Fifth Amendment privilege in Indiana

2024“The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's silence.” Moore v. State, 669 N.E.2d 733, 739 (Ind. 1996).

2024“The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's silence.” Moore v. State, 669 N.E.2d 733, 739 (Ind. 1996).

2016Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2015). 5 “Whether a prosecutor’s argument constitutes misconduct is measured by reference to case law and the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id. (citation omitted). [19] The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” “‘The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self- incrimination is violated when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’

2016Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2015). 5 “Whether a prosecutor’s argument constitutes misconduct is measured by reference to case law and the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id. (citation omitted). [19] The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” “‘The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self- incrimination is violated when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’

2020Request for an Attorney [19] “The right to have counsel present during [custodial] interrogation ‘is indispensable’ to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination.” Jolley v. State, 684 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)).

2020Request for an Attorney [19] “The right to have counsel present during [custodial] interrogation ‘is indispensable’ to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination.” Jolley v. State, 684 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)).

2014Recognizing the difficulties confronting a party to a civil case, whose testimony in the civil proceeding may require a decision to assert or waive the Fifth Amendment privilege 7 against self-incrimination, “‘courts in civil proceedings have taken steps to ensure that the litigation proceeds in a manner consistent with the interests of justice.’” Hardiman, 4 N.E.3d at 1152 .

2014Recognizing the difficulties confronting a party to a civil case, whose testimony in the civil proceeding may require a decision to assert or waive the Fifth Amendment privilege 7 against self-incrimination, “‘courts in civil proceedings have taken steps to ensure that the litigation proceeds in a manner consistent with the interests of justice.’” Hardiman, 4 N.E.3d at 1152 .

2018“To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must—at the time the alleged misconduct occurs—request an admonishment to the jury, and if further relief is desired, move for a mistrial.” Id. [20] “The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is violated ‘when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence.’” Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1113, 1118 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Moore v. State, 669 N.E.2d 733, 739 (Ind. 1996)).

2018“To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must—at the time the alleged misconduct occurs—request an admonishment to the jury, and if further relief is desired, move for a mistrial.” Id. [20] “The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is violated ‘when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence.’” Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1113, 1118 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Moore v. State, 669 N.E.2d 733, 739 (Ind. 1996)).

2014And we do not intend to suggest that they must, but "[t]he purpose underlying the Miranda warnings is to protect an individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by placing reasonable limitations on police interrogations,” Sauerheber v. State, 698 N.E.2d 796, 801-02 (Ind.1998), and to effectuate that purpose they warn a suspect specifically as to those limitations.

2014And we do not intend to suggest that they must, but "[t]he purpose underlying the Miranda warnings is to protect an individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by placing reasonable limitations on police interrogations,” Sauerheber v. State, 698 N.E.2d 796, 801-02 (Ind.1998), and to effectuate that purpose they warn a suspect specifically as to those limitations.

2014See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688-89 , 113 S.Ct. 1745 , 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). “[T]his prohibition not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial ... but also ‘privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.’ ” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 , 94 S.Ct. 316 , 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973)); see also Clifft v. Ind. Dep’t

2014See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688-89 , 113 S.Ct. 1745 , 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). “[T]his prohibition not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial ... but also ‘privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.’ ” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 , 94 S.Ct. 316 , 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973)); see also Clifft v. Ind. Dep’t

2014A civil defendant who chooses to avail himself of this protection, however, does so at his peril: “the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.” Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976); see also Morgan v. Kendall, 124 Ind. 454 , 24 N.E. 143, 145 (1890) (holding a defendant’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege during his trial testimony “was a matter proper to be considered by the jury”).

2014A civil defendant who chooses to avail himself of this protection, however, does so at his peril: “the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.” Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 , 96 S.Ct. 1551 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976); see also Morgan v. Kendall, 124 Ind. 454 , 24 N.E. 143, 145 (1890) (holding a defendant’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege during his trial testimony “was a matter proper to be considered by the jury”).

2019In other words, “an agency relationship implicates Miranda only if the suspect is aware enough of the underlying police involvement to create a ‘coercive atmosphere.’” D.Z., 100 N.E.3d at 249 (quoting Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296 ). “[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned ‘with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.’” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985)). [14] Evidentiary rulings involving Miranda present “a mixed question of fact and law.” State v. Ruiz, No. 19S-CR-3

2010Whether a product of the detective's natural style or a caleulated technique, such an interrogation style is not inherently coercive because it does not threaten, cause injury, or evoke fear. "[The Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned 'with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.'" Berghuis, 560 U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 2263, 176 L.Ed.2d at 1114 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 523 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 486 (1986) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 , 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1290 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 229

2018The State asserted that Peterson’s request that his sex offender designation be removed was a request that could not be granted because he had already been granted relief in his First SORA Petition. 3 In Bleeke v. Lemmon, 6 N.E.3d 907, 940 (Ind. 2014), our Indiana Supreme Court discussed the SOMM Program, explained that it “is a valuable tool aimed at the legitimate purpose of rehabilitating sex offenders before they are fully released from State control,” and held that “its requirements do not violate the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” Court of Appeals of Indiana | M

2016See 6 N.E.3d at 940 (“[The SOMM program’s] requirements do not violate the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.”).

2020Request for an Attorney [19] “The right to have counsel present during [custodial] interrogation ‘is indispensable’ to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination.” Jolley v. State, 684 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)).

2020Request for an Attorney [19] “The right to have counsel present during [custodial] interrogation ‘is indispensable’ to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination.” Jolley v. State, 684 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)).

2019See id. at 185-91 , 133 S.Ct. 2174 (a plurality opinion holding that a witness does not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination by simply standing mute and that the prosecution's use of the defendant's noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the defendant failed to state that he was not answering the officer's question on Fifth Amendment grounds); Nichols , 55 N.E.3d at 860 (holding that evidence that the defendant did not accept a police officer's invitation to attend an interview did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina

2019See id. at 185-91 , 133 S.Ct. 2174 (a plurality opinion holding that a witness does not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination by simply standing mute and that the prosecution's use of the defendant's noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the defendant failed to state that he was not answering the officer's question on Fifth Amendment grounds); Nichols , 55 N.E.3d at 860 (holding that evidence that the defendant did not accept a police officer's invitation to attend an interview did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina

2019In other words, “an agency relationship implicates Miranda only if the suspect is aware enough of the underlying police involvement to create a ‘coercive atmosphere.’” D.Z., 100 N.E.3d at 249 (quoting Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296 ). “[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned ‘with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.’” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985)). [14] Evidentiary rulings involving Miranda present “a mixed question of fact and law.” State v. Ruiz, No. 19S-CR-3

2010Whether a product of the detective's natural style or a caleulated technique, such an interrogation style is not inherently coercive because it does not threaten, cause injury, or evoke fear. "[The Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned 'with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.'" Berghuis, 560 U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 2263, 176 L.Ed.2d at 1114 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 523 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 486 (1986) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 , 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1290 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 229

2020“Although the refusal to testify in a civil case cannot be used against the one asserting the privilege in a subsequent criminal proceeding, the privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit the trier of fact in a civil case from drawing adverse inferences from a witness’[s] refusal to testify.” Hardiman v. Cozmanoff, 4 N.E.3d 1148, 1151 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Gash v. Kohm, 476 N.E.2d 910, 913 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). [42] The trial court correctly found from the evidence and the inferences from the evidence that “there is no evidence that R.W. tried to stop or block [K.B.’s] harassment o

2014To consider such a detriment in the same light as the sanctions applied for exercising the fifth amendment privilege ... is simply too tenuous.” Id. at 913 (internal citations omitted).

2014The "penalty cases” were those in which "the State not only compelled an individual to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him to forgo the Fifth Amendment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions 'capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.’" Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 (quoting Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 806 , 97 S.Ct. 2132 ).

2014The "penalty cases” were those in which "the State not only compelled an individual to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him to forgo the Fifth Amendment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions 'capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.’" Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 (quoting Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 806 , 97 S.Ct. 2132 ).

2014See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688-89 , 113 S.Ct. 1745 , 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). “[T]his prohibition not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial ... but also ‘privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.’ ” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 , 94 S.Ct. 316 , 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973)); see also Clifft v. Ind. Dep’t

2014See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688-89 , 113 S.Ct. 1745 , 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). “[T]his prohibition not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial ... but also ‘privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.’ ” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 , 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 , 94 S.Ct. 316 , 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973)); see also Clifft v. Ind. Dep’t

2016See Sobolewski v. State, 889 N.E.2d 849, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

2016Sobolewski v. State, 889 N.E.2d 849, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. [16] Because Anderson’s trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s questions or comments, request a jury admonishment, or move for a mistrial, Anderson maintains that the prosecutor’s conduct constituted fundamental error. 2 We review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct by determining (1) whether misconduct occurred, and if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under all of the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected otherwise.

2024Id. [19] On appeal, this Court held: In Kastigar v. United States (1972), 406 U.S. 441 , 92 S. Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 , reh’g denied, 408 U.S. 931 , 92 S. Ct. 2478 , 33 L.Ed.2d 345 , the United States Supreme Court determined that a grant of use and derivative use immunity is coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and that a witness granted such immunity may thus be compelled to testify despite his claim of the privilege.

2024Id. [19] On appeal, this Court held: In Kastigar v. United States (1972), 406 U.S. 441 , 92 S. Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 , reh’g denied, 408 U.S. 931 , 92 S. Ct. 2478 , 33 L.Ed.2d 345 , the United States Supreme Court determined that a grant of use and derivative use immunity is coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and that a witness granted such immunity may thus be compelled to testify despite his claim of the privilege.

2017See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576-577 , 107 S. Ct. 851, 858-859 (1987) (“This Court has never held that mere silence by law enforcement officials as to the subject matter of an interrogation is ‘trickery’ sufficient to invalidate a suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights . . . . ‘[W]e have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.’”) (footnotes and internal citations omitted). “[A] suspect’s awareness of all the possible subjects of questionin

2017See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576-577 , 107 S. Ct. 851, 858-859 (1987) (“This Court has never held that mere silence by law enforcement officials as to the subject matter of an interrogation is ‘trickery’ sufficient to invalidate a suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights . . . . ‘[W]e have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.’”) (footnotes and internal citations omitted). “[A] suspect’s awareness of all the possible subjects of questionin

2019See id. at 185-91 , 133 S.Ct. 2174 (a plurality opinion holding that a witness does not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination by simply standing mute and that the prosecution's use of the defendant's noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the defendant failed to state that he was not answering the officer's question on Fifth Amendment grounds); Nichols , 55 N.E.3d at 860 (holding that evidence that the defendant did not accept a police officer's invitation to attend an interview did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina

2019See id. at 185-91 , 133 S.Ct. 2174 (a plurality opinion holding that a witness does not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination by simply standing mute and that the prosecution's use of the defendant's noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the defendant failed to state that he was not answering the officer's question on Fifth Amendment grounds); Nichols , 55 N.E.3d at 860 (holding that evidence that the defendant did not accept a police officer's invitation to attend an interview did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina

2020See, e.g., Pitman v. State, 749 N.E.2d 557, 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (probationer was not entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege with regard to basic identifying information and any disclosures which were necessary to effectively monitor her probation), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

2020See, e.g., Pitman v. State, 749 N.E.2d 557, 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (probationer was not entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege with regard to basic identifying information and any disclosures which were necessary to effectively monitor her probation), reh’g denied, trans. denied.