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21 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
New York v. Classgreen2 sentences2015Moreover, Karo’s brushing off of the potential trespass fits logically with earlier Supreme Court decisions concluding that ‘the physical characteristics of an automobile and its use result in a lessened expectation of privacy therein.’ ” Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 261 (quoting New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (to examine the exterior of an automobile does not constitute a search)). 2015Moreover, Karo’s brushing off of the potential trespass fits logically with earlier Supreme Court decisions concluding that ‘the physical characteristics of an automobile and its use result in a lessened expectation of privacy therein.’ ” Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 261 (quoting New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (to examine the exterior of an automobile does not constitute a search)); see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974) (plurality opinion) (warrantless taking of paint scrapings from the exterior of a vehicle does not constitute an unlawful search). 1 ¶ 38 We conclude that it | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Aguiargreen2 sentences2015The Court then proceeded to “broadly discredit[ ] the relevance of trespass in the context of electronic surveillance of vehicles: ‘[A] physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated, ... for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.’ ” Katzin, 769 F.3d at 175 (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 712-13 ); see also Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 261 (also noting that Karo discounted the importance of trespass in placing a tracking device). ¶ 37 As the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, explained in 2015The Court then proceeded to “broadly discredit[ ] the relevance of trespass in the context of electronic surveillance of vehicles: ‘[A] physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated, ... for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.’ ” Katzin, 769 F.3d at 175 (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 712-13 ); see also Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 261 (also noting that Karo discounted the importance of trespass in placing a tracking device). - 11 - ¶ 37 As the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, expla | 2 | 2 |
Pyne v. Witmergreen2 sentences1998However, in Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351 , 543 N.E.2d 1304 (1989), a case involving an allegedly intoxicated driver, the supreme court did not use the term “furtherance” as a touchstone of analysis; instead, it appears in the dissent. 1998However, in Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351 , 543 N.E.2d 1304 (1989), a case involving an allegedly intoxicated driver, the supreme court did not use the term “furtherance” as a touchstone of analysis; instead, it appears in the dissent. | 2 | 2 |
Michigan v. Longgreen2 sentences2020“In evaluating the validity of an officer’s protective conduct under Terry, the touchstone of the analysis is the reasonableness under the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security. [Citation.]” Id. at 441 , citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983). 2001Long, 463 U.S. at 1051 , 77 L. | 1 | 3 |
Maryland v. Garrisongreen2 sentences2018Id. (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987)). 2017Id. (citing Maryland v. Garrison , 480 U.S. 79 , 87, 107 S.Ct. 1013 , 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) ). | 1 | 3 |
Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicagogreen1 sentence2020In so ruling, the Electoral Board stated that the candidate did not violate the name change provision, the purpose of which was “to force Candidates, who have recently acquired new names in processes outside of the ‘ordinary’ name changes that occur in life, to divulge those former names.” Harris, 17 COEB JUD 18; see also Featherston, 17 COEB CC 03 (affirming the Electoral Board’s decision in Harris and reiterating that the statutory name change provision applies to names acquired outside of the ordinary changes that occur in life). ¶ 35 We review de novo the issue of the statutory constructio | 1 | 1 |
Marszalek v. Kelensongreen1 sentence2020In so ruling, the Electoral Board stated that the candidate did not violate the name change provision, the purpose of which was “to force Candidates, who have recently acquired new names in processes outside of the ‘ordinary’ name changes that occur in life, to divulge those former names.” Harris, 17 COEB JUD 18; see also Featherston, 17 COEB CC 03 (affirming the Electoral Board’s decision in Harris and reiterating that the statutory name change provision applies to names acquired outside of the ordinary changes that occur in life). ¶ 35 We review de novo the issue of the statutory constructio | 1 | 1 |
McGuire v. Nogajgreen1 sentence2020App. 3d 836, 839 (1991); McGuire v. Nogaj, 146 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Cardwell v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2015Moreover, Karo’s brushing off of the potential trespass fits logically with earlier Supreme Court decisions concluding that ‘the physical characteristics of an automobile and its use result in a lessened expectation of privacy therein.’ ” Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 261 (quoting New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (to examine the exterior of an automobile does not constitute a search)); see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974) (plurality opinion) (warrantless taking of paint scrapings from the exterior of a vehicle does not constitute an unlawful search). 1 ¶ 38 We conclude that it | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Snyder v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences2021The touchstone inquiry is “whether the defendant’s presence at the proceeding would have contributed to his opportunity to defend himself against the charges.” Id. 2013The touchstone of this analysis is “whether the defendant’s presence at the proceeding would have contributed to his opportunity to defend himself against the charges.” Id., 740 N.E.2d at 798 . | 2 | 2013–2021 |
Sandin v. Conner
green
2 sentences2020Wilkinson reiterated that “[a]fter Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’ ” Id. at 223 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 ). ¶ 46 With the preceding in mind, we look to the disciplinary actions the committee might recommend if it finds the offender did commit the offense or a lesser offense for which the 2019Wilkinson reiterated that “[a]fter Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but - 15 - the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’ ” Id. at 223 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 ). ¶ 46 With the preceding in mind, we look to the disciplinary actions the committee might recommend if it finds the offender did commit the offense or a lesser offense for whi | 2 | 2019–2020 |
People v. Young
green
2 sentences2020Moreover, “a defendant’s presence is not required when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow. [Citation.] The touchstone of this analysis is whether the defendant’s presence at the proceeding would have contributed to his opportunity to defend himself against the charges. [Citation.] Whether a stage of trial is a critical stage is a question of law that we review de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Young, 2013 IL App (4th) 120228, ¶ 23 . ¶ 51 We need not decide whether defendant waived her right to be present through her counsel. 2019Moreover, “a defendant’s presence is not required when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow. [Citation.] The touchstone of this analysis is whether the defendant’s presence at the proceeding would have contributed to his opportunity to defend himself against the charges. [Citation.] Whether a stage of trial is a critical stage is a question of law that we review de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Young, 2013 IL App (4th) 120228, ¶ 23 . ¶ 51 We need not decide whether defendant waived her right to be present through her counsel. | 2 | 2019–2020 |
Wilkinson v. Austin
green
2 sentences2020Wilkinson reiterated that “[a]fter Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’ ” Id. at 223 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 ). ¶ 46 With the preceding in mind, we look to the disciplinary actions the committee might recommend if it finds the offender did commit the offense or a lesser offense for which the 2019Wilkinson reiterated that “[a]fter Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but - 15 - the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’ ” Id. at 223 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 ). ¶ 46 With the preceding in mind, we look to the disciplinary actions the committee might recommend if it finds the offender did commit the offense or a lesser offense for whi | 2 | 2019–2020 |
People v. Luckett
green
2 sentences2018Id. (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987)). 2017Id. (citing Maryland v. Garrison , 480 U.S. 79 , 87, 107 S.Ct. 1013 , 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) ). | 2 | 2017–2018 |
United States v. Harry Katzin
green
2 sentences2015The Court then proceeded to “broadly discredit[ ] the relevance of trespass in the context of electronic surveillance of vehicles: ‘[A] physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated, ... for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.’ ” Katzin, 769 F.3d at 175 (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 712-13 ); see also Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 261 (also noting that Karo discounted the importance of trespass in placing a tracking device). ¶ 37 As the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, explained in 2015The Court then proceeded to “broadly discredit[ ] the relevance of trespass in the context of electronic surveillance of vehicles: ‘[A] physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated, ... for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.’ ” Katzin, 769 F.3d at 175 (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 712-13 ); see also Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 261 (also noting that Karo discounted the importance of trespass in placing a tracking device). - 11 - ¶ 37 As the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, expla | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Ristaino v. Ross
green
2 sentences2010The touchstone for inquiry concerning racial prejudice during voir dire derives from Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 , 47 L. 2010The touchstone for inquiry concerning racial prejudice during voir dire derives from Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 , 47 L. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Sorenson
green
1 sentence2020“In evaluating the validity of an officer’s protective conduct under Terry, the touchstone of the analysis is the reasonableness under the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security. [Citation.]” Id. at 441 , citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Lofton
green
1 sentence2013The touchstone of this analysis is “whether the defendant’s presence at the proceeding would have contributed to his opportunity to defend himself against the charges.” Id., 740 N.E.2d at 798 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Velazquez v. Soliz
green
1 sentence1986App. 3d 1024 , 490 N.E.2d 1346 .) This is the touchstone for our analysis in this case which requires close scrutiny of the Election Code as it applies to circulation of petitions in an aldermanic election. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Briske v. Village of Burnham
green
2 sentences1985“If a negligent act or omission does nothing more than furnish a condition making an injury possible, and such condition, by the subsequent independent act of a third person, causes an injury, the two acts are not concurrent and the existence of the condition is not the proximate cause of the injury.” (Briske v. Village of Burnham (1942), 379 Ill. 193, 199 , 39 N.E.2d 976 .) The acts of Hayes are an efficient intervening cause in the condition created by the city such that the condition so created by the city is not the proximate cause of the injury suffered. 1985“If a negligent act or omission does nothing more than furnish a condition making an injury possible, and such condition, by the subsequent independent act of a third person, causes an injury, the two acts are not concurrent and the existence of the condition is not the proximate cause of the injury.” (Briske v. Village of Burnham (1942), 379 Ill. 193, 199 , 39 N.E.2d 976 .) The acts of Hayes are an efficient intervening cause in the condition created by the city such that the condition so created by the city is not the proximate cause of the injury suffered. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.