touchstone analysis (Wisconsin) · Go Syfert
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touchstone analysis in Wisconsin

15 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2025 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (15)

CaseFollowedCited
Den Ex Dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.green
scotus · 1856 · cited in 2 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
2 sentences

2020The touchstone for a claim based on this constitutional protection is the "settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); see also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994). ¶108 Under the common law, the grounds for judicial disqualification were simple and narrow: a man could not act as the judge in his own case.

2020The touchstone for a claim based on this constitutional protection is the "settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); see also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994). ¶108 Under the common law, the grounds for judicial disqualification were simple and narrow: a man could not act as the judge in his own case.

22
Tumey v. Ohiogreen
scotus · 1927 · cited in 2 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
2 sentences

2020The touchstone for a claim based on this constitutional protection is the "settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); see also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994). ¶108 Under the common law, the grounds for judicial disqualification were simple and narrow: a man could not act as the judge in his own case.

2020The touchstone for a claim based on this constitutional protection is the "settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); see also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994). ¶108 Under the common law, the grounds for judicial disqualification were simple and narrow: a man could not act as the judge in his own case.

22
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberggreen
scotus · 1994 · cited in 2 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
2 sentences

2020The touchstone for a claim based on this constitutional protection is the "settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); see also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994). ¶108 Under the common law, the grounds for judicial disqualification were simple and narrow: a man could not act as the judge in his own case.

2020The touchstone for a claim based on this constitutional protection is the "settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); see also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994). ¶108 Under the common law, the grounds for judicial disqualification were simple and narrow: a man could not act as the judge in his own case.

22
Pennsylvania v. Mimmsgreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 2 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2001–2015
2 sentences

2015See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 ("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."); State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶ 21 , 274 Wis. 2d 540 , 683 N.W.2d 1 (a court must "carefully scrutinize the totality of the circumstances.").

2015Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 ("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."); Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, ¶ 21 (a court must "carefully scrutinize the totality of the circumstances.").

22
Terry v. Ohiogreen
scotus · 1968 · cited in 3 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2000–2015
2 sentences

2015See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 ("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."); State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶ 21 , 274 Wis. 2d 540 , 683 N.W.2d 1 (a court must "carefully scrutinize the totality of the circumstances.").

2015Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 ("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."); Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, ¶ 21 (a court must "carefully scrutinize the totality of the circumstances.").

13
Handel v. Stategreen
wis · 1976 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021The touchstone of our inquiry remains on principles of due process—that is, whether the circuit court’s actions resulted in a violation of Throndson’s due process right to an impartial judge. 11 No. 2020AP1081-CR 74 Wis. 2d 699, 703 , 247 N.W.2d 711 (1976) (“in sentencing, a trial judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope and largely unlimited either as to the kind of information considered or the source from which it comes”).

2021The touchstone of our inquiry remains on principles of due process—that is, whether the circuit court’s actions resulted in a violation of Throndson’s due process right to an impartial judge. 11 No. 2020AP1081-CR 74 Wis. 2d 699, 703 , 247 N.W.2d 711 (1976) (“in sentencing, a trial judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope and largely unlimited either as to the kind of information considered or the source from which it comes”).

11
Ohio v. Robinettegreen
scotus · 1996 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 ("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."); State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶ 21 , 274 Wis. 2d 540 , 683 N.W.2d 1 (a court must "carefully scrutinize the totality of the circumstances.").

2015Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 ("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."); Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, ¶ 21 (a court must "carefully scrutinize the totality of the circumstances.").

11
State v. Malonegreen
wis · 2004 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 ("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."); State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶ 21 , 274 Wis. 2d 540 , 683 N.W.2d 1 (a court must "carefully scrutinize the totality of the circumstances.").

2015See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 ("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."); State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶ 21 , 274 Wis. 2d 540 , 683 N.W.2d 1 (a court must "carefully scrutinize the totality of the circumstances.").

11
State v. Gaulrappgreen
wisctapp · 1996 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶ 11 ; see also Houghton, 364 Wis. 2d 234, ¶ 29 ("It is undisputed that traffic stops must be reasonable under the circumstances.") (citing Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d at 605 ).

2015IV. 22 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 ("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."); Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, ¶21 (a court must "carefully scrutinize the totality of the circumstances."). 23 Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶11 ; see also Houghton, 364 Wis. 2d 234, ¶29 ("It is

11
State v. Richard E. Houghton, Jr.green
wis · 2015 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶ 11 ; see also Houghton, 364 Wis. 2d 234, ¶ 29 ("It is undisputed that traffic stops must be reasonable under the circumstances.") (citing Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d at 605 ).

2015IV. 22 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 ("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."); Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, ¶21 (a court must "carefully scrutinize the totality of the circumstances."). 23 Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶11 ; see also Houghton, 364 Wis. 2d 234, ¶29 ("It is

11
In RE MARRIAGE OF KENNEDY v. Kennedygreen
wisctapp · 1988 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 145 Wis. 2d 219, 222 , 426 N.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1988).

2010See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 145 Wis. 2d 219, 222 , 426 N.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1988).

11
In RE DMD (A MINOR) v. Stategreen
wis · 1972 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010See D.M.D. v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 313, 318 , 195 N.W.2d 594 (1972); State v. Marinez, 2010 WI App 34, ¶ 21 , 324 Wis. 2d 282 , 781 N.W.2d 511 . ¶ 52.

2010See D.M.D. v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 313, 318 , 195 N.W.2d 594 (1972); State v. Marinez, 2010 WI App 34, ¶ 21 , 324 Wis. 2d 282 , 781 N.W.2d 511 . ¶ 52.

11
Wyoming v. Houghtongreen
scotus · 1999 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001This evaluation turns on an assessment of "the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy and. . .the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).

2001This evaluation turns on an assessment of "the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy and. . .the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).

11
United States v. Frank L. Faziogreen
ca7 · 1990 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001This determination is based on the "totality of the circumstances." United States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 954 (7th Cir. 1990).

2001This determination is based on the "totality of the circumstances." United States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 954 (7th Cir. 1990).

11
United States v. Brignoni-Poncegreen
scotus · 1975 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Reasonableness, of course, depends "on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers." Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 , and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).

2001The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Reasonableness, of course, depends "on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers." Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 , and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
In Re Marriage of LaRocque green
wis · 1987
2 sentences

2013In LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 32-33 , 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987), our supreme court advised that: These [§ 767.56] factors are the touchstone of analysis in determining or reviewing a maintenance award.

2013In LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 32-33 , 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987), our supreme court advised that: These [§ 767.56] factors are the touchstone of analysis in determining or reviewing a maintenance award.

21994–2013
Schmeling v. Phelps green
wisctapp · 1997
2 sentences

2025The agricultural-land rationale discussed above easily satisfies this standard. ¶57 The landowner attempts to bolster its constitutional argument by taking out of context and embellishing on one statement in Schmeling v. Phelps, 212 Wis. 2d 898, 917 , 569 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1997).

2025The agricultural-land rationale discussed above easily satisfies this standard. ¶57 The landowner attempts to bolster its constitutional argument by taking out of context and embellishing on one statement in Schmeling v. Phelps, 212 Wis. 2d 898, 917 , 569 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1997).

12025–2025
State v. McQuay green
wis · 1990
2 sentences

2021Wisconsin courts have explained that, subject to limitations not applicable here, sentencing courts should be in “possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics,” State v. Knapp, 111 Wis. 2d 380, 385 , 330 N.W.2d 242 (Ct. App. 1983), and that it is against public policy for the prosecutor and the defendant to make an agreement to conceal or withhold relevant information from the sentencing court, State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 127-28 , 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990). ¶25 On the other hand, other cases have imposed limits on the scope of independent

2021Wisconsin courts have explained that, subject to limitations not applicable here, sentencing courts should be in “possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics,” State v. Knapp, 111 Wis. 2d 380, 385 , 330 N.W.2d 242 (Ct. App. 1983), and that it is against public policy for the prosecutor and the defendant to make an agreement to conceal or withhold relevant information from the sentencing court, State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 127-28 , 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990). ¶25 On the other hand, other cases have imposed limits on the scope of independent

12021–2021
State v. Kelsey C.R. green
wis · 2001
1 sentence

2021Kelsey C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, ¶34 .

12021–2021
State v. Knapp green
wisctapp · 1983
2 sentences

2021Wisconsin courts have explained that, subject to limitations not applicable here, sentencing courts should be in “possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics,” State v. Knapp, 111 Wis. 2d 380, 385 , 330 N.W.2d 242 (Ct. App. 1983), and that it is against public policy for the prosecutor and the defendant to make an agreement to conceal or withhold relevant information from the sentencing court, State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 127-28 , 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990). ¶25 On the other hand, other cases have imposed limits on the scope of independent

2021Wisconsin courts have explained that, subject to limitations not applicable here, sentencing courts should be in “possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics,” State v. Knapp, 111 Wis. 2d 380, 385 , 330 N.W.2d 242 (Ct. App. 1983), and that it is against public policy for the prosecutor and the defendant to make an agreement to conceal or withhold relevant information from the sentencing court, State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 127-28 , 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990). ¶25 On the other hand, other cases have imposed limits on the scope of independent

12021–2021
State v. Henning green
wis · 2004
2 sentences

2019Nonetheless, we note that the touchstone test for such a challenge is the “elements-only” test, i.e., where “one offense is not the ‘same offense’ as another when ‘each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’” State v. Henning, 2004 WI 89, ¶17 , 273 Wis. 2d 352 , 681 N.W.2d 871 (citations omitted).

2019Nonetheless, we note that the touchstone test for such a challenge is the “elements-only” test, i.e., where “one offense is not the ‘same offense’ as another when ‘each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’” State v. Henning, 2004 WI 89, ¶17 , 273 Wis. 2d 352 , 681 N.W.2d 871 (citations omitted).

12019–2019
State v. Popke green
wis · 2009
2 sentences

2015Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶ 11 ; see also Houghton, 364 Wis. 2d 234, ¶ 29 ("It is undisputed that traffic stops must be reasonable under the circumstances.") (citing Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d at 605 ).

2015IV. 22 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 ("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."); Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, ¶21 (a court must "carefully scrutinize the totality of the circumstances."). 23 Popke, 317 Wis. 2d 118, ¶11 ; see also Houghton, 364 Wis. 2d 234, ¶29 ("It is

12015–2015
State v. Marinez green
wisctapp · 2010
2 sentences

2010See D.M.D. v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 313, 318 , 195 N.W.2d 594 (1972); State v. Marinez, 2010 WI App 34, ¶ 21 , 324 Wis. 2d 282 , 781 N.W.2d 511 . ¶ 52.

2010See D.M.D. v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 313, 318 , 195 N.W.2d 594 (1972); State v. Marinez, 2010 WI App 34, ¶ 21 , 324 Wis. 2d 282 , 781 N.W.2d 511 . ¶ 52.

12010–2010
Berkemer v. McCarty green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

2001But I view as the touchstone the rule that, in deciding whether a suspect is in custody, courts look at "how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situa tion." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 .

2001But I view as the touchstone the rule that, in deciding whether a suspect is in custody, courts look at "how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." *390 Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 .

12001–2001
Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance green
wis · 1975
1 sentence

1999Id. at 13 . ¶ 19.

11999–1999

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WI § Wis. Stat. § 805.17 (5) WI § Wis. Stat. § 808.10 (4) WI § Wis. Stat. § 968.24 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

OH 467 (1982–2026) CA 52 (1978–2026) MA 36 (1988–2026) PA 35 (1980–2026) NY 33 (1914–2026) TX 30 (1976–2022) WA 26 (1976–2026) IL 21 (1985–2021) TN 17 (2001–2019) WI 15 (1994–2025) GA 15 (2012–2024) MD 15 (1979–2023) AZ 13 (1979–2022) OR 12 (2008–2022) MI 12 (1978–2024) AR 11 (1991–2024) CT 10 (1991–2016) IA 10 (2000–2019) FL 10 (1980–2024) VA 9 (1994–2025) MN 9 (1978–2023) UT 8 (2003–2019) MO 7 (1980–2023) NJ 7 (1975–2022) DC 7 (1991–2024) KY 5 (2023–2025) IN 5 (2001–2023) ME 5 (1973–2025) VT 4 (2008–2025) NE 4 (2008–2016) NM 4 (2009–2020) NC 4 (2012–2026) NH 4 (1985–2019) HI 4 (1973–2025) MS 4 (2002–2026) RI 3 (1993–2015) DE 3 (2019–2025) OK 3 (1997–2006) LA 3 (1996–2021) MT 3 (1979–2023) AL 2 (2000–2013) WY 2 (1989–2003) ID 2 (2018–2018) VI 2 (2011–2012) AK 2 (1979–2024) SC 2 (2013–2022)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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