view doctrine in New Jersey

2008We continue to adhere to the view of the doctrine of probable intent expressed in Fidelity Union[ Trust Co. v. Robert, 36 N.J. 561 , 178 A.2d 185 (1962)].

2008We continue to adhere to the view of the doctrine of probable intent expressed in Fidelity Union[ Trust Co. v. Robert, 36 N.J. 561 , 178 A.2d 185 (1962)].

2021This standard of review "is 13 A-5136-17 consistent with the view that defense attorneys are in a better position to assess a defendant's competency; it is they who should bring such matters to the court's attention." Harris, 181 N.J. at 458 .

2020The clear and convincing standard of review of a court's decision not to sua sponte hold a competency hearing "is consistent with the view that defense attorneys are in a better position to assess a defendant's competency . . . ." Harris, 181 N.J. at 458 .

2020Counsel's failure to raise the issue of competency weighs against a finding there was clear and convincing evidence a defendant is incompetent because "judges must depend to some extent on counsel to bring [these] issues into focus." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 176-77 ). "[B]ecause defense attorneys are in a better position than the trial court to question a defendant's competency, the fact that [counsel finds] no reason to question [a defendant's] competency must be given substantial weight" in determining whether a hearing was required.

2004It is to be ordinarily expected that defense counsel, who is in a far better position than the trial judge to assay the salient facts concerning the defendant’s ability to stand trial and assist in his own defense, would originate the request that such an inquiry be conducted. [ Lucas, supra 30 N.J. at 74 , 152 A.2d 50 .] The United States Supreme Court approaches the question similarly, stating that “judges must depend to some extent on counsel to bring [these] issues into focus.” Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at 176-77 , 95 S.Ct. at 906 , 43 L.Ed.2d at 116 .

2003The Appellate Division took a strict view of the principle’s applicability, stating that “by its own terms, the principle has limited, if any, application [where] ... there is no traditional family setting, i.e., no marriage or even continuing cohabitation over time.” F.B., supra, 350 N.J.Super. at 400 , 795 A.2d 331 .

2003The Appellate Division took a strict view of the principle’s applicability, stating that “by its own terms, the principle has limited, if any, application [where] ... there is no traditional family setting, i.e., no marriage or even continuing cohabitation over time.” F.B., supra, 350 N.J.Super. at 400 , 795 A.2d 331 .

1968R. 531, in reference to the Administrator’s subpoena power under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court said ‘his investigative function, in searching out violations with a view to securing enforcement of the Act, is essentially the same as the grand jury’s, or the court’s in issuing other pretrial orders for the discovery of evidence, and is governed by the same limitations,’ and accordingly applied the view that inquiry must be ‘ “limited * * * by forecasts of the probable result of the investigation.” ’ In United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 642-643 , 70 S. Ct. 357, 364 , 94 L

1968R. 531, in reference to the Administrator’s subpoena power under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court said ‘his investigative function, in searching out violations with a view to securing enforcement of the Act, is essentially the same as the grand jury’s, or the court’s in issuing other pretrial orders for the discovery of evidence, and is governed by the same limitations,’ and accordingly applied the view that inquiry must be ‘ “limited * * * by forecasts of the probable result of the investigation.” ’ In United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 642-643 , 70 S. Ct. 357, 364 , 94 L

1963In Weeks , the Supreme Court announced the rule that evidence seized illegally by federal officers is to be excluded from federal criminal trials; Justice Day expressed the view that if the rule were otherwise the Fourth Amendment would be of no value and "might as well be stricken from the Constitution." 232 U.S., *264 at p. 393, 34 S.Ct., at p. 344 , 58 L.Ed., at p. 656 .

1963In Weeks , the Supreme Court announced the rule that evidence seized illegally by federal officers is to be excluded from federal criminal trials; Justice Day expressed the view that if the rule were otherwise the Fourth Amendment would be of no value and "might as well be stricken from the Constitution." 232 U.S., *264 at p. 393, 34 S.Ct., at p. 344 , 58 L.Ed., at p. 656 .

2018The Court "continue[s] to adhere to the view of the doctrine of probable intent expressed in Fidelity Union ." Payne , 186 N.J. at 335 , 895 A.2d 428 .

2018The Court "continue[s] to adhere to the view of the doctrine of probable intent expressed in Fidelity Union ." Payne , 186 N.J. at 335 , 895 A.2d 428 .

2018The doctrine does not permit a court to "conjure up an interpretation or derive a missing testamentary provision out of whole cloth." Engle v. Siegel , 74 N.J. 287 , 291, 377 A.2d 892 (1977) (quoting *159 In re Estate of Burke , 48 N.J. 50 , 64, 222 A.2d 273 (1966) ).

2018The doctrine does not permit a court to "conjure up an interpretation or derive a missing testamentary provision out of whole cloth." Engle v. Siegel , 74 N.J. 287 , 291, 377 A.2d 892 (1977) (quoting *159 In re Estate of Burke , 48 N.J. 50 , 64, 222 A.2d 273 (1966) ).

2018Indeed, Eggleston hardly supports such a view because waiver instead of estoppel was found implicated there. 37 N.J. at 130 , 179 A.2d 505 .

2018Indeed, Eggleston hardly supports such a view because waiver instead of estoppel was found implicated there. 37 N.J. at 130 , 179 A.2d 505 .

2018The doctrine does not permit a court to "conjure up an interpretation or derive a missing testamentary provision out of whole cloth." Engle v. Siegel , 74 N.J. 287 , 291, 377 A.2d 892 (1977) (quoting *159 In re Estate of Burke , 48 N.J. 50 , 64, 222 A.2d 273 (1966) ).

2018The doctrine does not permit a court to "conjure up an interpretation or derive a missing testamentary provision out of whole cloth." Engle v. Siegel , 74 N.J. 287 , 291, 377 A.2d 892 (1977) (quoting *159 In re Estate of Burke , 48 N.J. 50 , 64, 222 A.2d 273 (1966) ).

2017Super. 10, 65 (App. Div. 2008), appeal dismissed, 200 N.J. 267 (2009), that, prior to 2007, the FDA did not have the "authority to compel labeling changes, but instead had to negotiate changes with the drug's sponsor." And, given the manufacturers' "common resistance to such labeling changes, a 35 A-4760-14T1 revised label may be the result of a compromise, rather than a unilateral expression of the FDA's preferred regulatory approach." Kendall I, supra, slip op. at 54.

2007In Maressa, swpra, we concluded that it was “inconceivable that the Legislature intended a broader view of waiver in civil matters, where the public interest in disclosure is less compelling.” 89 N.J. at 195 , 445 A.2d 376 .

2007In Maressa, swpra, we concluded that it was “inconceivable that the Legislature intended a broader view of waiver in civil matters, where the public interest in disclosure is less compelling.” 89 N.J. at 195 , 445 A.2d 376 .

2004It is to be ordinarily expected that defense counsel, who is in a far better position than the trial judge to assay the salient facts concerning the defendant’s ability to stand trial and assist in his own defense, would originate the request that such an inquiry be conducted. [ Lucas, supra 30 N.J. at 74 , 152 A.2d 50 .] The United States Supreme Court approaches the question similarly, stating that “judges must depend to some extent on counsel to bring [these] issues into focus.” Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at 176-77 , 95 S.Ct. at 906 , 43 L.Ed.2d at 116 .

2004It is to be ordinarily expected that defense counsel, who is in a far better position than the trial judge to assay the salient facts concerning the defendant’s ability to stand trial and assist in his own defense, would originate the request that such an inquiry be conducted. [ Lucas, supra 30 N.J. at 74 , 152 A.2d 50 .] The United States Supreme Court approaches the question similarly, stating that “judges must depend to some extent on counsel to bring [these] issues into focus.” Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at 176-77 , 95 S.Ct. at 906 , 43 L.Ed.2d at 116 .

1994The publisher is protected because of the public's interest in reading the testimony in order to resolve for itself the issues at trial (and thus evaluate the fairness and conduct of the trial). *627 [David Marburger, More Protection for the Press: The Third Circuit Expands the Fair Report Privilege, 43 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 1143, 1160 (1982).] Such a view of the privilege "provid[es] protection for the republisher to help the public resolve the issues of life. * * * The statement provides the public with knowledge of what is being said about the issues of the day and by whom, while at the same time p

1994The publisher is protected because of the public’s interest in reading the testimony in order to resolve for itself the issues at trial (and thus evaluate the fairness and conduct of the trial). [David Marburger, More Protection for the Press: The Third Circuit Expands the Fair Report Privilege, 43 U.PittL.Rev. 1143, 1160 (1982).] Such a view of the privilege “provid[es] protection for the republisher to help the public resolve the issues of life. * * * The statement provides the public with knowledge of what is being said about the issues of the day and by whom, while at the same time prompti

1993See Palko v. Palko, 73 N.J. 395, 397-398 , 375 A. 2d 625 (1977); Palko v. Palko, 150 N.J.

1992The court noted the, "proliferation of private security forces many of whose employees have criminal records," 427 N.Y.S. 2d at 398 and, that a defendant's rights are equally trampled when a privately engineered or police sponsored confrontation is suggestive. 427 N.Y.S. 2d at 402 .

1992The court noted the, "proliferation of private security forces many of whose employees have criminal records," 427 N.Y.S. 2d at 398 and, that a defendant's rights are equally trampled when a privately engineered or police sponsored confrontation is suggestive. 427 N.Y.S. 2d at 402 .

1989It reflects a view of a violation of probation similar *93 to that expressed by our Supreme Court in State v. Molina and State v. Baylass, supra .

1988In making this determination, we are not unmindful that the duty to contribute to higher education costs, as described by the Supreme Court in Newburgh v. Arrigo, supra , was said to depend on "financially capable parents," 88 N.J. at 544 , and the "ability ... to pay," 88 N.J. at 545 , such amounts.

1988In making this determination, we are not unmindful that the duty to contribute to higher education costs, as described by the Supreme Court in Newburgh v. Arrigo, supra , was said to depend on "financially capable parents," 88 N.J. at 544 , and the "ability ... to pay," 88 N.J. at 545 , such amounts.