by the officer claimed to have been guilty of entrapment. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Henshaw v. Texas Natural Resources Foundation
green
2 sentences1956Under the foregoing undisputed conditions, as well as all the testimony tendered in this cause, we are of the view that the rule announced by our Supreme Court in Henshaw v. Texas Natural Resources Foundation, 147 Tex. 436 , 216 S.W.2d 566 , at page 570, points 1-3, is applicable here. 1956Under the foregoing undisputed conditions, as well as all the testimony tendered in this cause, we are of the view that the rule announced by our Supreme Court in Henshaw v. Texas Natural Resources Foundation, 147 Tex. 436 , 216 S.W.2d 566 , at page 570, points 1-3, is applicable here. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
State v. Wiess
green
2 sentences1947The case of State v. Wiess, 141 Tex. 303 , 171 S.W.2d 848 , 147 A.L.R. 460 , supports this view in principle. 1947The case of State v. Wiess, 141 Tex. 303 , 171 S.W.2d 848 , 147 A.L.R. 460 , supports this view in principle. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Davis v. Laning
green
1 sentence1947Laning, 19 S. W. 846 , Murchison vs. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Barton v. State red | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Fielder v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Porter v. Miller neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Woodson v. Allen neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Hart v. Patterson neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad v. Franklin green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Pelican Insurance v. Troy Co-operative Ass'n neutral | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Beck v. Texas Co. green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Smyth v. Ames; Smyth v. Smith; Smyth v. Higginson green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.