touchstone analysis in New York

2021But the touchstone of the analysis is whether the employer exercised control over the results produced by the worker or the means used to achieve the results" ( id. at 137 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Matter of Mayo [Epstein-Commissioner of Labor] , 193 AD3d 1199 , 1200 [2021]; Matter of Jordan [Alterna Holdings Corp.-Commissioner of Labor] , 187 AD3d 1264, 1265 [2020]).

2021But the touchstone of the analysis is whether the employer exercised control over the results produced by the worker or the means used to achieve the results" ( id. at 137 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Matter of Mayo [Epstein-Commissioner of Labor] , 193 AD3d 1199 , 1200 [2021]; Matter of Jordan [Alterna Holdings Corp.-Commissioner of Labor] , 187 AD3d 1264, 1265 [2020]).

1983“The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19 (1968).” (Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106,108-109 .) The “single issue” is “whether the action of the police officer was reasonable”.

1982“The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).” (Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106, 108-109 .) The “single issue” is “whether the action of the police officer was reasonable”.

2023The doctrine is necessarily flexible because no enumerated list of factors can apply to every situation faced by a worker, and the relevant indicia of control will necessarily vary depending on the nature of the work" ( Matter of Vega [Postmates Inc.-Commissioner of Labor] , 35 NY3d 131 , 137 [2020] [internal quotation marks, brackets, footnotes and citations omitted]; see Matter of Hawkins [A Place for Rover Inc.-Commissioner of Labor] , 198 AD3d 1120, 1121 [3d Dept 2021]).

2023The doctrine is necessarily flexible because no enumerated list of factors can apply to every situation faced by a worker, and the relevant indicia [*2]of control will necessarily vary depending on the nature of the work" ( Matter of Vega [Postmates Inc.-Commissioner of Labor] , 35 NY3d 131 , 137 [2020] [internal quotation marks, brackets, citations and footnote omitted]; see Matter of Hawkins [A Place for Rover Inc.-Commissioner of Labor] , 198 AD3d 1120, 1121 [3d Dept 2021]).

2008(People v Batista, supra; People v Chestnut, supra.) “Bearing in mind that reasonableness is the touchstone of our inquiry into the propriety of police conduct, we must weigh the degree and scope of the particular intrusion ‘ “against the precipitating and attending conditions” ’ confronted.” (People v McLaurin, 70 NY2d 779, 781 [1987].) In People v Hicks ( 68 NY2d 234 [1986]), defendant was transported by the police to the scene of a robbery for identification purposes.

1998(People v McLaurin, 70 NY2d 779, 781 [1987], citing People v Harrison, 57 NY2d 470, 475 , quoting People v De Bour, supra; People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14 .) Whether the action of the police officer was reasonable (in a citizen’s street encounter) “must necessarily turn on the facts in each individual case.” (People v Green, 35 NY2d 193, 195 [1974].) Therefore, our Constitutions provide, and our courts routinely order, relief from the tyranny of terminology using reason ableness as the key.

1983(People vProchilo, 41 NY2d 759 , 761; see People v Simmons, 83 AD2d 79, 80 ; People v Clements, 88 AD2d 541, 541-542 ; People v Clee, 89 AD2d 188 .) The actions of the police officers were reasonable.

1982(People v Prochilo, 41 NY2d 759 , 761; see People v Simmons, 83 AD2d 79, 80 ; People v Clements, 88 AD2d 541 .) In our view, in all the circumstances, the officers acted reasonably.

2008(People v Batista, supra; People v Chestnut, supra.) “Bearing in mind that reasonableness is the touchstone of our inquiry into the propriety of police conduct, we must weigh the degree and scope of the particular intrusion ‘ “against the precipitating and attending conditions” ’ confronted.” (People v McLaurin, 70 NY2d 779, 781 [1987].) In People v Hicks ( 68 NY2d 234 [1986]), defendant was transported by the police to the scene of a robbery for identification purposes.

1987Bearing in mind that reasonableness is the touchstone of our inquiry into the propriety of police conduct, we must weigh the degree and scope of the particular intrusion " 'against the precipitating and attending conditions’ ” confronted (People v Harrison, 57 NY2d 470, 475 , quoting People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 ; see, People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14, 21, 22 ).

2026NO. 392 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/05/2026 Summary Judgment Standard It is a well-established principle that the "function of summary judgment is issue finding, not issue determination." Assaf v Ropog Cab Corp., 153 AD2d 520, 544 [1st Dept 1989].

2022In making a determination regarding employment status, "all aspects of the arrangement" must be considered, "[b]ut the touchstone of the analysis is whether the [putative] employer exercised control over the results produced by the worker or the means used to achieve the results" ( Matter of Vega [Postmates Inc.-Commissioner of Labor] , 35 NY3d 131 , 137 [2020] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). "[I]f supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole," such a determination "is beyond further judicial review even though there is evidence in the record that wou

2022In making a determination regarding employment status, "all aspects of the arrangement" must be considered, "[b]ut the touchstone of the analysis is whether the [putative] employer exercised control over the results produced by the worker or the means used to achieve the results" ( Matter of Vega [Postmates Inc.-Commissioner of Labor] , 35 NY3d 131 , 137 [2020] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). "[I]f supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole," such a determination "is beyond further judicial review even though there is evidence in the record that wou

2016(Matter of Goldman v McGuire, 101 AD2d 768 [1st Dept 1984], affd 64 NY2d 1041 [1985]; Matter of Vallas v Safir, 304 AD2d 353 [1st Dept 2003]; accord Matter of Wholihan v Vanessen, 254 AD2d 492 [2d Dept 1998].) “That case [Matter of Goldman] holds that competent evidence which demonstrates that a heart condition which, in the absence of hypertension or coronary disease, is not stress related or induced by occupational factors is sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption.” (Matter of Gumbrecht v McGuire, 117 AD2d 531, 533 [1st Dept 1986].) Put differently, the lack of coronary artery disease

2016The touchstone of whether the presumption under the Heart/ Stroke Bill is rebutted is whether there is competent evidence that “eliminated the possibility that the [disabling condition] was stress or job-related.” (Matter of Lo Pinto v Ward, 124 AD2d 497, 498 [1st Dept 1986].) For a disabling condition caused by diseases of the heart of unknown origin, the lack of coronary artery disease or hypertension is sufficient to rebut the presumption.

2016(Matter of Goldman v McGuire, 101 AD2d 768 [1st Dept 1984], affd 64 NY2d 1041 [1985]; Matter of Vallas v Safir, 304 AD2d 353 [1st Dept 2003]; accord Matter of Wholihan v Vanessen, 254 AD2d 492 [2d Dept 1998].) “That case [Matter of Goldman] holds that competent evidence which demonstrates that a heart condition which, in the absence of hypertension or coronary disease, is not stress related or induced by occupational factors is sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption.” (Matter of Gumbrecht v McGuire, 117 AD2d 531, 533 [1st Dept 1986].) Put differently, the lack of coronary artery disease

2012Instead, traditional statutory and constitutional principles remain the touchstone of the inquiry” (Best Van Lines, Inc. v Walker, 490 F3d 239, 252 [2007], quoting 2004 WL 964009 , *3, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 7830 , *9 [SD NY 2004] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). .

2011Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (1), entitled “Negligence in use or operation of vehicle attributable to owner,” provides, “Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.” Prior to the enactment of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, at common law, a car owner could only be held liable for the negligence of a pe

2011Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (1), entitled “Negligence in use or operation of vehicle attributable to owner,” provides, “Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.” Prior to the enactment of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, at common law, a car owner could only be held liable for the negligence of a pe

2011Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (1), entitled “Negligence in use or operation of vehicle attributable to owner,” provides, “Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.” Prior to the enactment of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, at common law, a car owner could only be held liable for the negligence of a pe

2011Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (1), entitled “Negligence in use or operation of vehicle attributable to owner,” provides, “Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.” Prior to the enactment of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, at common law, a car owner could only be held liable for the negligence of a pe

2008Since the issue is one of statutory interpretation, the touchstone of the analysis is the legislative intent (see Matter of M.B., 6 NY3d 437, 447 [2006]).