Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
12 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Andrewsgreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., Simonov, 358 Or at 546 (“The determination whether a particular element of an offense within the Criminal Code requires a culpable mental state and, if so, what men- tal state is required, ultimately is a matter of legislative intent.”); Andrews, 174 Or App at 365 (“[W]e emphasize that legislative intent must be the touchstone of analysis under ORS 161.095 to ORS 161.115.”); accord Owen, 369 Or at 320 (“[T]he definition of second-degree assault suggests that applying the guideline in ORS 161.115(1) * * * would be incorrect: It would require the knowing culpable mental Cite as 318 Or | 1 | 1 |
State v. Owengreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., Simonov, 358 Or at 546 (“The determination whether a particular element of an offense within the Criminal Code requires a culpable mental state and, if so, what men- tal state is required, ultimately is a matter of legislative intent.”); Andrews, 174 Or App at 365 (“[W]e emphasize that legislative intent must be the touchstone of analysis under ORS 161.095 to ORS 161.115.”); accord Owen, 369 Or at 320 (“[T]he definition of second-degree assault suggests that applying the guideline in ORS 161.115(1) * * * would be incorrect: It would require the knowing culpable mental Cite as 318 Or | 1 | 1 |
State v. Simonovgreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., Simonov, 358 Or at 546 (“The determination whether a particular element of an offense within the Criminal Code requires a culpable mental state and, if so, what men- tal state is required, ultimately is a matter of legislative intent.”); Andrews, 174 Or App at 365 (“[W]e emphasize that legislative intent must be the touchstone of analysis under ORS 161.095 to ORS 161.115.”); accord Owen, 369 Or at 320 (“[T]he definition of second-degree assault suggests that applying the guideline in ORS 161.115(1) * * * would be incorrect: It would require the knowing culpable mental Cite as 318 Or | 1 | 1 |
State v. Langleygreen2 sentences2008See Langley, 314 Or. at 258 , 839 P.2d 692 (articulating that constitutional standard for testing a denial of a motion for substitution of counsel); see also Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir.2000) (the ultimate constitutional question in reviewing a denial of a motion for substitute counsel is whether the conflict between the defendant and counsel became so great that it resulted in representation that fell below Sixth Amendment standards). 2008See Langley, 314 Or at 258 (articulating that constitutional standard for testing a denial of a motion for substitution of counsel); see also Schell v. Witek, 218 F3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir 2000) (the ultimate constitutional question in reviewing a denial of a motion for substitute counsel is whether the conflict between the defendant and counsel became so great that it resulted in representation that fell below Sixth Amendment standards). | 1 | 1 |
Wayne Dale Schell v. Larry Witek, Warden Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, State of California, 1green2 sentences2008See Langley, 314 Or. at 258 , 839 P.2d 692 (articulating that constitutional standard for testing a denial of a motion for substitution of counsel); see also Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir.2000) (the ultimate constitutional question in reviewing a denial of a motion for substitute counsel is whether the conflict between the defendant and counsel became so great that it resulted in representation that fell below Sixth Amendment standards). 2008See Langley, 314 Or at 258 (articulating that constitutional standard for testing a denial of a motion for substitution of counsel); see also Schell v. Witek, 218 F3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir 2000) (the ultimate constitutional question in reviewing a denial of a motion for substitute counsel is whether the conflict between the defendant and counsel became so great that it resulted in representation that fell below Sixth Amendment standards). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lowell v. Wright
green
2 sentences2022The Court of Appeals acknowledged that this court “gave little explanation of its specific reasoning” but concluded that the court derived its result from the touchstone principle that to be speech on a matter of public concern, the speech must be in the interest of democratic dialogue and this court determined that “the interest in democratic dialogue [was] non-existent.” Lowell, 306 Or App at 340 . 2020Another relevant precedent is our decision in Cooper v. PGE, 110 Or App 581 , 824 P2d 1152 , rev den, 313 Or 299 Cite as 306 Or App 325 (2020) 341 (1992). | 2 | 2020–2022 |
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Dun & Bradstreet, 472 US at 761-62 . 2020Referring back to the touchstone principle of Sullivan, the Court concluded by stating that there was “simply no credible argument” that the type of credit reporting at issue required special protection to ensure that “ ‘debate on pub- lic issues [will] be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ ” Id. (quoting Sullivan, 376 US at 270 ). | 2 | 2020–2022 |
State v. Hale
green
2 sentences2015We discuss those cases below because the state urges us to adopt a variation on the rationale of those cases here. 6 At oral argument, the state argued that the touchstone of our standard of review should be whether the lack of a concurrence instruction would cause “jury confusion.” See, e.g., State v. Hale, 335 Or 612, 627 , 75 P3d 448 (2003) (noting that lack of concurrence instruction could cause “jury confusion”). 2015We discuss those cases below because the state urges us to adopt a variation on the rationale of those cases here. 6 At oral argument, the state argued that the touchstone of our standard of review should be whether the lack of a concurrence instruction would cause “jury confusion.” See, e.g., State v. Hale, 335 Or 612, 627 , 75 P3d 448 (2003) (noting that lack of concurrence instruction could cause “jury confusion”). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Jacobson
neutral
1 sentence2022As we have stated, the touchstone of the inquiry is whether there has been “an intentional relinquishment of a known right, based on what the defendant knows and understands.” Jacobson, 296 Or App at 91-92 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Prophet
green
1 sentence2022See, e.g., Simonov, 358 Or at 546 (“The determination whether a particular element of an offense within the Criminal Code requires a culpable mental state and, if so, what men- tal state is required, ultimately is a matter of legislative intent.”); Andrews, 174 Or App at 365 (“[W]e emphasize that legislative intent must be the touchstone of analysis under ORS 161.095 to ORS 161.115.”); accord Owen, 369 Or at 320 (“[T]he definition of second-degree assault suggests that applying the guideline in ORS 161.115(1) * * * would be incorrect: It would require the knowing culpable mental Cite as 318 Or | 1 | 2022–2022 |
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
1 sentence2020Referring back to the touchstone principle of Sullivan, the Court concluded by stating that there was “simply no credible argument” that the type of credit reporting at issue required special protection to ensure that “ ‘debate on pub- lic issues [will] be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ ” Id. (quoting Sullivan, 376 US at 270 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley
green
1 sentence2020Although the court gave little explanation of its specific reasoning, it, like the Court in Dun & Bradstreet, ultimately harkened back to the touchstone principle of Sullivan, stating that “the interest in democratic dialogue [was] non-existent” in such circumstances and that “[t]he defamatory matter [did] not contribute to the free exchange of ideas in decision making for a self-governing society.” Id. at 369 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Cooper v. Portland General Electric Corp.
green
2 sentences2020Another relevant precedent is our decision in Cooper v. PGE, 110 Or App 581 , 824 P2d 1152 , rev den, 313 Or 299 Cite as 306 Or App 325 (2020) 341 (1992). 2020Another relevant precedent is our decision in Cooper v. PGE, 110 Or App 581 , 824 P2d 1152 , rev den, 313 Or 299 Cite as 306 Or App 325 (2020) 341 (1992). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Bates
green
1 sentence2016The touchstone of our inquiry is whether Jewell had a reasonable suspicion that defendant “might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present.” Bates, 304 Or at 524 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Fair
green
2 sentences2013Cf. State v. Fair, 353 Or 588, 602 , 302 P3d 417 (2013) (the “touchstone” of the state and federal constitutional limitations on searches and seizures is “reasonableness”). 2013Cf. State v. Fair, 353 Or 588, 602 , 302 P3d 417 (2013) (the “touchstone” of the state and federal constitutional limitations on searches and seizures is “reasonableness”). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Meyrick
green
1 sentence2012Id. at 131-32 . 10 *666 The touchstone of the inquiry into a motion to withdraw as counsel is: “[W]hether there has been a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship sufficient to establish an abridgement of the constitutional right to counsel.” State v. Davis, 345 Or 551, 580 , 201 P3d 185 (2008). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2012Id. at 131-32 . 10 *666 The touchstone of the inquiry into a motion to withdraw as counsel is: “[W]hether there has been a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship sufficient to establish an abridgement of the constitutional right to counsel.” State v. Davis, 345 Or 551, 580 , 201 P3d 185 (2008). 2012Id. at 131-32 . 10 *666 The touchstone of the inquiry into a motion to withdraw as counsel is: “[W]hether there has been a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship sufficient to establish an abridgement of the constitutional right to counsel.” State v. Davis, 345 Or 551, 580 , 201 P3d 185 (2008). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Rodriguez/Buck
green
1 sentence2010Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Davis
green
1 sentence2009Davis, 336 Or at 33-34 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.