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30 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1976–2022 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pennsylvania v. Mimmsgreen2 sentences2021“The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 , 98 S. Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L. 2021“The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 , 98 S. Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L. | 3 | 5 |
City of Magnolia 4A Economic Development Corp. v. Smedleygreen2 sentences2021Corp. v. Smedley, 533 S.W.3d 297, 301 (Tex. 2017) (explaining that “[u]nder [Estate of] Jones, the touchstone of our analysis [is] whether the later plea to the jurisdiction [is] a new and distinct motion or a mere motion to reconsider”); City of Hous. v. Estate of Jones, 388 S.W.3d 663 , 666–67 (Tex. 2012) (holding that an appellate court does not have interlocutory jurisdiction over an amended plea to the jurisdiction that was substantively a motion to reconsider the original plea to the jurisdiction because the amended plea did not assert a new immunity ground). 2021Corp. v. Smedley, 533 S.W.3d 297, 301 (Tex. 2017) (explaining that “[u]nder Jones, the touchstone of our analysis [is] whether the later plea to the jurisdiction [is] a new and distinct motion or a mere motion to reconsider”). 11 demonstrate an incurable defect in jurisdiction, the plaintiff should be given the opportunity to amend. | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Thomas Cameron Kincadegreen2 sentences2008As a general proposition, the reasonableness of a search depends upon law-enforcement officers obtaining a warrant, but “the general rule of the Warrant Clause is not unyielding.” United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality op.). 2008As a general proposition, the reasonableness of a search depends upon law-enforcement officers obtaining a warrant, but "the general rule of the Warrant Clause is not unyielding.” United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (plurality op.). | 3 | 3 |
Crittenden v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Holder–11 the same right to the same degree, but the touchstone of our analysis is whether the Supreme Court’s reasoning makes more sense than the alternatives.15 Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 673 (Tex. Crim. 2020Holder–11 the same right to the same degree, but the touchstone of our analysis is whether the Supreme Court’s reasoning makes more sense than the alternatives.15 Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 673 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
MacK v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Mack v. State, 928 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. ref’d) (citations omitted); see Dominguez v. State, 355 S.W.3d 918, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d) (explaining that a person commits burglary by breaking into a habitation in another’s possession). 2015See Mack v. State , 928 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. App.- Austin 1996, pet. refd) ("The touchstone of our analysis is not whether the defendant has any right to possession of the property at all, but whether the alleged owner' s right to possess the property is greater than the defendant' s."). | 2 | 2 |
Root v. Brodheadgreen2 sentences2001Root v. Brodhead, 854 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex.App. — Austin 1993, no writ). 2000Root v. Brodhead , 854 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. App.--Austin 1993, no writ). | 2 | 2 |
Abel Noe Dominguez v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Mack v. State, 928 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. ref’d) (citations omitted); see Dominguez v. State, 355 S.W.3d 918, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d) (explaining that a person commits burglary by breaking into a habitation in another’s possession). 2015The issue also arose in Dominguez v. State, 355 S.W.3d 918 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d)(mem. op.), another capital murder case. | 1 | 2 |
Logan v. Mullisgreen2 sentences2004Logan v. Mullis, 686 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Tex.1985). 1995Id. at 608 . | 1 | 2 |
Pederson v. Apple Corrugated Packaging, Inc.green1 sentence2018LABOR CODE § 401.011(18) (defining “employer” as “a person who makes a contract of hire, employs one or more employees, and has workers’ compensation insurance coverage”); id. § 401.012(a) (defining “employee” as “each person in the service of another under a contract of hire, whether express or implied, or oral or written”). 16 The Mewbourne Defendants and Plaintiffs both agree that the touchstone in that inquiry is “control”: Determining the identity of Lentz’s employer requires an evaluation of which company had the “right to control [Lentz] at the time of [his] injury.” (CR 91–92, quoting | 1 | 1 |
Texas Health Facilities Commission v. Charter Medical-Dallas, Inc.green2 sentences2015E.g., Tex. Health Facilities Comm’n v. Charter Med.- Dallas., Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Tex. 1984). 2015E.g., Charter Med.-Dallas, 665 S.W.2d at 452 . | 1 | 1 |
DHS Management Services, Inc., Diagnostic Health Services, Inc., Mobile Diagnostic Systems, Inc., and Jennifer Hjarpe v. Heather Castrogreen1 sentence2015Servs, Inc. v. Castro, 435 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. App. --- Dallas 2014, no pet.); Sherman v. HealthSouth Specialty Hospital, Inc., 397 S.W.3d 869, 702 (Tex. App. --- Dallas 2013, pet. denied) 28 See Texas West Oaks Hospital, 371 S.W.3d at 177 ; Marks v. St. | 1 | 1 |
Sherman, Andrea v. Healthsouth Specialty Hospital, Inc. D/B/A Healthsouth Dallas Rehab Hospitalgreen1 sentence2015Servs, Inc. v. Castro, 435 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. App. --- Dallas 2014, no pet.); Sherman v. HealthSouth Specialty Hospital, Inc., 397 S.W.3d 869, 702 (Tex. App. --- Dallas 2013, pet. denied) 28 See Texas West Oaks Hospital, 371 S.W.3d at 177 ; Marks v. St. | 1 | 1 |
Yamada v. Friendgreen1 sentence2015The Court Should Apply a De Novo Standard of Review The question of whether or not Appellant’s claims fall within the scope of Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code is a question of statutory interpretation which triggers a de novo review.28 In reviewing a statute, the goal is to “determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent” and the touchstone of the analysis should be the “plain and common meaning of the statute’s words.”29 In such an analysis, statutory 27 See Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Tex. 2010); DHS Mgmt. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
the City of Houston v. the Estate of Kenneth Samuel Jones
green
2 sentences2021Corp. v. Smedley, 533 S.W.3d 297, 301 (Tex. 2017) (explaining that “[u]nder [Estate of] Jones, the touchstone of our analysis [is] whether the later plea to the jurisdiction [is] a new and distinct motion or a mere motion to reconsider”); City of Hous. v. Estate of Jones, 388 S.W.3d 663 , 666–67 (Tex. 2012) (holding that an appellate court does not have interlocutory jurisdiction over an amended plea to the jurisdiction that was substantively a motion to reconsider the original plea to the jurisdiction because the amended plea did not assert a new immunity ground). 2017Id. | 2 | 2017–2021 |
Sonnier v. Chisholm-Ryder Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Id. 2002Id. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Company
green
2 sentences1993"Due process requires that the rule of collateral estoppel operate only against persons who have had their day in court either as a party to the prior suit or as a privy, and, where not so, that, at the least, the presently asserted interest was actually and adequately represented in the prior trial." Benson , 468 S.W.2d at 363 . 1993“Due process requires that the rule of collateral estoppel operate only against persons who have had their day in court either as a party to the prior suit or as a privy, and, where not so, that, at the least, the presently asserted interest was actually and adequately represented in the prior trial.” Benson, 468 S.W.2d at 363 . | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Antwine v. Reed
green
1 sentence2022As explained below, the Bank’s action in assigning the judgment to Angel for collection is, in the words of Antwine, “some act inconsistent” with the settlement offer 45 and, in the words of Sections 42 and 43 of the 45 199 S.W.2d at 485 . 17 Restatement, a definite action inconsistent with an intention to enter the proposed settlement transaction. 46 The court of appeals’ suggestion that only a presently enforceable contract would suffice is at odds with extant jurisprudence and learned treatises. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2021Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 , 88 S.Ct. at 1878 ). 2021Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 , 88 S.Ct. at 1878 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Tarrant Regional Water District v. Richard Johnson and Sharkara Johnson, Individually and as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Brandy Johnson
green
1 sentence2019Johnson, 572 S.W.3d at 667-68 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Lockhart v. Fretwell
green
1 sentence2015Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 , at page 372 (1993). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Texas West Oaks Hospital, LP v. Williams
green
1 sentence2015Servs, Inc. v. Castro, 435 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. App. --- Dallas 2014, no pet.); Sherman v. HealthSouth Specialty Hospital, Inc., 397 S.W.3d 869, 702 (Tex. App. --- Dallas 2013, pet. denied) 28 See Texas West Oaks Hospital, 371 S.W.3d at 177 ; Marks v. St. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Goodson v. City Of Corpus Christi
green
1 sentence2002Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Cardwell v. Lewis
green
2 sentences1976But insofar as Fourth Amendment protection extends to a motor vehicle, it is the right to privacy that is the touchstone of our inquiry.” 94 S.Ct. 2464, at 2470 . 1976After noting that nothing from the interior of the car had been searched or seized and introduced into evidence, the Court continued as follows: “With the ‘search’ limited to the examination of the tire on the wheel and the taking of paint scrapings from the exteri- or of the vehicle left in the public parking lot, we fail to comprehend what expectation of privacy was infringed.” “Under circumstances such as these, where probable cause exists, a warrant-less examination of the exterior of a car is not unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 94 S.Ct. 2464, at 2470 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.