Fifth Amendment privilege in Tennessee

2024Shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” “[T]he Fifth Amendment’s exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).

2022V; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding “the Fifth Amendment’s exception from compulsory self-incrimination” applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).

2025In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court -8- established procedural safeguards to secure the Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).

2025In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court -8- established procedural safeguards to secure the Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).

2022At that point, he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege.’” State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966)).

2013At that point, he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege.’” State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966)).

2025Moreover, while direct comments on a defendant’s exercise of the right provide clearer evidence of a due process violation, “‘indirect references on the failure to testify also can violate the Fifth Amendment privilege.’” Id. at 587 (quoting Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 533 (6th Cir. 2000); citing Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266 , 282 n.10 (Tenn. 2011); Morris v. State, 537 S.W.2d 721, 723-24 (Tenn. Crim.

2025Moreover, while direct comments on a defendant’s exercise of the right provide clearer evidence of a due process violation, “‘indirect references on the failure to testify also can violate the Fifth Amendment privilege.’” Id. at 587 (quoting Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 533 (6th Cir. 2000); citing Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266 , 282 n.10 (Tenn. 2011); Morris v. State, 537 S.W.2d 721, 723-24 (Tenn. Crim.

2025However, our case law is clear that “[n]either side has a right to benefit from any inferences the jury may draw simply from the witness’ assertion of the privilege either alone or in conjunction with questions that have been put to him.” Dicks, 615 S.W.2d at 129 ; see also State v. Rollins, 188 S.W.3d 553, 569 (Tenn. 2006) (noting that a witness’s invocation of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury may have “a disproportionate impact on [the jury’s] deliberations”) (quoting State v. Bowles, 439 F.2d 536, 541-42 (D.C.

2022Next, the State argued that, pursuant to State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126 (Tenn. 1981), defense counsel should not ask the victim questions about her pending charges for theft in Greene County if the court knew in advance that the victim planned on asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

2019Negative Inferences Courts have recognized that, in a civil proceeding where the parties are on a “somewhat equal footing” and one of the parties invokes his or her Fifth Amendment privilege, the invocation of the privilege ‘“should not obliterate another party’s right to a fair proceeding.’” Akers v. Prime Succession of Tennessee, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 495, 506 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Serafino v. Hasbro, Inc., 82 F.3d 515, 518 (1st Cir. 1996)).

2016See Akers v. Prime Succession of Tenn., Inc., 387 S.W.3d 495, 506 (Tenn. 2012); In re Nickolas E., No. M2009-01888-COA-R3-PT, 2010 WL 454809 , at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2010) (“[T]here is no constitutional infirmity in the ability of the trial court to draw a negative inference from the parent not testifying or to consider evidence obtained over the parent‟s Fifth Amendment objection in a proceeding to terminate that parent‟s parental rights.”).

2025Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981) (“We can discern no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty phases of respondent’s capital murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege is concerned.”); see also Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326 (1998) (extending Estelle’s holding to noncapital cases).

2025Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981) (“We can discern no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty phases of respondent’s capital murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege is concerned.”); see also Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326 (1998) (extending Estelle’s holding to noncapital cases).

2021First, we address the Defendant’s contention that his waiver could not have been knowing because he “did not have ‘any idea’ what Detective Spearman wanted to speak with him about.” This court has held that “the failure of law enforcement officials to inform a suspect of all the possible subjects of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his or her Fifth Amendment privilege.” State v. Green, 995 S.W.2d 591, 600 (Tenn. Crim.

2016Contrary to the Defendant‟s argument, “the failure of law enforcement officials to inform a suspect of all the possible subjects of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his or her Fifth Amendment privilege.” State v. Green, 995 S.W.2d 591, 600 (Tenn. Crim.

2015State v. Dooley, 29 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Tenn. Crim.

2013Turning first to the defendant’s argument that Brooks’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights was insufficient for admission of his interview as a prior inconsistent statement, we note that “[a] trial witness other than the accused in a criminal prosecution may not claim a blanket Fifth Amendment immunity from giving relevant testimony simply because certain questions . . . might elicit incriminating answers.” State v. Dooley, 29 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Tenn. Crim.

2012Id. at 674 ; see also Brown, 422 U.S. at 599 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)) (holding that when considering whether a statement obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed, the question is “whether [the statement] ‘was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.’”).

2012Id. at 674 ; see also Brown, 422 U.S. at 599 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)) (holding that when considering whether a statement obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed, the question is “whether [the statement] ‘was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.’”).

2025“A criminal defendant lacks standing to complain of the violation of a third party’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 479 (Tenn. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Miller, 638 S.W.3d 136 (Tenn. 2021); State v. Hardy, 2009 WL 2733821 , at *6 (Tenn. Crim.

2025“A criminal defendant lacks standing to complain of the violation of a third party’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 479 (Tenn. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Miller, 638 S.W.3d 136 (Tenn. 2021); State v. Hardy, 2009 WL 2733821 , at *6 (Tenn. Crim.

2019See generally Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980).

2019See generally Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980).

2012Id. at 674 ; see also Brown, 422 U.S. at 599 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)) (holding that when considering whether a statement obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed, the question is “whether [the statement] ‘was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.’”).

2012Id. at 674 ; see also Brown, 422 U.S. at 599 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)) (holding that when considering whether a statement obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed, the question is “whether [the statement] ‘was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.’”).

2005The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects an accused “from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.... ” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).

2005The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects an accused “from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.... ” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).

2013“The Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege.” Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 , 107 S.Ct. 851 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987) (emphasis added).

2013“The Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege.” Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 , 107 S.Ct. 851 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987) (emphasis added).

2008Because of the pressures inherent in custodial interrogations, “the Court in Miranda was impelled to adopt the extraordinary safeguard of excluding statements made without a knowing and intelligent waiver of the privilege [against self-incrimination].” Garner v. U.S., 424 U.S. at 657 , 96 S.Ct. at 1184 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). “[T]he Miranda Court required the exclusion of incriminating statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after being suitably warned of his ri

2008Because of the pressures inherent in custodial interrogations, “the Court in Miranda was impelled to adopt the extraordinary safeguard of excluding statements made without a knowing and intelligent waiver of the privilege [against self-incrimination].” Garner v. U.S., 424 U.S. at 657 , 96 S.Ct. at 1184 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). “[T]he Miranda Court required the exclusion of incriminating statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after being suitably warned of his ri

2018Privilege Against Self-Incrimination First, the Defendant argues that “Charles Maples was not entitled to the privilege against self-incrimination.” According to the Defendant, “Mr. Maples asserted the privilege against self-incrimination only as a pretext to evade testifying at [the Defendant’s] trial”; “[i]nstead, Mr. Maples’ concern was that his testimony would incriminate Tony Dix[s]on, who would then, retaliate against him either personally or through another member of Rollin Crips gang.” The Defendant relies on Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001), which holds that the Fifth Amendment

2018Privilege Against Self-Incrimination First, the Defendant argues that “Charles Maples was not entitled to the privilege against self-incrimination.” According to the Defendant, “Mr. Maples asserted the privilege against self-incrimination only as a pretext to evade testifying at [the Defendant’s] trial”; “[i]nstead, Mr. Maples’ concern was that his testimony would incriminate Tony Dix[s]on, who would then, retaliate against him either personally or through another member of Rollin Crips gang.” The Defendant relies on Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001), which holds that the Fifth Amendment

2021Evid. 804(a), (b)(3); State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 392 (Tenn. 2008) (stating that the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination renders a declarant “unavailable” for purposes of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804); see also State v. Charles Sanderson, No. M2007-00387-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 624922 , at *8 (Tenn. Crim.

2021Evid. 804(a), (b)(3); State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 392 (Tenn. 2008) (stating that the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination renders a declarant “unavailable” for purposes of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804); see also State v. Charles Sanderson, No. M2007-00387-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 624922 , at *8 (Tenn. Crim.

2017See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53 (1987) (recognizing the right to testify as a corollary to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).

2017See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53 (1987) (recognizing the right to testify as a corollary to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).