touchstone analysis in Maryland

2013The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.” “The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ ” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 , 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878-79 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

2013The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.” “The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ ” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 , 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878-79 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

2006In determining whether there has been a violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” Wilkes, swpra; Terry, supra. Reasonableness, of course, depends “on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 ; Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 , 98 S.

2006In determining whether there has been a violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” Wilkes, swpra; Terry, supra. Reasonableness, of course, depends “on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 ; Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 , 98 S.

2013The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.” “The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ ” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 , 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878-79 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

2013The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.” “The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ ” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 , 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878-79 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

2023Rucker, however, was later criticized by the Supreme Court of Maryland in Longshore v. State for failing to “accord the trial court finding [about the exchange between the police and defendant] any deference” and failing to “address, or seek to assess ‘how a reasonable [person] . . . would have understood the situation.’” 399 Md. 486 , 525 n.9 (2007).

2013Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

2013Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

2009The court reiterated that the touchstone of the doctrine is that the police “were engaged in a community caretaking function and not in an investigative function and that the appropriate standard for judging such police behavior is that of general reasonableness.” Id. at 280 , 721 A.2d at 286 .

2009The court reiterated that the touchstone of the doctrine is that the police “were engaged in a community caretaking function and not in an investigative function and that the appropriate standard for judging such police behavior is that of general reasonableness.” Id. at 280 , 721 A.2d at 286 .

2006In Belton, 453 U.S. at 455-56 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the recovery of cocaine from the pocket of a leather jacket belonging to an occupant of a vehicle which had been stopped for traveling at an excessive rate of speed on the New York Thruway comported with Fourth Amendment strictures.

2006In Belton, 453 U.S. at 455-56 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the recovery of cocaine from the pocket of a leather jacket belonging to an occupant of a vehicle which had been stopped for traveling at an excessive rate of speed on the New York Thruway comported with Fourth Amendment strictures.

2006In determining whether there has been a violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” Wilkes, swpra; Terry, supra. Reasonableness, of course, depends “on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 ; Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 , 98 S.

2001We begin with our statement from Graham v. State, 119 Md.App. 444, 453 , 705 A.2d 82 (1998): The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion, and that reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual[’]s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.

2001We begin with our statement from Graham v. State, 119 Md.App. 444, 453 , 705 A.2d 82 (1998): The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion, and that reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual[’]s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.

2001(Internal quotations omitted) (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 , 117 S.Ct. 882 , 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997)).

2001(Internal quotations omitted) (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 , 117 S.Ct. 882 , 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997)).

2000The touchstone of the analysis is Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), where the Supreme Court held that an “excessive force” claim against police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to be judged under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, rather than under notions of substantive due process.

2000The touchstone of the analysis is Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), where the Supreme Court held that an “excessive force” claim against police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to be judged under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, rather than under notions of substantive due process.

2000Securities, 709 F.Supp. 1290, 1298 (S.D.N.Y.1989) indicated with respect to the ‘linking conduct’ requirement, the touchstone of the inquiry "is not ... formal direct communication, but rather some link of the defendant to plaintiff which evinces defendant’s understanding of plaintiff’s reliance, then no distinction may exist between the two.” Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick Main & Co., 79 N.Y.2d 695, 586 N.Y.S.2d 87 , 597 N.E.2d 1080 (1992), as we shall see, has interpreted that requirement more restrictively, however. .

2000Securities, 709 F.Supp. 1290, 1298 (S.D.N.Y.1989) indicated with respect to the ‘linking conduct’ requirement, the touchstone of the inquiry "is not ... formal direct communication, but rather some link of the defendant to plaintiff which evinces defendant’s understanding of plaintiff’s reliance, then no distinction may exist between the two.” Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick Main & Co., 79 N.Y.2d 695, 586 N.Y.S.2d 87 , 597 N.E.2d 1080 (1992), as we shall see, has interpreted that requirement more restrictively, however. .

1997We held that “[t]o determine whether an injury has been ‘committed’ so as to trigger the limitations period in C.J. § 5-109(a)(l), the touchstone of the inquiry is whether the patient has suffered harm that is legally cognizable.” Id. at 259, 681 A.2d 546 .

1996To determine whether an “injury” has been “committed” so as to trigger the limitations period in C.J. § 5—109(a)(1), the touchstone of the inquiry is whether the patient has suffered harm that is “legally cognizable.” In Hill , which involved an alleged negligent misdiagnosis, the Court held that, to activate the limitations period in C.J. § 5—109(a)(1), “all that is required is that the negligent act be coupled with some harm in order for a legally cognizable wrong—and, therefore, injury— to have occurred.” Id., 304 Md. at 696 , 501 A.2d 27 (emphasis supplied).

1996To determine whether an “injury” has been “committed” so as to trigger the limitations period in C.J. § 5—109(a)(1), the touchstone of the inquiry is whether the patient has suffered harm that is “legally cognizable.” In Hill , which involved an alleged negligent misdiagnosis, the Court held that, to activate the limitations period in C.J. § 5—109(a)(1), “all that is required is that the negligent act be coupled with some harm in order for a legally cognizable wrong—and, therefore, injury— to have occurred.” Id., 304 Md. at 696 , 501 A.2d 27 (emphasis supplied).