view rule in Illinois

1978In People v. Wolff (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 318, 327 , 167 N.E.2d 197 , the court stated: “Accordingly, we adopt the view that where no privilege exists, and where the relevancy and competency of a statement or report has been established, the trial judge shall order the document delivered directly to the accused for his inspection and use for impeachment purposes.

1978In People v. Wolff (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 318, 327 , 167 N.E.2d 197 , the court stated: “Accordingly, we adopt the view that where no privilege exists, and where the relevancy and competency of a statement or report has been established, the trial judge shall order the document delivered directly to the accused for his inspection and use for impeachment purposes.

1969Ballinger v. O’Connor, 13 Ill App2d 317, 142 NE2d 144 (1957), this court stated at page 329: “. . . our courts have taken the view that the bar of loches applies both to certiorari and mandamus and that six months has been established as the limitation period during which petitions for such writs must be filed, unless a reasonable excuse is shown for the delay.” In accord, People ex rel.

1962Ballinger v. O’Connor, 13 Ill App2d 317, 142 NE2d 144 , where a probationary patrolman was discharged on November 21, 1953, and brought his action on November 1, 1954, slightly less than 12 months later, the court said (329): “It is apparent from these decisions that our courts have taken the view that the bar of laches applies both to certiorari and mandamus and that six months has been established as the limitation period during which petitions for such writs must be filed, unless a reasonable excuse is shown for the delay.” Ballinger, by way of excusing the delay in filing his action relied

2026Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177 .

2022But in Jones, our supreme court rejected the defendant’s argument that when he entered his plea agreement, “he did not anticipate that the 50-year prison term stipulated in it would later be declared to be a de facto life sentence that required the trial court’s use of discretion and consideration of his youthful characteristics and rehabilitative potential.” Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 19 .

2000We stated: “The substantial similarity between the murder statutes is not found in the language of the respective statutes but, rather, in the mental states required by each statute in order to prove the offense of murder.” Guest , 115 Ill. 2d at 95 .

1997As this court has previously observed, and as the majority notes elsewhere in today's opinion ( 177 Ill.2d at 226-27 , 226 Ill.Dec. at 241-42 , 685 N.E.2d at 344-45 ), "the unconditional repeal of a special remedial statute without a saving clause stops all pending actions where the repeal finds them." People ex rel.

1997As this court has previously observed, and as the majority notes elsewhere in today's opinion ( 177 Ill.2d at 226-27 , 226 Ill.Dec. at 241-42 , 685 N.E.2d at 344-45 ), "the unconditional repeal of a special remedial statute without a saving clause stops all pending actions where the repeal finds them." People ex rel.

1994It has been recognized in this State that the waiver rule is addressed only to the parties, and serves to warn them that except in limited instances, if they fail to properly preserve an issue, they are not entitled to appellate review of it. ( People v. Lowe (1992), 153 Ill.2d 195 , 180 Ill.Dec. 90 , 606 N.E.2d 1167 ; see also People v. Walsh (1981), 101 Ill.App.3d 1146, 1149 , 57 Ill.Dec. 257, 260 , 428 N.E.2d 937, 940 ("The waiver rule, however, is not a limitation upon the reviewing court but an admonition to the parties").) This view of waiver explains the "plain error rule" quotation tak

1994It has been recognized in this State that the waiver rule is addressed only to the parties, and serves to warn them that except in limited instances, if they fail to properly preserve an issue, they are not entitled to appellate review of it. ( People v. Lowe (1992), 153 Ill.2d 195 , 180 Ill.Dec. 90 , 606 N.E.2d 1167 ; see also People v. Walsh (1981), 101 Ill.App.3d 1146, 1149 , 57 Ill.Dec. 257, 260 , 428 N.E.2d 937, 940 ("The waiver rule, however, is not a limitation upon the reviewing court but an admonition to the parties").) This view of waiver explains the "plain error rule" quotation tak

1993We note that the dissent in Kobylanski disputed the majority's statements that the rule represented well-settled law. ( Kobylanski, 63 Ill.2d at 178-79 , 347 N.E.2d 705 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting, joined by Ward and Schaefer, JJ.).) Similarly, in Tanari , Justice Goldenhersh specially concurred, urging that the rule, if it existed, should be supported by authority other than Nudd. ( Tanari, 69 Ill.2d at 639-40 , 14 Ill.Dec. 874 , 373 N.E.2d 5 (Goldenhersh, J., specially concurring).) We agree with defendant that these statements support rather than dispel the view that the rule was developin

1993We note that the dissent in Kobylanski disputed the majority's statements that the rule represented well-settled law. ( Kobylanski, 63 Ill.2d at 178-79 , 347 N.E.2d 705 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting, joined by Ward and Schaefer, JJ.).) Similarly, in Tanari , Justice Goldenhersh specially concurred, urging that the rule, if it existed, should be supported by authority other than Nudd. ( Tanari, 69 Ill.2d at 639-40 , 14 Ill.Dec. 874 , 373 N.E.2d 5 (Goldenhersh, J., specially concurring).) We agree with defendant that these statements support rather than dispel the view that the rule was developin

1993Rather, it applies only where the plaintiff, by virtue of his voluntary conduct, “assume[s] [a] role[ ] of especial prominence in the affairs of society *** [which] invitefs] attention and comment.” (Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 , 41 L.

1993Rather, it applies only where the plaintiff, by virtue of his voluntary conduct, “assume[s] [a] role[ ] of especial prominence in the affairs of society *** [which] invitefs] attention and comment.” (Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 , 41 L.

1991In Fitzpatrick, this court did not agree with the plaintiff’s interpretation of section 2—202, which would have granted immunity only where the specific, allegedly negligent act (the act of parking a squad car) was one of “execution or enforcement.” Citing Thompson, the court held that such an interpretation was “ ‘overly narrow.’ ” (Fitzpatrick, 112 Ill. 2d at 221 , quoting Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 434 .) The court reiterated the view that enforcing the law is most often a course of conduct and expressed the view that the immunity ought to be available where an officer is engaged in a course

1991(Fitzpatrick, 112 Ill. 2d at 221 .) In doing so, however, this court did not repudiate the holding in Arnolt that a police officer is not ipso facto engaged in the “execution or enforcement” of law simply because he is on duty within the scope of his employment.

1991In Fitzpatrick, this court did not agree with the plaintiff’s interpretation of section 2—202, which would have granted immunity only where the specific, allegedly negligent act (the act of parking a squad car) was one of “execution or enforcement.” Citing Thompson, the court held that such an interpretation was “ ‘overly narrow.’ ” (Fitzpatrick, 112 Ill. 2d at 221 , quoting Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 434 .) The court reiterated the view that enforcing the law is most often a course of conduct and expressed the view that the immunity ought to be available where an officer is engaged in a course

1988Ill. 1987), 665 F. Supp. 1342 , demonstrate that the Federal courts intend to overturn *394 death sentences that we affirm based on the majority's view that defense counsel's failure to introduce any evidence in mitigation does not indicate ineffective assistance of counsel.

1988Ill. 1987), 665 F. Supp. 1342 , demonstrate that the Federal courts intend to overturn death sentences that we affirm based on the majority’s view that defense counsel’s failure to introduce any evidence in mitigation does not indicate ineffective assistance of counsel.

1986App. 3d 285, 287 , 484 N.E.2d 514, 515 , where the court stated: “Palmer indicates that when a prior conviction changes the nature of an offense from a misdemeanor to a felony, rather than enhances a sentence, proof of the prior conviction is a required element of the State’s case and must be proved prior to a finding of guilt or innocence.

1986The view that the rule in Palmer applies to theft cases, and seemingly to any instance in which a prior conviction changes the nature of an offense from a misdemeanor to a felony, has been accepted by the Fourth District in People v. Rice (1985), 137 Ill.

1984(See Wardlow v. Pozzi (1959), 170 Cal. App. 2d 208 , 338 P.2d 564 ; Mann v. Bradley (1975), 188 Colo. 392 , 535 P.2d 213 ; Rich v. Silver (1964), 226 Cal. App. 2d 60 , 37 Cal. Rptr. 749 .) However, the Illinois Appellate Court has addressed this very issue and has held: “we think the better view is the rule which prevails in other jurisdictions: a divorce decree alone does not effect a severance of joint tenancy real estate.” In re Estate of Woodshank (1975), 27 Ill.

1984(See Wardlow v. Pozzi (1959), 170 Cal. App. 2d 208 , 338 P.2d 564 ; Mann v. Bradley (1975), 188 Colo. 392 , 535 P.2d 213 ; Rich v. Silver (1964), 226 Cal. App. 2d 60 , 37 Cal. Rptr. 749 .) However, the Illinois Appellate Court has addressed this very issue and has held: “we think the better view is the rule which prevails in other jurisdictions: a divorce decree alone does not effect a severance of joint tenancy real estate.” In re Estate of Woodshank (1975), 27 Ill.

1984(See Wardlow v. Pozzi (1959), 170 Cal. App. 2d 208 , 338 P.2d 564 ; Mann v. Bradley (1975), 188 Colo. 392 , 535 P.2d 213 ; Rich v. Silver (1964), 226 Cal. App. 2d 60 , 37 Cal. Rptr. 749 .) However, the Illinois Appellate Court has addressed this very issue and has held: “we think the better view is the rule which prevails in other jurisdictions: a divorce decree alone does not effect a severance of joint tenancy real estate.” In re Estate of Woodshank (1975), 27 Ill.

1984(See Wardlow v. Pozzi (1959), 170 Cal. App. 2d 208 , 338 P.2d 564 ; Mann v. Bradley (1975), 188 Colo. 392 , 535 P.2d 213 ; Rich v. Silver (1964), 226 Cal. App. 2d 60 , 37 Cal. Rptr. 749 .) However, the Illinois Appellate Court has addressed this very issue and has held: “we think the better view is the rule which prevails in other jurisdictions: a divorce decree alone does not effect a severance of joint tenancy real estate.” In re Estate of Woodshank (1975), 27 Ill.

1984App. 3d 444, 447 , 325 N.E.2d 686 ; see also In re Estate of Coleman (1979), 77 Ill.

1984(See Wardlow v. Pozzi (1959), 170 Cal. App. 2d 208 , 338 P.2d 564 ; Mann v. Bradley (1975), 188 Colo. 392 , 535 P.2d 213 ; Rich v. Silver (1964), 226 Cal. App. 2d 60 , 37 Cal. Rptr. 749 .) However, the Illinois Appellate Court has addressed this very issue and has held: “we think the better view is the rule which prevails in other jurisdictions: a divorce decree alone does not effect a severance of joint tenancy real estate.” In re Estate of Woodshank (1975), 27 Ill.

1984(See Wardlow v. Pozzi (1959), 170 Cal. App. 2d 208 , 338 P.2d 564 ; Mann v. Bradley (1975), 188 Colo. 392 , 535 P.2d 213 ; Rich v. Silver (1964), 226 Cal. App. 2d 60 , 37 Cal. Rptr. 749 .) However, the Illinois Appellate Court has addressed this very issue and has held: “we think the better view is the rule which prevails in other jurisdictions: a divorce decree alone does not effect a severance of joint tenancy real estate.” In re Estate of Woodshank (1975), 27 Ill.

1984(See Wardlow v. Pozzi (1959), 170 Cal. App. 2d 208 , 338 P.2d 564 ; Mann v. Bradley (1975), 188 Colo. 392 , 535 P.2d 213 ; Rich v. Silver (1964), 226 Cal. App. 2d 60 , 37 Cal. Rptr. 749 .) However, the Illinois Appellate Court has addressed this very issue and has held: “we think the better view is the rule which prevails in other jurisdictions: a divorce decree alone does not effect a severance of joint tenancy real estate.” In re Estate of Woodshank (1975), 27 Ill.

1978As stated in People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 370 , 143 N.E.2d 239 , 245: `[T]his is a rule of administration and not of jurisdiction or power." Reviewing courts have applied the rule in order to require defendants to file written, specific motions for a new trial where under the circumstances the enforcement of the rule best serves the interests of a fair, orderly and expeditious administration of justice. ( People v. Pickett, 54 Ill.2d 280 , 296 N.E.2d 856 ; People v. Irwin, 32 Ill.2d 441 , 207 N.E.2d 76 .) The purposes of the waiver rule are correlative to the object of section 116-1: (1) t

1978As stated in People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 370 , 143 N.E.2d 239 , 245: `[T]his is a rule of administration and not of jurisdiction or power." Reviewing courts have applied the rule in order to require defendants to file written, specific motions for a new trial where under the circumstances the enforcement of the rule best serves the interests of a fair, orderly and expeditious administration of justice. ( People v. Pickett, 54 Ill.2d 280 , 296 N.E.2d 856 ; People v. Irwin, 32 Ill.2d 441 , 207 N.E.2d 76 .) The purposes of the waiver rule are correlative to the object of section 116-1: (1) t

1978People v. Miller (1975), 31 Ill.

1978As stated in People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360, 370 , 143 N.E.2d 239 , 245: ‘[T]his is a rule of administration and not of jurisdiction or power.” Reviewing courts have applied the rule in order to require defendants to file written, specific motions for a new trial where under the circumstances the enforcement of the rule best serves the interests of a fair, orderly and expeditious administration of justice.

1978As stated in People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360, 370 , 143 N.E.2d 239 , 245: ‘[T]his is a rule of administration and not of jurisdiction or power.” Reviewing courts have applied the rule in order to require defendants to file written, specific motions for a new trial where under the circumstances the enforcement of the rule best serves the interests of a fair, orderly and expeditious administration of justice.

1978As stated in People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 370 , 143 N.E.2d 239 , 245: `[T]his is a rule of administration and not of jurisdiction or power." Reviewing courts have applied the rule in order to require defendants to file written, specific motions for a new trial where under the circumstances the enforcement of the rule best serves the interests of a fair, orderly and expeditious administration of justice. ( People v. Pickett, 54 Ill.2d 280 , 296 N.E.2d 856 ; People v. Irwin, 32 Ill.2d 441 , 207 N.E.2d 76 .) The purposes of the waiver rule are correlative to the object of section 116-1: (1) t

1978As stated in People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 370 , 143 N.E.2d 239 , 245: `[T]his is a rule of administration and not of jurisdiction or power." Reviewing courts have applied the rule in order to require defendants to file written, specific motions for a new trial where under the circumstances the enforcement of the rule best serves the interests of a fair, orderly and expeditious administration of justice. ( People v. Pickett, 54 Ill.2d 280 , 296 N.E.2d 856 ; People v. Irwin, 32 Ill.2d 441 , 207 N.E.2d 76 .) The purposes of the waiver rule are correlative to the object of section 116-1: (1) t

1975(Nichols v. Nichols, 43 Wis.2d 346 , 168 N.W.2d 876 (1969); Poulson v. Poulson, 145 Me. 15 , 70 A.2d 868 (1950); see Witzel v. Witzel, 386 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1963); Gwin v. Camp, 25 Cal.App.2d 10 , 76 P.2d 160 (1938).) The general rule concerning the legal effect of a divorce decree upon property rights was stated in Bulger v. Bulger, 291 Ill.App. 233 , 9 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1937), to be that divorce terminates those property rights and interests, not actually vested, of the divorced persons in the property of each other which are dependent upon the marriage relationship such as dower, curtesy,

1975(Nichols v. Nichols, 43 Wis.2d 346 , 168 N.W.2d 876 (1969); Poulson v. Poulson, 145 Me. 15 , 70 A.2d 868 (1950); see Witzel v. Witzel, 386 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1963); Gwin v. Camp, 25 Cal.App.2d 10 , 76 P.2d 160 (1938).) The general rule concerning the legal effect of a divorce decree upon property rights was stated in Bulger v. Bulger, 291 Ill.App. 233 , 9 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1937), to be that divorce terminates those property rights and interests, not actually vested, of the divorced persons in the property of each other which are dependent upon the marriage relationship such as dower, curtesy,

1975(Nichols v. Nichols, 43 Wis.2d 346 , 168 N.W.2d 876 (1969); Poulson v. Poulson, 145 Me. 15 , 70 A.2d 868 (1950); see Witzel v. Witzel, 386 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1963); Gwin v. Camp, 25 Cal.App.2d 10 , 76 P.2d 160 (1938).) The general rule concerning the legal effect of a divorce decree upon property rights was stated in Bulger v. Bulger, 291 Ill.App. 233 , 9 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1937), to be that divorce terminates those property rights and interests, not actually vested, of the divorced persons in the property of each other which are dependent upon the marriage relationship such as dower, curtesy,

1975(Nichols v. Nichols, 43 Wis.2d 346 , 168 N.W.2d 876 (1969); Poulson v. Poulson, 145 Me. 15 , 70 A.2d 868 (1950); see Witzel v. Witzel, 386 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1963); Gwin v. Camp, 25 Cal.App.2d 10 , 76 P.2d 160 (1938).) The general rule concerning the legal effect of a divorce decree upon property rights was stated in Bulger v. Bulger, 291 Ill.App. 233 , 9 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1937), to be that divorce terminates those property rights and interests, not actually vested, of the divorced persons in the property of each other which are dependent upon the marriage relationship such as dower, curtesy,

1975(Nichols v. Nichols, 43 Wis.2d 346 , 168 N.W.2d 876 (1969); Poulson v. Poulson, 145 Me. 15 , 70 A.2d 868 (1950); see Witzel v. Witzel, 386 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1963); Gwin v. Camp, 25 Cal.App.2d 10 , 76 P.2d 160 (1938).) The general rule concerning the legal effect of a divorce decree upon property rights was stated in Bulger v. Bulger, 291 Ill.App. 233 , 9 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1937), to be that divorce terminates those property rights and interests, not actually vested, of the divorced persons in the property of each other which are dependent upon the marriage relationship such as dower, curtesy,

1975(Nichols v. Nichols, 43 Wis.2d 346 , 168 N.W.2d 876 (1969); Poulson v. Poulson, 145 Me. 15 , 70 A.2d 868 (1950); see Witzel v. Witzel, 386 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1963); Gwin v. Camp, 25 Cal.App.2d 10 , 76 P.2d 160 (1938).) The general rule concerning the legal effect of a divorce decree upon property rights was stated in Bulger v. Bulger, 291 Ill.App. 233 , 9 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1937), to be that divorce terminates those property rights and interests, not actually vested, of the divorced persons in the property of each other which are dependent upon the marriage relationship such as dower, curtesy,